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A Panoramic View to 1810 
PmoR to the era of revolution the people and the govern-
ment of the United States came into contact chiefly with the border 
regions of Spain's American empire. Such areas as Florida, Texas, 
and the Greater Antilles were absorbing the attention of American 
expansionists. There was, therefore, a widespread ignorance of 
those areas of Spain's empire that would take the lead in revolu-
tion. The Gaceta de Buenos Aires, a paper founded by Mariano 
Moreno to print revolutionary propaganda, published in 1810 an 
article by the editor of the Baltimore Commercial Advertiser. The 
account stated he had found it impossible to discover anything 
about Caracas except the name and situation, and this in spite of 
searching through ten or twelve modern geographies.1 The press 
of the United State lamented the fact and numerous complaint;-; 
were heard from the people. H. M. Brackenridge, in his two-
volume Voyage to South America, was somewhat amazed that this 
was so, stating in his preface that "it would require at least six 
months to become master of all the information laboriously col-
lected." 2 
There were those who believed, as did Brackenridge, that there 
was not a deficiency in the amount of information available. The 
fault, they argued, was the failure to use material within reach.3 
Numerous volumes dealing with the South-American countries as 
a whole and as individual sections were easy to obtain. They were 
voluminous and in many instances wearisome reading, but there 
also existed a number of abridgements and compilations which were 
just as instructive and made easier reading.4 
d 1: Gaceta de Buenos Aif'e.t ( 1810-1821 ). Reimpresion facsimilar dirigida por la junta 
e hi.ttoria Y numismatica Americana (5 vols., Buenos Aires, 1910-1914), I, 369. Herein-
after cited as Gaceta. 
H 2: H~ M. Brackenridge, Voyage to South America (2 vols., Baltimore, 1819), I, vi. 




The only complaint with any justification was that satisfactory 
accounts of the actual state of the different countries of South 
America did not exist. What were the conditions of the Rfo de la 
Plata, its size, population, and products? The answers to these and 
other similar questions were not available. The press, particularly 
such publications as the North American Review and the Niles 
Weekly Register, slowly gathered this information and passed it on 
in the form of series of articles to enlighten the "reading public" on 
the history, geography, general culture, and events of South 
America. 
Nor was this ignorance a monopoly of the United States. Eng-
land, in spite of being the commercial power of the world, France, 
and other nations of Europe were in a similar situation. The reason 
was not so much the monopolistic and restrictive policies of Spain 
as the fact the Rfo de la Plata was not a great producer of gold and 
silver, was decidedly isolated from the normal trade routes of the 
period, and was in its early periods a poor, squalid territory. For 
some three centuries as a colony, under the control of the Kings 
of Spain, the region of the Rio de la Plata was one of the most 
backward and neglected areas of the Spanish-American empire. 
From its beginnings in 1536, there being no mineral wealth in 
the vicinity, Buenos Aires became an agricultural colony. The re-
sult of this was a new social organization that tended toward 
democracy because it tended toward equality. Thus, unlike Peru 
and Mexico where Spaniards were using Indians as serfs and 
there were two outstanding classes of society, the rich Spaniards 
and poor Indians, in the Rio de la Plata most were on the same 
economic level. Everyone had to work and all were only slightly 
above poverty. Agriculture, however, was made somewhat un-
attractive by the discovery of the rapidity with which horses and 
cattle multiplied on the Pampas. Peoples of the Rio de la Plata 
then lived off the exports of what today we call by-products: 
hides, horns, and tallow. 
The territory which formed the Rio de la Plata was colonized 
between 1536 and 1596 by three rival invasions of Spanish Con-
quistadores whose jealous hatred of one another was even more 
bitter than their hatred of the Indians who disputed their advance. 
The first invasion went directly frum Spain to colonize the region 
of the Plata which included the territory between the 25th and 
36th parallels and extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The 
second invasion was an extension of the conquest of Peru. It 
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moved southward through the Humahuaca Valley, following the 
trail of the Incas, who had carried their empire as far south as 
San Carlos and Tunuyan in Mendoza Province. This colonizing 
stream founded the city of Santiago del Estero, and later spread out 
over the provinces of Tucuman, Salta, Jujuy, La Rioja, Catamarca, 
Santiago del Estero, Cordoba, and part of the territory of the 
Chaco. The third invasion entered from Chile and divided into 
two branches. One of these continued the occupation of Tucu-
man. The other occupied the region then known as Cuyo, which 
included the present provinces of Mendoza, San Luis, and San 
Juan, and then extended itself into the territory of Nuequen and 
parts of the territories of La Pampa and Rio Negro. · In these 
movements rested the original territorial claims which became the 
objectives of the embryonic national state in 1810. That new state 
chose to overlook the royal cedula of 1617, by which the Crown 
separated Paraguay from Buenos Aires, placing them under the 
jurisdiction of the viceroy at Lima as two distinct colonies, and 
correctly claimed that the establishment of the viceroyalty in 1776 
had voided this cedula. 
In 1776, partly owing to Portuguese aggression, the important 
resolution was taken to separate the provinces of the Rio de la Plata 
from their dependence upon the government of Peru and to create 
a new viceroyalty with Don Pedro Cevallos, governor of Buenos 
Aires from 1757 to 1766, as the first viceroy. The capital of this 
viceroyalty was Buenos Aires, and it comprised the provinces of 
Buenos Aires, Paraguay, Cordova, Salta, Potosi, La Plata, Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra or Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno, besides the 
subordinate governments of Montevideo, Moxos, and Chiquitos, 
and the Missions on the rivers Uruguay and Pararni. 
Sir Woodbine Parish, Vice-President of the Royal Geographical 
Society of London and for many years British Charge D'Affairs at 
Buenos Aires, saw in the choice of Don Pedro Cevallos as viceroy 
further indication of stiffening resistance on the part of Spain to 
Portuguese encroachments in the Banda Oriental. Cevallos, as 
Governor of Buenos Aires, had opposed the Portuguese with vigor, 
even to the point of war in 1762. Parish commented that "the 
most formidable armament which had ever been sent by Spain to 
America was placed at his [Cevallos] command: it consisted of 
10,000 men, embarked in 116 ships, which convoyed by 12 men-of-
war, sailed from Spain in 1776." 5 With this force Cevallos took 
5. Sir Woodbine Parish, Bueno• Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata: From 
T(;:::dDucovery and Conquest by the Spaniards to the Establishment of Their Independence 
n on, 1852), 64. Hereinafter cited as Parish, Buenos Ayres. 
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the island of Santa Caterina, after which he proceeded to Colonia,6 
driving the Portuguese from all their possessions in that area. 7 
Because of two deliberate policies of Spain, neglect and severe 
restrictions, Buenos Aires had grown very slowly.8 The establish-
ment of Rio de la Plata as a viceroyalty gave impetus to trade and 
commerce, and broke down the old restrictions against migration 
into the area. The liberties granted must not, however, be inter-
preted too broadly, for as with all the Spanish colonies they were 
closely controlled. Even the history of their own country, unless 
written by an approved Spaniard, was withheld from them.9 
Another impetus was given to life in Buenos Aires with the 
British invasion under Sir Home Popham. Even so, in 1810, Buenos 
Aires had a long way to go to reach the living standards of other 
cities of the world. The city itself probably had a population of 
about 46,000, 10 although Sir Home Popham reported 70,000 in 
1806.11 For the entire Rio de la Plata the Weekly Register esti-
mated about 1,900,000 "souls." 12 While the city was not preten-
tious, and life not as agreeable to those who "were accustomed to 
6. For the repeated capture and return of Colonia, see D. Antokoletz, Histoire de la 
Diplomatie Argentine (Paris, 1914), 54-60. H ereinafter cited as Antokoletz, Histoire. 
7. Parish, Buenos Ayres, 64. 
8. Its increase was about 130 persons a year according to V. F. L6pez, Historia de la 
Republic Argentina: su origen, su revoluclon, y su desa"ollo poUtico hasta 1852 ( Buenos 
Aires, 1883 ), I, Cap. xxvi. Hereinafter cited as L6pez, Historia. L6pez points out that 
in 1608 Buenos Aires had 2000 inhabitants and in 1778 had 24,205. Parish gives a 
tabluation of the Census of 1778 showing 15,719 Europeans and Creoles; 544 Indians; 
674 Mestizos; 3,153 Mulattoes; 4,115 Negroes. In the country districts were 12,925 persons 
and 550 more in Ecclesiastical establishments. Total 37,680. Parish, Buenos Ayres, Ap-
pendix VIII, 418. To these numbers some additions should be made for short returns, 
particularly from the country districts, not only from the difficulty in collecting them but 
from the disposition of the people to evade any such attempt of the authorities to take a 
particular account of them. The military, too, are not included in the numbers given, 
although only two years before no less than 10,000 men were sent from Spain to carry on 
the war against the Portuguese, in addition to the troops already in the country. 
9. The following Decree, by Jose de Galvez, the Spanish Minister in 1779, prohibiting 
Dr. William Robertson's History of America, must be seen to be believed. 
"Circular 
El E,ano. Sr. virey de estas provincias en oficio de 7 del presente me dice lo siguiente. 
El Sr. D. Jose de Galbez, en carta de 22 de Deciembre d el aiio pr6ximo pasado, me 
dici lo siguiente: El Dr. Guillermo Robertson, Rector de la Universidad de Edinburgo, y 
cronista de Escocia, ha escrito y publicado, en idioma Ingles, la historia del discubrimiento 
de la America; y teniendo el rey justos motivos para que dicha obra no se introduzca en 
Espana ni sus Indias, ha resuelto su magestad, que con el mayor rigor y vigilancia, se 
impida su embarco para las Americas, y Filipinas, ni en el idioma Ingles, ni en ningun 
otra a que se ha traducido, 6 se traduzca: y que si hubiese algunas partidas, 6 ejemplares 
de dicha obra, en los puertos de unos u otros dominios 6 introducidos ya tierra a dentro, 
se detengan y embarguen a disposicion del ministerio de mi cargo. Y de su real orden, 
se lo participo a V. E. para que tomando las providencias mas estrechas y convenientes 
es esta jurisdiccion, tenga el debido cumplimiento esta resolucion: cuya real orden translado 
a V. S. literal, a fin de que espida las mas eficaces, y conducentes a su cumplimiento, 
en esta jurisdiccion de su cargo." Quoted in Parish, Buenos Ayres, 91. 
10. For a discussion of the population see L6pez, Historia, I, Cap. xxvi. Parish, 
Buenos Ayres, 111, shows 40,000, although he also gives the figure 72,000, in ibid., 69. 
11. Nuea Weekly Register, V, 82. 
12. Ibid. 
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English comforts," 13 still it boasted a cathedral, a viceroy's palace, 
and a fort which were called splendid and magnificent buildings.14 
Street paving had been started, as well as night illumination by 
candles.15 There was at least one theater where the women all 
sat in the boxes and the men, regardless of station in life, sat in the 
pits.16 The private homes were not of the type to please an English-
man, who would consider them dirty, damp, and moldy, with poorly 
"paved floors" and badly heated by small charcoal fires.17 The 
butcher shops were disagreeable objects, being only covered carts, 
and the slaughter yard was just on the edge of the city, any edge.18 
One could hire a horse coach to take him to or bring him from 
the theater or one of the several pulperias, providing it was not 
raining.19 In many respects life in the city of Buenos Aires in 1810 
was not too different from life in other cities of the world, and 
dress and manners were the same as those of Spain.20 While other 
large cities of the Rio de la Plata were in smiliar condition, life in 
the country was on a par with that of the Indian. The prestige of 
being a viceroyalty, and the resultant increase in trade and com-
merce, plus the British invasion, created a new spirit in the Rio de 
la Plata, particularly in Buenos Aires. 
The British established many contacts with Spanish America 
between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Their earliest 
interest probably dates back to May 4, 1493, when exclusive title 
to what is now called Latin America was granted to Spain and 
Portugal by Pope Alexander VI. The hatred England held for 
Spain and jealousy of Spanish wealth and power resulted in men 
such as Drake and Hawkins raiding in the Caribbean as a means of 
destroying Spanish ambition in Europe. The great burst of energy 
and interest born in the Elizabethan period faded in the Stuart. 
There were intermittent periods from 1654 to 1804 which saw a 
renewal of interest, but these bore little fruit. The plans of Crom-
well as projected in his "Western Design" in 1654, owing to the 
failure of his commanders, resulted in bringing into the English 
13. Frances B. H ead, Rough Notes taken during Some Rapid Journeys acros, the 
Pampas and Among the Ande:, (London, 1826), 30. Hereinafter cited as Head, Rough 
Notes. 
14. Niles Weekly Register, V, 82. 
15. This form of street lighting was introduced by the second viceroy, Juan Jose 
Vertiz, and was used until replaced by oil lamps in 1840. 
16. Head, Rough Notes, 30. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., 32. 
19. Horse coaches were still so scarce that those who let them would not permit them 
out in the rain. Ibid., 32. 
20. Niles Weekly Register, V, 82. 
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fold only Jamaica. The Scots attempted in 1695 to take over 
Darien, but failed. In 1739, under the leadership of Sir Robert 
Wal pole, given impetus by a great public outburst, England en-
tered into the War of Jenkins' Ear. At this time Wal pole engaged 
in ~o expeditions against Panama, but the entire movement be-
came absorbed in the larger and more important conflict, the War 
of the Austrian Succession. Cuba, the Floridas, and Manila had 
been seized by Pitt, the elder, but Cuba and Manila were given up 
in the. Paris peace negotiations. England's interest in the balance 
of power, and her continental entanglements as a result of this in-
terest, plus her concentration upon the French colonial empire, 
saved the Spanish colonies for Spain. 
While the British lost their acquisitions in the Spanish empire in 
America, two factors caused the English interest to continue to de-
velop. One was the British policy, many times displayed, of diversi-
fied risks. The continental policy of England could be balanced 
by the South-American colonies. In the thinking of the British 
government it would be pure folly to enter unreservedly any 
European conflict without an alternative plan to secure costs or 
possible losses. Second, because of weakness and internal rot 
which was robbing Spain of its strength, the English merchants were 
selling their goods to Spain, which was in turn sending these goods 
to the colonies. As this trade became increasingly important the 
English merchant had his eyes opened to the full possibilities latent 
in the vast territory of the Spanish colonies. 
English interest in the area greatly expanded in 1715, after the 
Peace of Utrecht. At this time the English obtained the Asiento, 
or contract for supplying the Spanish colonies in America with 
African slaves. By virtue of this they had the right to form an 
establishment with not over six men to supervise it, to till the soil 
for the maintenance of the slaves until sold,21 and to send to Buenos 
Aires four ships -annually with 1200 Negroes,22 the value of which 
they were permitted to export in produce of the country. They 
were strictly forbidden to introduce any goods other than those 
necessary for their own establishment. The temptation to evade 
the regulations was irresistible, particularly among a people who 
were in absolute want of clothing and willing to pay almost any 
price for it. The Asiento ships became the means of carrying on 
21. J. B. Williams, "The Establishment of British Commerce with Argentina," Hispanic 
American Historical Review, XV ( 1935 ), 44. Hereinafter cited as Williams, "British 
Commerce" in HAHR. 
22. As there were only 4,115 Negroes in Buenos Aires in 1778 the British apparently 
made little pretense of a slave trade in this region of Spanish America. 
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a contraband traffic which was justified by a necessity which 
recognized no other law. In this manner there developed a large 
and lucrative contraband trade which whetted the appetites of the 
British merchants,23 and by 1736 "a hitt [hit] in the Illicit Trade" 
was considered to be "like getting a great prize in a Lottery." 24 
Spain's efforts to maintain her monopoly were not entirely un-
successful, resulting in a violent fluctuation of volume and profits for 
those involved in carrying on contraband trade. In spite of this the 
feeling grew in England that there were great possibilities in the 
South-American market. By 1804, the magic wand of the Indus-
trial Revolution had wrought great change upon English industry, 
and cotton, woolen, iron, and leather goods were pouring from 
the mills in ever increasing amounts. However, war upon the con-
tinent had forced consumption far behind production, making the 
potential markets of Latin America particularly inviting. 
The difficulty with such an opportunity to relieve the English 
surplus rested in the problem of how to open the market. This 
problem was thrown into the hands of William Pitt, First Lord of 
the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Pitt, faced with 
war on the Continent against Napoleon, with the Third Coalition 
hanging fire and Napoleon threatening an invasion of England, 
felt that the British could not afford the men, ships or money neces-
sary to force open a series of new markets or risk an additional war 
with Spain. There was little hope that ~pain would open them 
of her own accord. The only answer to such a problem was revo-
lution; therefore, for a short time the English government some-
what surreptitiously toyed with the policy of aiding and abetting 
revolution between the colonies and their mother country. 
Outstanding advocates of such a policy were Francisco de 
Miranda, William Burke, and Sir Home Popham. 25 It was quite 
possible for England of the nineteenth century to work with 
Miranda, who wanted independence for his homeland. British 
policy, in changing from conquest to one of commercial interest, 
placed in Miranda's hands something to offer England in return for 
English aid. 
23. The English were not the worst contrabandists in the Rfo de la Plata. The 
Treaty of Utrecht also secured to the Portuguese the important settlement of Colonia de 
~acramento. This position afforded them every facility of communication with the neighbor-
ing settlements of the Spaniard, and although by the same treaty the Crown of Portugal 
was solemnly engaged to prohibit all smuggling, they abundantly supplied Buenos Aires, 
Paraguay, aud Tucuman. 
~4. George H. Nelson, "Contraband Trade under the Asiento," American Historical 
Review, LI(l945), 62. Hereinafter cited as Nelson, "Contraband Trade" in AHR. 
25. For a discussion of these men, their many plots and pleas see William S. Robert-
son: "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America," American H is-
torical Association Report, 1(1907), 197-210. 
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In an effort to put an end to smuggling, Charles III had insti-
tuted a number of reforms in the old Spanish system, a system 
which had made the entire trade of Spain with America little 
better than a monopoly in the hands of the merchants of Seville 
and Cadiz. The major reform measures originated with Don 
Jose de Galvez, minister for the department of the Indies. Galvez 
had spent many years in America, and having personally witnessed 
the effects of the oppressive Spanish system was aware of how 
greatly Spain was the loser. 
In 1764 periodical packets were established which left from 
Corunna for all the principal ports in the colonies with permission 
to carry out cargoes of Spanish manufactures and to import in re-
turn colonial produce. In addition, direct intercourse was also 
granted for the first time with Cuba and the other islands of the 
West Indies. In 1774 all the colonies were allowed to open trade 
with one another. 
These reforms were followed in 1778 by a new commercial code 
given the title of "Free Trade Regulations." The Free Trade Regu-
lations, however, continued to maintain the basic concept of 
monopoly as found in the old Spanish system. Trade was still ex-
clusively confined to Spaniards and Spanish shipping, while the 
tariff was based entirely upon the principle of protection to Spanish 
industry. In spite of these features there were great changes in 
the regulation of colonial commerce. For ten years Spanish manu-
factures such as cotton, wool, linen, and glass were allowed to be 
shipped duty free for the colonies, as were the principal articles of 
raw produce from America imported in return, such as cotton, 
coffee, sugar, cochineal, indigo, and copper. Nine ports in Spain 
and twenty-four in the colonies were declared ports of entry.26 
However, Spain~s weakness and the size of her American em-
pire forced her, in the years between 1796 and 1804, into a vacillat-
ing policy of opening and closing her ports to neutral trade. This 
policy was instigated as a result of war with England in 1796, forc-
ing the Spanish government to issue a royal order, November 18, 
26. There is little question that these reforms were of great benefit to Buenos Airt:s. 
When it is recalled that just at this time Buenos Aires had been made the capital of the 
Viceroyalty of La Plata, that a considerable portion of the trade of Peru was now diverted 
to Buenos Aires, and that Spain had turned her attention to the aggressive moves of the 
Portuguese in this region, these reforms were bound to result in increased commercial 
activity and immigration in Buenos Aires. Parish points out the result in one product, 
hides. He states that "before the n ew regulations of 1778 the exports to Spain were 
calculated to average not more than 150,000 yearly. Afterwards, they rose to from 
700 000 to 800 000· in one year, 1783, upon the conclusion of peace with England, the 
extr~ordinary n~b;r of 1,400,000 were shipped to Europe. Prices rose in proportion 
to the increased d emand and instead of two or three ships, there sailed from seventy to 
eighty annually from the Rfo d e la Plata for the ports of Spain." Parish, Buenos Ayres, 69 
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1797, which threw the ports open to trade with neutral nations.27 
These privileges, except for foodstuffs, were revoked April 18, 1799, 
but so many protests resulted that in 1801 a system was set up 
whereby licenses could be sold to neutrals. 
The Free Trade Regulations were restored in 1802 as a result 
of peace, but because of war had to be abolished again in 1804. 
At this time the Spanish government introduced the contract sys-
tem which granted to individuals the right to sell licenses. This 
was the system in operation at the time of the British invasion of 
Buenos Aires under Sir Home Popham. The British then took con-
trol, and by an Order in Council September 17, 1806, "Buenos Aires 
was declared British and open to trade in British and Argentine 
ships." 28 However, the British were pushed out and this oppor-
tunity was lost to them. Spanish authority reinstated the Laws of 
the Indies in July, 1807.29 
The reforms, noble though they may have seemed to Spanish 
eyes, were not enough. Buenos Aires was a growing city, its wealth 
was increasing and so were the demands for manufactured goods 
which Spain was unable to supply. Smuggling persisted and the 
foreign powers continued to gather, as General Bartolome Mitre 
has said, "the best fruits, which Spain in her blindness has denied 
herself"; he added that "the contraband trade constituted the true 
commerce, and its operations were carried on with the regularity 
of a lawful act for the protection of the common interest. The 
merchants of the ports had agents for this purpose in Rio de Janeiro 
and Lisbon and even in Seville." The authorities were not able 
to suppress it and had to tolerate it or consent to it, as a fact or as 
a necessity.30 But this was not enough for the British, and they 
turned their attention to the numerous plans and schemes which 
had been placed before them. William Pitt was apparently greatly 
impressed with the possibilities he found in the plans of Miranda 
and, for a time at least, seemed to be ready to put them into opera-
tion. Nevertheless, shortly before his death, he used Miranda 
merely as a club over the head of the Spanish crown and sacrificed 
Miranda's plans on the altar of the Third Coalition.31 The story of 
27. Emilio Ravignani, El virreinato del R£o de la Plata (Buenos Aires, 1938) 148. 
Hereinafter cited as Ravignani, Virreinato. ' 
28. J.B. Williams, "British Commerce" in HAHR, XV ( 1935), 47 . 
. 29: Doro~y B. Goebel, "British Trade to the Spanish Colonies," Hispanic American 
Histoncal Review, XLIII (1938), 308. Hereinafter cited as Goebel, "British Trade" in 
RAHR. 
30. ~artolome Mitre, Historia de Belgrano y de la Independencia Argentina (3 vols. 
Buenos Arres, 1859), I, 42. Hereinafter cited as Mitre, Historia de Belgrano. ' 
_31. Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge History of British Foreign 
Policy, 1783-1919 (3 vols., Cambridge, 1922-23), I, 341. 
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Miranda has been painstakingly recorded 32 and needs no recount-
ing here; however, the effects of Pitt's decision upon Miranda were 
catastrophic and Miranda decided to organize his own revolution, 
leaving in July for the United States. In the meantime Miranda's 
ardent supporter, Sir Home Popham, had urged upon Pitt the seizure 
of the Cape of Good Hope, a Dutch colony, once taken by the Eng-
lish but restored to Holland at the Peace of Amiens. Pitt agreed 
to this plan, feeling that the Cape was an important way station 
on the route to India and therefore should be in English hands. 
In case of failure of the Third Coalition and a return to the plans 
of Miranda, such a move would greatly facilitate any actions re-
quired in that region. This policy Pitt explained to Popham, who 
sailed for the Cape of Good Hope with the understanding that if 
friendly negotiation failed to detach Spain from France, or if the 
Third Coalition should fail, then Pitt intended to go through with 
the project of Miranda.33 Thus it was that Sir Home Popham was 
at the Cape and Miranda in New York, organizing his revolution, 
when Pitt received news of the crushing blow of the battle of Aus-
terlitz, December 2, 1805, the death of the Third Coalition before 
it was completely on the field. Thi blow undoubtedly hastened 
the death of Pitt, but neither Popham nor Miranda heard of his 
death, a piece of news that would probably have changed the ac-
tions of both, until long after they had made their respective moves. 
The death of Pitt brought in an entirely new administration, the 
so called Ministry of All the Talents, one of the "Talents" being 
William Windham, a disciple of William Burke, both of whom had 
a penchant for Buenos Aires. This administration, in the first days 
of power, aroused the highest expectations in England, but it soon 
became evident that it was engulfed in inertia and shot through 
with indecision and discord. This state of affairs was exploded 
with great suddenness by the actions of Miranda and Sir Home 
Popham. 
The Lord Grenville-Charles James Fox combination of this new 
administration, faced with peace negotiations with France and, 
therefore, questioning the expediency of attack against the pos-
sessions of Spain at the same time, decided to ignore Miranda 
except for some slight secret assistance. 
The actions of Sir Home Popham, however, were not so easy to 
ignore or reverse. In April, 1806, Popham, aware of the collapse 
32. William S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda ( 2 vols., Chapel' Hill, 1929). 
33. Minutes of a Court Martial, holden on board His Maiesty's ship Gladiator in 
P01tsmouth Harbor, on Friday, the 6th day of March, 1807, . . . . of Cap't Sir 
Home Popham (London, 1807), 80. 
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of the Third Coalition but without knowledge of Pitt's death, left 
the island of St. Helena for Buenos Aires, after persuading the 
island's governor to lend him four hundred men.34 Popham doubt-
less believed that the collapse of the Third Coalition meant that 
Pitt would go through with the original plans as discussed among 
Pitt, Miranda and himself.35 Regardless of the correctness or in-
correctness of Popham's thinking, he arrived June 8, 1806, at the 
estuary of the Plata and on the 27th entered Buenos Aires with fif-
teen hundred and sixty men. 36 
In the short time he was in Buenos Aires Popham grew to "like 
the South Americans prodigiously," 37 but this liking was not par-
ticularly returned, due to the humiliation felt by the people of that 
city and to the fact that the English had come as conquerors, not 
as liberators. On August 12, 1806, the people of Buenos Aires re-
volted against General William Carr Beresford, whom Popham 
had placed in charge of the city of Buenos Aires, and at the end of 
three days of hard fighting, Beresford was compelled to capitulate 
to the forces of Buenos Aires under the leadership of the French 
emigre, Jacques Liniers. Popham, after helplessly watching the 
fighting from his ships floating lazily in the Plata river, moved the 
remnants of the British forces into Maldonado and Colonia to await 
reinforcements which, to the number of 3000 troops, finally arrived 
under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. Popham returned 
to England and eventual court martial. 
In the meantime, word of Popham's attack on Buenos Aires had 
arrived in London and completely disconcerted the Ministry of all 
the Talents. When a search for secret orders from the previous 
administration proved fruitless, Lord Grenville attempted a series 
of evasive maneuvers to cover up his lack of competence to handle 
the situation. Under pressure he finally sent, under Auchmuty, the 
small force mentioned above. 
This small reinforcement, however, did not solve the problem 
facing the British government. What should they do if Popham 
were successful? The policies and attempted actions of the Minis-
try in regards to the continent were abject failures, and all British 
proposals had to be discarded and new policies substituted. 
34. Alexander Gillespie, Gleanings and Remarks Collected During Many Months of 
Residence at Buenos Ayres and Within the Upper Country (Leeds, 1818), 28-29. 
35. For the conversation and the records of this see Minutes af a Court Martial . . . 
af Cap't Sir Home Popham. For the plans of Miranda see Robertson, Life of Miranda. 
36. There are numerous accounts of the British invasion. The details are not neces-
sary here, but for an excellent .brief account in English see Bernard Moses, Spain's Declining 
Power in South America 1730-1806 (Berkeley, 1919), 341 ff. In Spanish see Mitre, 
Historia de Belgrano, I, 90 ff. · 
37. Letter to Miranda in Robertson , Life of Miranda, I, 323. 
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Then, September 12, 1806, came news of the success of the attack 
on Buenos Aires. The cabinet was in great confusion, not only be-
cause the issue must now be faced, but also because the strength 
and ability of Charles Fox had been lost with his death on Sep-
tember 13, 1806. Lord Grenville jumped from pillar to post, not 
knowing whether to give up Buenos Aires and concentrate British 
efforts on the Continent and Napoleon or to give up the Continent 
and concentrate on Buenos Aires. Napoleon answered the ques-
tion for him by gaining control of western Europe with the defeat 
of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt on October 14, 1806. 
Upon the news of Jena and Auerstadt, Grenville turned his back 
upon Europe and began to dream of the conquest, not just of 
Buenos Aires but of all South America. The ministers dreamed and 
talked over anticipated victories, but it all came to nothing. There 
were several reasons for this. They discovered that the means to 
carry out these great ideas were not at hand: the military was 
small and inefficient, and the navy, from many months of monoto-
nous blockade duty, was low in both material and morale. On Jan-
uary 27, 1807, the news of Beresford's surrender reached London. 
It was now not a question of taking all of South America but of 
restoring lost prestige by recapturing Buenos Aires. For this pur-
pose a large force was immediately shipped to Buenos Aires under 
the command of General John Whitelocke. 
General Whitelocke, however, was not the man to vindicate 
British arms by recapturing Buenos Aires. Montevideo was in 
English hands, affording an excellent base from which to carry 
out any operations against Buenos Aires, and there were ten thou-
sand troops at Whitelocke's disposal. Yet, to the surprise of the 
Spanish-Americans, after a few skirmishes Whitelocke asked for a 
truce and agreed to evacuate the entire region. The English as 
colonizers were out, but the policy which had been slowly devel-
oped by Pitt received added impetus. Dislike of the English did 
not last long in the region of the Rio de la Plata, but dissatisfaction 
with Spanish rule and the desire for independence rapidly ex-
panded. England was forced to return to the course which had 
been advocated by Pitt, trade not annexation, and by 1810 this 
became the objective of both England and Buenos Aires. The idea · 
of conquest had vanished from ministerial minds. 
The Portuguese were also interested in the region of the Plata. 
Prior to the establish:ment of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, the Por-
tuguese, not satisfied with possession of Colonia, started a more im-
portant settlement in the vicinity of Montevideo. The Spanish 
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promptly dislodged them and in tum proceeded to make per-
manent settlements there and at Maldonado to maintain more effec-
tively the rights of the Spanish crown and to put an end to Portu-
guese smuggling. 
In this manner, in 1726, was started the present city of Monte-
video, under the name of San Felipe, Puerto de Monte Video. 
Some families were transported there from the Canaries, and others 
moved from Buenos Aires, in order to secure the privileges offered 
to first settlers. Large sums of money were sent by the viceroy 
to carry on the work; and, in time, with the labor of the Guarani 
Indians, a fort was constructed which the Spanish government 
hoped would block and overawe the Portuguese. Such, however, 
was not the case; indeed, the opposite effect seemed to be true, for 
the Portuguese increased their own establishments and stationed 
themselves permanently on the Rio Grande. From this base they 
overran the adjoining lands, pillaged the Spanish settlers, and car-
ded on contraband trade with more impunity than ever. 
New conflicts were the natural results. Finally, in 1750, a treaty 
was drawn up between Spain and Portugal, and one of the articles 
dealt with the question of the Banda Oriental. This article stipu-
lated that Portugal should cede to Spain all the establishments she 
had formed in the Banda Oriental, including Colonia, in exchange 
for the seven missionary towns upon the Uruguay. However, the 
settlement was not successful, for the Indians rose in revolt against 
an arrangement which delivered them to a nation known to them 
only for their cruelties. Spain and Portugal joined forces to enforce 
by arms the submission of the Indians to the treaty. When the 
fighting ceased, the missions were depopulated and ruined; and 
the Portuguese refused to take possession of them, using this as a 
pretext for refusing to release Colonia to Spain. Thus, the Portu-
guese question was not settled. They continued to carry on contra-
band trade and to carry out aggressive action against Spanish 
territory. 
In the Rio de la Plata the continued encroachments of the Por-
tuguese, the continuance of contraband trade, and the disputes 
arising with foreign nations as a result of such a state of affairs, 
emphasized the necessity for a change in the government of that 
colony. To deal with such difficulties was impossible for a viceroy 
residing at Lima. Such distances from the seat of government also 
hampered any effective or, if needed, immediate action on the part 
of subordinate officials at Buenos Aires. 
There were other factors, as we have seen, which contributed 
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to the Spanish ministry giving fresh vigor to their administrative 
officials in the Rfo de la Plata. The defenseless state of the region 
had already attracted notice and there was every reason to believe 
that hostilities with England would bring almost immediate attack 
upon the Rio de la Plata region. This fact alone would have been 
sufficient to force Spain to arrange proper means of defense, but 
the more immediate cause for so doing was the provocations of 
the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental. The result, as we have 
already seen, was the formation of the Viceroyalty in 1776. 
In the year 1808, the Rfo de la Plata was threatened with a new 
invasion by the Prince Regent of Portugal, who, from the moment 
of his reaching Brazil, seems to have contemplated the possibility 
of increasing his domains in America by the annexation of the 
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata in right of his wife, the Princess 
Carlota, a daughter of Charles IV and sister of King Ferdinand. 
Over the signature of Dom Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, Minister 
and Secretary of State for War and Foreign AHairs, the Prince 
Regent, upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro in 1808, sent a letter 
dated March 13, to the "Cabildo of Buenos Ayres" requiring them 
on the grounds that "now beyond a doubt" the Spanish monarchy 
was dissolved and the "Spanish Americans are totally abandoned," 
to submit themselves to his protection and to place themselves under 
his government. As added incentive to this union Coutinho pointed 
out quite bluntly that if the Cabildo of Buenos Aires refused then 
the Portuguese would, with the aid of her ally Britain, open hostili-
ties which would in the end force the Plata under Portuguese con-
trol. as 
A spirited answer came from the Cabildo, April 29, 1808, express-
ing its determination, under its distinguished General Santiago 
(Jacques) Liniers, to maintain the rights of Spain and to defend 
itself to the last drop of blood. With notable dignity the Cabildo of 
Buenos Aires advised the Prince Regent that his note was "an 
intolerable offense to her" and that the Cabildo "will never forgive 
such an affront." 39 
Nothing in the way of war resulted in the above exchange of 
notes, but the pride and nascent patriotism for Buenos Aires was 
given great impetus. Their antagonism toward Brazil and Portu-
gal was cemented. Thus, by 1810, there could be little chance 
of peace between these two regions and both were desirous of 
maintaining possession of the Banda Oriental. 
38. Coutinho to Cabildo of Buenos Ayres, March 13, 1808, in Parish, Buenos Ayres, 
Appendix I, 383-384. 
39. Cabildo of Buenos Ayres to Coutinho, April 29, 1808, in ibid., 384-385. 
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The interest of the United States in the region of the Rio de la 
Plata to 1810 was slight and trade was of small volume when com-
pared to other regions of Spanish America. The early interest of 
the United States was, therefore, more closely tied to the Spanish 
West Indies, Mexico, and to a lesser degree the northern coastal 
region of South America. 
Following the American Revolution most of the political leaders 
in the United States showed some interest in the future of Spanish 
America, and there developed a definite sentiment for the inde-
pendence of Spanish America. This feeling was no secret as is indi-
cated in a letter to John Jay, Secretary of State of the Confederation, 
from John Adams, the representative in England. Adams wrote on 
May 28, 1786, that "It is the fixed opinion in many minds here, that 
a revolution in South America would be agreeable to the United 
States, and it is depended on that we shall do nothing to prevent 
it, if we do not exert ourselves to promote it." 40 In the same year 
Jefferson propounded a different concept when he expressed fear 
that Spain could not hold Spanish America "till our population 
can be sufficiently advanced to gain it piece by piece," 41 and in 
1808, an Englishman wrote that if England or France did not free 
South America, or if she did not free herself, the United States 
would probably do so.42 
Many incidents of American interest in Spanish America are 
recorded for this early period, the outstanding ones being the in-
trigues of Citizen Genet against Louisiana and Mexico; of the am-
bitious Miranda, who interested such men as Alexander Hamilton, 
Rufus King and other Federalists in his revolutionary schemes;43 
of Aaron Burr whose conspiracy 44 occurred while Miranda was in 
New York organizing his revolution and Popham was invading 
Buenos Aires. 
It may readily be seen that while there was an American senti-
ment in favor of the independence of the Spanish colonies, some 
of it sincere, for the most part it was closely tied to American 
expansionist feeling or manifest destiny. A study of the newspapers 
of the period indicates also that public opinion in the United States 
40. C. L. Chandler, Inter-American Acquaintances (Sewanee, Tenn., 1915), 8-9. 
I 
9
41. Jefferson to A. Stewart, Jan. 25, 1786 in Thomas Jefferson, Writings of Thomas 
af
e ers~n, ed. by Andrew A. Lipscomb (20 vols., Washington, 1904), V, 260. Herein-
ter cited as Jefferson, Writings. 
42. Chandler, Inter-American Acquaintances, 31. 
43. See Robertson, Life of Miranda, I, 161-184. 
193!4)· See John Rydjord, Foreign Interest in the Independence of New Spain (Durham, and •. 210. W. F. McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy; a History Largely from Original 
Hitherto Unused Sources (New York, 1903), 29 ff. I. J. Cox, "Hispanic American 
Phases of the Burr Conspiracy," Hispanic American Historical Review, XII( 1932 ), 146 ff. 
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followed party lines, with most Federalists favoring Spain and 
most Republicans taking the side of the Spanish-Americans.45 
Furthermore, the affairs of Spanish America assumed, in the eyes 
of the North Americans, a subordinate position to affairs in Europe. 
While the American politician and most of the general public 
looked upon events in Buenos Aires as subordinate to Europe, a 
number of merchants had developed great interest in the region. 
As early as 1807, David C. DeForest wrote Secretary of State 
James Madison urging the appointment of a Consular Commercial 
Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires. He wrote that such a 
step would be ''highly pleasing to the inhabitants, and sufficiently 
countenanced by this Government to answer all the purposes for 
which he would be admitted, although the laws would not allow of 
his being formally admitted." 46 
The hopes and ambitions of the commercial interests faced an 
uphill battle in spite of the fact that in two periods, 1797-1799 and 
1804-1806, United States vessels occupied a favorable position and 
were welcomed as neutrals in the Spanish-American ports from 
which the British were barred.47 The enmity of the British govern-
ment as well as the British merchant was aroused, for the British 
government feared the growth of American shipping as a threat 
to British navigation as well as to her commerce. 48 In addition to 
this British resentment which led to a British embargo of the Rio 
de la Plata,49 there was Jefferson's embargo upon all shipping, 
December 1807 to March 1809, during which time only two United 
States vessels appeared in the ports of the Rio de la Plata,50 and th~ 
embargo by the government of Buenos Aires put into operation 
after the expulsion of the British. This embargo by the govern-
ment of Buenos Aires about October 7, 1807, stated that all neutrals 
must leave the Rio de la Plata within forty days, "loaded or not," 51 
and apparently grew from the opinion of the people of Buenos 
45. See the New York Spectator for June 6, June 27 and Sept. 8, 1810; Philadelphia 
Aurora, Sept. 10, Nov. 5, 1810; Niles W eekly Register, II, 71. 
46. Chandler, Inter-Am erican Acquaintances, 48-49. 
47. See Goebel, "British Trade," in HAHR, XLIII( 1938 ), 295; Roy F. Nichols, "Trade 
Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish Ami>rica, 
1779-1809," Hispanic American Historical Review, XIII( 1933 ), 296, 301 , 306. While 
dealing primarily with the Spanish W est Indies, particularly Cuba in relation to agents, 
Nichols does show how blocking of the seaways during the periodic wars 1799-1808 
caused the Spanish government to tolerate emergency trade with the United States. Buenos 
Aires shared in this trade. H ereinafter cited as Nichols, "Trade Relations" in HAHR. 
48. Goebel, "British Trade" in HAHR, XLIII ( 1938), 296. 
49. C. L. Chandler, "United States Merchant Ships in the Rio de la Plata," Hispanic 
American Historical Review, II( 1919 ), 36. Hereinafter cited as Chandler, "Merchant Ships" 
inHAHR. 
50. Ibid., 161. 
51. Ibid., 52. Taken from an extract in the American Daily Advertiser of Philadelphia 
for January 7, 1808. 
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Aires that the Americans were spies for the English. By this 
embargo no neutrals would be permitted in any of the ports of 
the Rfo de la Plata region for a period of two years "under any 
pretense whatever, even if they should have a royal license." 52 
In spite of these handicaps, in the period 1798 to 1810, one hun-
dred and twenty-five merchant vessels of the United States touched 
at Buenos Aires and Montevideo,53 and by 1810 at least one United 
States vessel had established a regular run between Rio de Ia Plata 
and the United States.54 In 1810, the United States was second 
only to England as an exporter to the Plata region. 55 
In the three decades following the American Revolution the 
merchants of the United States, in spite of severe hindrances, had 
tasted the fruit of the Spanish-American trade. In many instances 
great profits had been the rewards. Certainly, a large number of 
individuals had gained "on the spot" knowledge of conditions in 
Spanish America. By 1810, there were a number of United States 
businessmen in the Plata region who had learned first-hand that 
the business was there ( Buenos Aires was then largely dependent 
on imported articles for all phases of life), and they had learned 
it was almost impossible to deal with a colony so arbitrarily ruled. 
The State Department of the United States had also learned that 
little or no satisfaction could be achieved from Spain in regard to 
her South American colony. Thus, when revolt came in 1810, both 
the mercantile class and the State Department welcomed the action 
as an opportunity to extend trade. Evidence for this is given in 
the speed with which Joel Poinsett was appointed "Agent for 
Seamen and Commerce" to Buenos Aires and the region of the 
Rfo de Ia Plata. 
Following the defeat and withdrawal of the English from Buenos 
Aires, Don Santiago Liniers, as a reward for his gallantry, was ap-
pointed Viceroy of the Rio de la Plata. Under other circumstances 
this might have been a happy choice, but with the explosive ele-
ments present in both Buenos Aires and in Europe, it proved other-
wise. General Mitre describes Liniers as being a "high spirited" 
man with a "sensitive imagination, reckless temperament [and] with 
more good nature than energy." Mitre adds that Liniers had "more 
52. Ibid., 52. 
18 53. See C. L. Chandler, "United States Shipping in the Rio de la Plata Region, 1809-lO," Hispanic American Historical Review, ill(l920), 159-176. Hereinafter cited as 
~andler, "United States Shipping" in HAHR. See also his "United States Merchant Ships ~-t;:. Rio de la Plata (1801-1808), as shown by Early Newspapers," in ibid, II (1919), 
54. Chandler, "United States Shipping" in HAHR, III(l920), 160. 
55. Ibid., 160. 
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zeal in taking up projects than perseverance in carrying them out'' 
and that "he was guided rather by his emotions than his judgment."56 
Then, too, it must be remembered that Liniers was a French-
man. 
In 1808, when news of the abdication of the King and the declara-
tion of war against France was received in the Rio de la Plata, 
Liniers found himself, almost immediately, an object of distrust to 
the old Spaniards. However, it was the city of Montevideo, under 
governor Francisco Xavier Elio, which reacted first. Elio refused 
to obey the orders of Liniers, called together the people, and estab-
lished an independent junta after the pattern set up in Spain. 57 
Shortly after the action of Elio and the city of Montevideo, some 
of the leading Spaniards of Buenos Aires attempted to follow their 
example, a movement which was crushed by Liniers and his troops. 
However, there was as a result unrest in Buenos Aires; and the 
Central Junta at Seville, in an effort to calm the public mind, sent 
out an old naval officer, Don Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, to re-
place Liniers as viceroy. 
Buenos Aires, at this time, had an empty treasury and could not 
even meet the current expenses of the government. This, it was 
felt, was a result of the paralyzation of trade with Spain, with the 
decrease of custom-house duties as a consequence. The people, 
needing everything, and with a tremendous accumulation of pro-
duce, were crying out for at least a temporary opening of the ports. 
Into this situation came Cisneros, without money or troops and 
without permission to open the ports or relax in any way the Spanish 
colonial regulations. 
The man who took up the cries of the people and placed them 
in the form of a memorial presented to Cisneros was Mariano 
Moreno. In September, 1809, Moreno published his Representaci6n 
a nombre del apodero de los hacendados de las companas del Rio 
de la Plata dirigida al excmo. Senor Virrey Don Baltasar Hidalgo 
de Cisneros en el expendiente promovido sobre proporcionar in-
gresos al erario por medio de un franco comercio con la naci6n 
56. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, I, 128. 
57. It is not the writer's intention to go into detail regarding the events of the revo-
lution. Excellent accounts have already been written: Ricardo Levene, ed., Ilistorin 
de la Nacwn Argentina desde los or£genes hasta la organizacion definitiva en 1862 ( 8 vols. 
to date, Buenos Aires, 1939-1950 ), hereinafter cited as Levene, Historia de la Nacwn 
Argentina; Mitre, Historia de Belgrano; and Gervasio Antonio Posadas, Memorias de 
Gervasio Antonio Posadas in Biblioteca Ayacucho, XLVI (Madrid, 1920), 9-169. From 
these sources, has been drawn the brief account herein given, except for those parts so 
indicated by footnotes. For a brief description of Spain and her internal situation at the 
time, see W. S. Robertson, "The Juntas of 1808 and the Spanish Colonies," English His-
torical Review, XXXI (1916), 573-585. 
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inglesa.58 Moreno advocated the entry of English goods; he was 
opposed to smuggling because no revenue was gained in this man-
ner of trade; he exhorted free export of Argentine goods and wanted 
to destroy the commercial monopoly of the Cadiz merchants.59 
Moreno was clearly a revolutionary. 
Cisneros heard the cries of the populace and with great reluctance 
opened the ports of the Rio de la Plata to trade. This reluctance 
on his part to a matter which the people considered so important 
to them resulted in making him extremely unpopular and tended 
to give impetus to a crisis that had long been in preparation. This 
crisis was brought to a head when, greatly confused, Cisneros had 
to inform the people of the invasion of Spain by the French armies 
and of the dissolution of the junta at Seville. 
The revolutionary spirit which had been smoldering in Buenos 
Aires for some time burst forth on May 15, 1810. Events moved 
rapidly from that point. On May 20th Cisneros was ordered to 
resign, which he did the following day. A cabildo abierto was 
called for May 22, which two days later announced the creation 
of a new junta, but its appointment was opposed by the people who 
objected to Cisneros as its President. On May 25, a new vote was 
held and a new junta gubernativa was elected with Cornelio Saave-
dra as President and Mariano Moreno as Secretary. In this manner 
was established the "provisional junta of the provinces of Rio de la 
Plata, in the name of King Ferdinand the Seventh." This junta 
gubernativa was, in essence, the beginning of Argentina's independ-
ence, although no complete declaration of such was made until 
1816 and political stability was not achieved until long after that. 
Consequently, by 1810, Buenos Aires, in the midst of the turmoil 
created by the outside influences of Great Britain, France, and the 
United States, and by the internal problems of Spain, acted for 
herself. The latter part of that year saw the Plata region embroiled 
in the problems of establishing its own government and attempting 
to regulate its relations with the existing nations of the world. 
58. M~iano Moreno, Escritos de Mariano Moreno, con un pr6logo por Noberlo Piiiero 
(Buenos A~~s, 1896), 89. H ereinafter cited as Moreno, Escritos. This is the most 
complete edition of Moreno's writings. 




The Formulation of Policies 
BY 1807, the United States knew it had a large stake and 
a great opportunity in Spanish America; unfortunately, it did not 
know how to protect the stake or exploit the opportunity. With Na-
poleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula in 1808, the Jefferson ad-
ministration was faced with the problem of shaping policy to cover 
the situation. In formulating his policies J eHerson ran into opposi-
tion from John Adams and other New England critics. Adams 
believed that the United States should support the Spanish patriots 
in their struggle to restore Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne. 
This concept would not advance the cause of freedom in Spain and 
would deal a severe blow to freedom in Spanish America; to this 
Jefferson could not agree. The policy formulated by Jefferson fore-
shadowed the Monroe Doctrine in calling for the encouragement 
of independence in Spanish America and opposition to the transfer 
of an American colony from one European power to another, as well 
as resistance to the extension of commercial and political influence 
of any European power in America. The chief objective of Jeffer-
son's policy was the exclusion of all European influence from the 
Western Hemisphere. Madison agreed wholeheartedly to this 
policy and was fully committed to it when he took over the presi-
dency March 4, 1809. 
At first glance this would appear to be a simple, straightforward 
policy in view of the penchant of the people of the United States to 
give aid and sympathy to any group they believed emulating them 
and their own earlier struggle to gain freedom and independence. 
It was, unfortunately, an impractical policy for the period, based 
almost entirely upon idealism and disregarding the internal circum-
stances and the international conditions of the time. The European 
conflict between the Tiger and the Shark, and the internal problems 
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created by a growing nation with its accompanying manifest destiny 
and need for immediate markets, brought forth a number of fac-
tors which prevented the administrations of Jefferson and Madison 
from carrying out the policy of 1808. These administrations were 
forced into acts such as the embargo, the development of the Penin-
sula trade, playing with the project of co-operation with France in 
revolutionizing Spanish America, and the War of 1812. In addition 
to these factors, the War Hawks and their manifest destiny turned 
the thinking of the people of the United States from the broader 
aspect of trade, commerce, and political influence in all of Spanish 
America to those in areas of Spanish territory immediately contigu-
ous with the United States. The vacillations of the United States 
and its flirtations with, on the one hand, strict neutrality and, on the 
other, loose neutrality, resulted by 1815 in the loss of the opportuni-
ties presented in 1808 in all of Spanish America. 
The news of revolt in Buenos Aires reached the United States 
at a time when the wars of Europe, with the various problems they 
created, monopolized the attention of the United States. This re-
sulted in a great amount of confusion, for as previously stated, 
South American events were looked upon as subordinate parts of the 
European entanglements. In the early stages the revolt was re-
garded either as a Napoleonic plot or a British scheme. The 
Federalist newspapers urged the government to recognize the 
Patriot government of Spain and its representative, Lufs de Onfs, 1 
seeing in the revolt an extension of national resistance to French 
domination in Spain and pointing out that there had been no formal 
declaration of independence.2 The Republican Philadelphia Aurora 
rejoiced that the Napoleonic directed revolts would prevent the 
Spanish colonists from becoming allies of England. It bemoaned 
the fact that the control was not in the hands of France, but well 
settled in the market basket of Great Britain.3 
There was an equal amount of confusion in the administration 
as President James Madison considered the movement for inde-
pendence a fait accornpli and that time alone would reveal whether 
it would be under British or French influence.4 
At the first news of the revolt an agent, Joel R. Poinsett, was 
sent to Buenos Aires with instructions which emphasized the im-
I. New York Spectator, June 6, 1810. 
2. Ibid., June 27, 1810. 
3. Philadelphia Aurora, Nov. 5, 1810. 
4. Madison to Armstrong, Oct. 29, 1810 in The Writings of James Madison, ed. by 
G. Hunt (9 vols., New York, 1900-1910), VIII, 116. Hereinafter cited as Madison, 
Writings. 
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portance of developing trade relations with the region of the Rio 
de la Plata. 5 The Madison administration thus paved the way for 
the adoption of an attitude which reflected the favorable interest 
that the revolutionists brought to the front in the United States. 
However, it must be noted that the official stand was more cautious. 
In placing the position of the United States before the world, 
Madison drew upon a body of precedent that had been created 
by President George Washington during the Anglo-French wars 
after 1793. Under Washington the United States had played an 
important part in the formulation of doctrine and practice on the 
subject of neutrality, although the American point of view had not 
been universally accepted. The foundation for American practice 
regarding neutrality and the enforcement of neutrality was summed 
up in the legislation of 1794, which prohibited Americans from 
engaging in or preparing for hostilities against any power with 
which the United States was at peace, from within the territory 
of the United States. 6 The Madison administration decided to 
apply "existing laws" which meant, therefore, the Neutrality Act 
of 1794. This was accomplished by executive orders directing 
that the shelter of American ports be extended to all ships, re-
gardless of flag or nationality.7 The official American policy was 
to be one of strict neutrality. 
It must be remembered that Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian 
peninsula, in 1808, presented the United States with great political 
and commercial advantages in Latin America. From 1808 to 1813 
Spain was rocked by a conflict that was both international and 
civil. The international phase involved France and England, with 
Spain as the battleground. The civil war involved two factions 
within Spain, one, the Francophile party which supported Joseph 
Bonaparte and had behind it the French army; the other, the 
Patriots who, with English patronage, set up a government in 
support of Ferdinand VII. Both groups claimed authority over 
Spanish America, and consequently there was a great amount of 
political and commercial freedom for the Spanish-Americans.8 Add 
to this fact that most North Americans favored any struggle for 
5. In regard to the agent, Poinsett, his instructions and his work see Ch. IV this paper. 
On the emphasis on the commercial importance of the revolution see Robert Smith to 
Armstrong, May 1, 1809, in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning 
the Independence of the Latin American Nations, ed. by W. R. Manning ( 3 vols., New 
York, 1925), I, 4. H ereinafter cited as Manning, Dip. Cor. 
6. John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law (6 vols., Washington, 1906), 
VII, 1010. For a discussion of these laws and their weaknesses see Ch. VI, this study. 
7. Instructions to collectors of customs, July 3, 1815, in ibid., I, 170. 
8. For a d etailed account of this conflict and its effects see Levene, Historia de la 
Naci6n Argentina, V. 
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liberty from the tyrant monarchs of Europe and one may well 
question that the United States could follow a neutral course. 
In spite of the restrictions of the Seville junta and Jefferson's 
embargo many American merchant groups were interested in the 
region of the Rio de la Plata. A number of firms had established 
themselves there and were carrying on a lucrative trade. This was 
of value to Buenos Aires not only for the products and manufactured 
articles received but also for the revenue collected, which contrib-
uted funds necessary to maintain the revolution. Firms such as 
Blodget and Childs of Baltimore; William Gray, Elias H. Derby, 
the Crowninshields, Pickmans, Osgoods, and Ornes of Salem; 
Brown and Ives of Providence; and Miller and Van Beuren of 
Philadelphia, would not readily give up the trade they were de-
veloping in the Plata region. 
The transactions of these shipping concerns and the activities 
of such individuals as David C. DeForest, William P. White, and 
Joel R. Poinsett could be called neutral only by an extreme stretch-
ing of the meaning of the word. They were constantly agitating 
for freedom from Spain. Poinsett even went so far as to accept 
a commission in the Chilean army. 
Perhaps, in forming official policy toward the revolution and 
trade, the American government had in mind the risk of incidents 
that could lead to war with Spain. This risk had been clearly 
indicated in 1802, when some American citizens at Buenos Aires 
wrote to Charles Pinckney, the United States Minister to Spain, 
complaining of the difficulties the authorities in Buenos Aires 
were creating for them. In this petition, which had first been 
presented to the viceroy at Buenos Aires, they complained that 
all previous petitions had been passed over and that "Hospitality 
and justice have been denied us." They stated that they were 
ruined by delay or, indirectly, by the viceroy encouraging or com-
pelling individuals to violate their contracts.9 Minister Pinckney 
reported to the State Department on August 15, 1802, that these 
claims, added to some others from South America, amounted to 
not less than five million dollars and probably as much as eight 
millions.10 The continuation of such enormous claims against Spain 
and the actions which precipitated them could, if permitted to go 
on, lead to war. 
9. Chandler, Inter-American Acquaintances, 35-37. Those who signed this petition 
were: Thomas O'Reilly, Caleb Loring, John Ansley, Josiah Roberts, Robert Gray, Moses 
Griffin, Daniel McPherson, John Grant, Josiah Gould, Daniel Olney and William Todd, Jr. 
10. The Debates and Proceedings of the United States ( 42 vols., Washington, 1834-
1856), 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 948. H ereinafter cited as Annals of Congress. 
24 
The question of trade with Buenos Aires did not reach an ex-
plosive point in the United States owing to the development of 
what was termed the Peninsular trade. This term referred to the 
shipment of foodstuffs from the United States to the Iberian penin-
sula to supply not only the civilians but also the French and English 
armies. By 1811, domestic exports from the United States to the 
Iberian peninsula were worth more than three times as much as 
those to Spanish America.11 Furthermore, the entire nation bene-
fited by this trade as it included products from every quarter of 
the nation.12 In this manner, the opportunities of Spanish-American 
trade were pushed into the background, and those with commercial 
interest concentrated more upon the Peninsular trade. 
Although, in the period 1810 to 1815, the chief foreign influence 
in Buenos Aires was British, Robertson points out that British ideas 
worked principally for free trade, while the United States fur-
nished the only example of an actual working experiment in state-
craft based on the principle of popular sovereignty. American 
influence was most noticeable after the colonists were faced with 
specific problems of governmental organization.13 The fact is 
clearly in evidence in the somewhat conservative Gaceta under the 
editorship of Mariano Moreno. While Moreno condemned the 
excesses of the French Revolution and distrusted North American 
political precedents,14 he admired Washington15 and was impressed 
with Jefferson's Notes on Virginia~16 In other articles he discussed 
the freedom of the press17 and the duties and functions of the 
Executive power in the United States.18 Moreno was also an ad-
mirer of Chief Justice John Marshall, and by quoting him at length 
in the Gaceta19 was largely responsible for the great esteem ac-
corded him in Buenos Aires. While Moreno distrusted many of 
the American precedents, he wanted and searched for favorable 
opinions expressed by North Americans on the right of the Spanish-
11. American State Papers, Class V, Commerce and Navigation (2 vols., Washington, 
1832-1834), I, 892. Hereinafter cited as ASP., CN. 
12. Senator James Lloyd1 Jr. of Massachusetts, Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 2 Sess., 34. The principal articles ot this trade were flour, corn, com-meal, rye-meal, rice, beans, 
pork, and tobacco. 
13. W . S. Robertson, Hispanic American Relations with the United States (New 
York, 1923 ), ch. III. See also Gaceta, May 25, 1816. 
14. Gaceta, July 3 , 1810. 
15. W. S. Robertson, Rise of the Spanish American Republics <U Told in the Lives 
of their Liberators (New York, 1918), 157. 
16. Gaceta, Nov. 28, 1810. Moreno d evoted an entire page to translation of this 
work of Jefferson's. 
17. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1810. 
18. Ibid., July 28, August 4, 1813. 
19. Ibid., August 18, 1813. 
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Americans to revolt. These he presented to the people of Buenos 
Aires, 20 as well as warnings of the dangers of false security. 21 
The relations of the United States with Buenos Aires, through 
1811, were auspicious. Examination of the period gives evidence 
of co-operation and understanding between the two that should 
have resulted in close commercial and political ties. In the political 
arena, the salient features of the democratic way of life in the 
United States were broadcast in the Rio de la Plata by sailors, whal-
ers, and by the American agents. Poinsett, while in Buenos Aires, 
translated the Constitution of the United States into Spanish, a 
copy of which reached the President of the junta in 1812.22 David 
C. DeForest presented Manuel Belgrano with a copy of Washing-
ton's Farewell Address which Belgrano translated and published.23 
The same source made the people of Buenos Aires acquainted with 
the Declaration of Independence of the United States. The political 
concepts involved in these documents impressed the people of the 
Plata, and the representative assembly, which met at Buenos Aires 
in 1813, gave evidence of the effect of all this propaganda.24 
The various expressions of North American sympathy and the 
very apparent belief that the people of the Plata had the right to 
revolt, plus the fact that the American agent, Poinsett, had made 
a very favorable impression in Buenos Aires, 25 created enthusiasm 
there and caused the junta to feel that the aid for which it was so 
eager could be had from the United States.26 These relations be-
tween the United States and the Rio de la Plata were greatly en-
hanced upon the return, in 1811, of its first agents to the United 
States, Diego de Saavedra and Juan Pedro Aguirre. They informed 
their government and the people of Buenos Aires of the very favor-
able attitude they found in the United States.27 This feeling toward 
Buenos Aires which the United States, people, press, and political 
leaders, made no attempt to conceal led the junta at Buenos Aires, 
20. In the Gaceta, June 21, 1810, is a translation from the New York Evening Post 
stating that "According to a letter from Cadiz, dated April 13th, the Spaniards complain 
that the United States approve of the revolutionary spirit that abounds in the American 
Dominions, and that we have openly recognized the rights those countries have to revolt." 
21. The Gaceta quoted Fisher Ames saying "Those who govern should remember that 
to preserve a free government a supine security is almost treason" in ibid. , Dec. 1, 1813. 
22. William G. Miller to Monroe, April 30, 1812, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 325. 
23. William G. D. Worthington to Adams, March 7, 1819, ibid., I, 533. 
24. Miller to Monroe, July 26, 1813, Department of State, MS., Despatches of 
United States Consuls in Buenos Aires, I, pt. I. Hereinafter cited as DS., DUSC. 
25. Miller to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1811, DS., DUSC., I, pt. I. 
26. Cornelio de Saavedra to the President of the United States, June 26, 1811, MS., 
Department of State, Argentine Republic Notes, I. Hereinafter cited as DS., ARN. 
27. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 320. 
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in 1813, to suggest an alliance with the United States28 in spite of 
the War of 1812 and Buenos Aires' almost complete dependence 
upon British trade. In addition, the United States was encount-
ering considerable difficulty getting ships into Buenos Aires, as 
it made no attempt to enforce the neutrality of that port. 29 This 
desire for an alliance with the United States may be accounted for 
by disappointment about British aid.3O 
The suggestion of an alliance between the United States and 
the junta of Buenos Aires is not as unexpected or as out of place as 
appears at first. By 1811, interest in the cause of the revolutionists 
had increased in the United States in spite of the threat of war 
which was hanging over the country. Information from Buenos 
Aires had become more plentiful, and articles, proclamations and 
war news from the revolutionary gazettes were copied in the 
American press.31 United States interest was greatly increased 
by the news of the abolition of the Inquistion and by the Declaration 
of Rights in Venezuela. The Niles Weekly Register, making quite 
a story of these, waxed eloquent on the possibilities of Spanish 
America.32 Even the Federalist New York Spectator commended 
Venezuela for so regulating the suffrage as to make it appear "that 
the South Americans are not running quite so wild as might have 
been expected," and added that "In going from the extreme of 
tyranny they do not go to the extreme of licentiousness." 33 Joel 
Poinsett, the American agent to Buenos Aires, had stressed Ameri-
can sympathy and friendship, and it was well known that Madison 
had given instructions to Joel Barlow, American Minister at Paris, 
to urge the recognition of the new Spanish-American governments, 
although he was in no way to compromise American neutrality.34 
The commissioners from Buenos Aires to the United States who 
arrived in October, 1811, were amiably, though not officially re-
ceived by the government,35 and were successful in buying arms,30 
but not able to secure any formal answer to their communications 
28. Nicholas Rodriguez Peiia, et. al. to Madison, July 21, 1813, DS., ARN., I. See 
also Juan Manuel de Luca to Miller, F eb. 10, 1813, DS., DUSC., I pt. I. 
29. Poinsett to Secretary of State, June 14, 1814, DS., Special Agents, III. 
30. Miller to Monroe, March 25, 1812, DS., DUSC., I, pt. I. 
31. New York Spectator, Aug. 29, 1811; Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 14, 1811. 
32. Niles Weekly Register, Feb. 1, 1812; see also New York Spectator, Aug, 29, 1811. 
33. New York Spectator, Aug. 29, 1811. 
34. Monroe to Barlow, Nov. 27, 1811, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 12. 
. 35 .. Aguirre and Saavedra to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1811, DS., ARN., I. They were, by 
ms~ction, not to ask for official recognition, For further discussion of this see ch. V 
of this study. 
36. Antokoletz, Histoire, 204. 
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to the American Secretary of State.37 With the existing friendly 
relations and good wishes of the United States, the successful pur-
chase of some arms and the pressing need of additional supplies and 
munitions,38 hope that an alliance would be acceptable to the 
United States is understandable. Of course, in view of Jefferson's 
warning of friendly relations with all, entangling alliances with 
none, still ringing in American ears, the United States would not 
accept the offer of the government of Buenos Aires. 
In the meantime, the policy of Jefferson as formulated in 1808, 
professing American interest in the independence of Spanish 
America and the expulsion of all European influence, had not been 
carried out. Indeed, Jefferson's refusal to repeal the embargo 
and his interest in the domestic problems of the United States 
tended to transfer the control of Latin America from the two weak-
est powers of Europe, Spain and Portugal, to the strongest of 
them, England. 
James Madison, on becoming President in 1809, accepted the 
Jefferson policy of 1808, and with the aid of Robert Smith and 
James Monroe, his two Secretaries of State, and Albert Gallatin, 
his Secretary of the Treasury, carried Jefferson's policy to a high 
point by 1811, after which time, owing to European complications 
and the War of 1812, the United States lost its advantage in Span-
ish America. 
Through 1811, there was no timidity in the Madison administra-
tion's relations with Buenos Aires. There was caution to maintain 
a strict neutrality, and it was made clear that the United States 
looked upon the revolt as a civil war. In so doing the United States 
recognized the belligerency of the Plata, angering Spain but mak-
ing it possible to keep American ports open. 
The significance of the Peninsular trade must have been missed 
by Madison, for he took from the beginning an aggressive attitude 
toward Napoleonic France in regard to trade with Spanish 
America. Fearing that Napoleon would insist upon the suppression 
of that commerce, Robert Smith, Secretary of State, wrote General 
John Armstrong, the American Minister at Paris, that such action 
on the part of France would be a threat to peace between France 
and the United States.89 
This proved to be the last thing that France wanted. France 
soon discovered that the United States was her best means of 
37. Aguirre and Saavedra to Monroe, Jan. 20 and F eb. 5, 1812, DS., ARN. , I. 
38. All communications from Buenos Aires emphasized this need. See Ignacio Alvarez 
to Thomas L. Halsey, May 10, 1815, DS., DUSC., I, pt. I. · 
39. Smith to Armstrong, April 27, 1809, Manning, Dip. Cor., I , 3. 
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communication with Spanish America and that American interest 
was well in line with that of France. That this opinion was correct 
and put to excellent use by France is evidenced by a letter written 
in January of 1810 by Lufs de Onfs, unrecognized Spanish Minis-
ter to the United States, to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires telling him 
to watch for French agents on all ships coming from the United 
States.40 Onfs later charged the United States government with 
conspiring with these agents and implied that the United States 
was trying to form an alliance with France, Russia, Denmark, and 
Sweden in order to carry on a war with England.41 W. S. Robert-
son points out that while Onis was in error in some minor points~ 
his account of Madison's policy was esssentially correct.42 
The Madison administration made the first systematic effort of 
the United States to extend its agencies in Spanish America. 
Three types of agents were employed: special agents, agents for 
commerce and seamen, and consuls. Special agents were appointed 
to perform some specific mission, usually of brief duration. Agents 
for commerce and seamen were appointed under an act of Con-
gress in 1796 for the protection of American seamen in foreign 
ports. John Quincy Adams summed it up neatly when he wrote 
that "This office of commercial agent is a substitute for that of 
consul in ports where consuls cannot be admitted, or to which 
from whatever cause they cannot be sent." 43 The use of consuls 
in Spanish America in this early period is quite interesting. By 
definition the consul was an official appointed to reside in a for-
eign country to care for the commercial interests of the citizens of 
the appointing government. As such, the United States sent con-
suls to Spanish America under the Madison administration. Adams, 
however, later refused to receive a consul from one of the Spanish-
American countries on the ground that such action committed the 
United States to recognition.44 Revolutionary agents from Spanish 
America were, however, permitted to reside in the United States. 
On November 12, 1811, that part of the President's message 
regarding South America was referred to a committee of the 
House of Representatives with Samuel L. Mitchill of New York 
40. Onis to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires, Jan. 5, 1810, MS., Archivo General de la 
Naci6n ( Buenos Aires), Sala 1, Amario 2, Anarquel 4, Numero 9. Hereinafter cited as 
AGN, Sl-A2-A4. 
41. On{s to the Captain General of Caracas, F eb. 2, 1810, enclosed in a message 
from Madison to Congress in Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 1273-1274. 
42. William Spence Robertson, France and Latin-American Independence ( Baltimore, 
1939) , 84, 86, 93-95. 
43. Adams to Anderson , May 27, 1823, in Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. by 
W. C. Ford (7 vols., New York, 1913-1917), VII, 478. Hereinafter cited as Adams, 
Writings. 
44. Adams to Monroe, Jan. 28, 1819, Manning, Dip. Car., I, 88. 
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as chairman. From this committee on December 10, 1811, came 
the first offer in a foreign legislative body of sympathy with the 
struggling Spanish-Americans. It took the form of a proposed 
public declaration to the following effect: 
Whereas, Several of the American Spanish Provinces have represented to 
the United States that it has been found expedient for them to associate and 
form federal governments upon the elective and representative plan, and to 
declare themselves free and independent; Therefore be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That they behold with friendly interest, 
the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Spanish Provinces in 
America, consequent upon the actual state of monarchy to which they belong; 
that as neighbors and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United States 
feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that, when these provinces shall have 
attained the conditions of nations, by the just exercise of their rights, the 
Senate and House will unite with the Executive in establishing with them, as 
sovereign and independent states, such amicable relations and commercial 
intercourse as may require their legislative authority.45 
While this is an official statement of sympathy for the Spanish 
Provinces in America, and the first statement of its kind made 
publicly by any branch of the United States government, it should 
be noted that it is a cautious but definite stand. There is nothing 
in it to arouse the enmity of Spain, no denial of her authority, 
and yet there is also an expression of ideas which play an important 
part in the development of United States policy down to the pres-
ent-hemisphere solidarity. 
The general opinion of the United States was that Spain was 
a decadent power, that Ferdinand VII was a tryant and opposed 
to everything the United States held dear. Why, then, this def-
erence to Spain? It would seem that all factors were leading 
toward a close and strong relationship between the United States 
and Spanish America which would bring about the latter's in-
dependence and effectively block European influence, political 
and commercial, in the Western Hemisphere. 
The answer lies, in part, in the unwillingness of many Ameri-
cans to aid in bringing about revolution because they did not 
believe the Spanish-Americans could govern themselves. The 
greater part of the answer lies in the fact that, while Spain was 
a weak and decadent power, she had a powerful ally, England. 
The key, therefore, to Spanish America and American policy re-
garding Spanish America lies in the policies and actions of Eng-
land. For a clear understanding of this complex period, 1810 to 
1815, we must turn our attention to that nation and the somewhat 
erratic development of its policies. 
45. Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 427-428. 
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Pitt had been too absorbed in the European conflict to develop 
a precise Spanish-American policy; Lord Grenville's administra-
tion had been too divided and irresolute to enforce one. Most 
believed that those who succeeded them would hardly remain in 
office long enough to discuss the question. This belief existed 
because the King had turned to his old Tory friends for advisers, 
and a cabinet led by the aged Duke of Portland and composed 
of Pitt's adherents took up the seals of office. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the members of the Duke's administration governed England 
for the next twenty years. 
The task which faced them in 1807 was not auspicious, for there 
were defeats at Buenos Aires, the Dardanelles, and Egypt to be 
announced, and there remained the threat of Napoleon's shadow 
over England. The prospects for England, looked at in their en-
tirety, were discouraging and yet, from the moment of its entry 
into office, the new administration presented a front of boldness 
and determination which was undiminished by the apparent near-
ness of disaster. 
This new and spirited conduct of affairs was the particular re-
sponsibility of two of the Duke of Portland's associates. The first, 
George Canning, who entered the Duke of Portland's cabinet as 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the second, Viscount Castle-
reagh, who became Secretary of War and Colonies. 
For the first six months in power there was very little these men 
could do. It is interesting to note that Canning was relieved at 
Whitelocke's defeat at Buenos Aires, as he felt that had removed 
the necessity of his having to follow the policies of the Talents in 
this regard.46 He informed the nations of Europe that England 
would look more closely at Continental affairs and did take action 
in two instances. He seized the Danish fleet to keep it from Na-
poleon, and helped the Prince Regent of Portugal escape the clutches 
of Napoleon by moving him to Brazil. These moves did not change 
affairs on the Continent, and he then turned toward Spanish Amer-
ica, asking Castlereagh to review that situation. 
Castlereagh, who favored a continuation of war on the Continent, 
thought little of a policy that attempted to combine military occu-
pation and commercial intercourse. Nevertheless, he investigated 
the problem and came up with what appeared to be an answer. 
Conquest was definitely out of the question, the Talents had given 
concrete evidence of that, but Castlereagh thought there was an-
other way. His answer was basically Pitt's old scheme with an 
46, A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and His Times (London, 1859), 128-129. 
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additional twist which Castlereagh believed would be acceptable 
to the Spanish-Americans. He advocated the creation of inde-
pendent monarchies under European princes friendly to England. 
These independent monarchies would replace the old Spanish vice-
royalties and, through their friendship with England, would destroy 
the commercial monopoly of Spain. By attracting the loyalties of 
the Spanish-American population, they would permit England to 
assume the role of a beneficent ally.47 The cabinet approved this 
plan; and Castlereagh, for assistance in carrying it out, turned to a 
man who seemed unable to learn from experience, Miranda. 
An excited and enthusiastic Miranda arrived in Portsmouth in 
December of 1807 and was received in January, 1808, by Canning, 
who thought Miranda's plans were "certainly very inviting." 48 Ac-
cording to Robertson, Miranda had excellent cause to be excited, 
for he was certainly given every reason to believe that this time the 
British government accepted wholeheartedly his plans and would 
carry them out. Colonel Willliamson and Joseph Pavia were dis-
patched to Mexico to bring about a pro-English revolution, and on 
June 6, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley was given his appointment to 
command an expedition against the Spanish colonies. Miranda 
wrote to Admiral Cochrane "that the thing is ultimately decided, 
according to our own wishes, and . . . I shall very soon have 
the satisfaction of taking you by the hand." 49 
Miranda's plans, however, were destined never to materialize. 
Two important factors had not been considered, France and Spain. 
Following the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and brutal suppression 
of a resistance movement in Madrid, France found herself faced 
with a national uprising in Spain. Delegates from Spain arrived 
in England and appealed to Canning for aid. Seeing in this an 
opportunity to get at France, Canning immediately turned the 
attention of the British government to the Continent and the cabinet 
accepted his change of plans.50 
Canning's change of policy meant the death of English aid to 
Miranda and his plans. Sir Arthur Wellesley was given new orders, 
sending him to Spain, and only if there were no chance of success 
there was he to go to South America.51 At the same time Castle-
47. Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to South America, May 1, 1807, in Cor-
respondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh; Second Marquess of 
Londonderry, ed. by Charles W. Vane ( 12 vols., London, 1848-1853 ), VII, 315-826. 
Here::inafter cited as Castlereagh, Papers. 
48. Canning to Castlereagh, Jan. 4, 1808, in ibid., VIII, 158. 
49. Miranda to Cochrane, May 5, 1808, Robertson, The Life of Miranda, II, 15-16. 
50 J. Holland Rose, "Canning and the Spanish Patriots in 1808," American Historical 
Review, XII(1906), 39. 
51. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, II, 18. 
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reagh' s earlier instructions were canceled, and the new policy was 
set forth in a dispatch to the Governor of Jamaica which stated, .. by 
the insurrection in the Asturias, some probability of restoring the 
Spanish monarchy is revived," and as this was .. an object of the first 
importance in his Majesty's mind, it is wished to suspend any 
measure tending to divide and therefore weaken that monarchy." 52 





THE beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed a 
greatly renewed interest in the Western Hemisphere by the French 
government under Napoleon. This interest came from the desire 
of France to regain a colonial empire and through Napoleon's 
effort to make effective his Continental System. 
The French government had been informed by various observers 
that Spanish administration was weak and that the defensive sys-
tem was such as to make conquest easy. French emigres were 
enthusiastic and untiring in informing Napoleon of the humiliation 
of the Spanish-Americans. These people were, in the opinion of 
the informers, controlled by a government which had neither the 
ability to govern them nor the power to protect them. These 
observers believed that the Spanish-Americans were in a state of 
apathy, which indicated a change would be welcomed, and who 
better than Napoleon could bring the change? It was suggested, 
as early as 1803, that Napoleon found a French mining colony in 
the Plata, a colony which would not only bring revenue to France 
and give France the beginning of a new colonial empire, but would 
at the same time threaten the flank of both the Portuguese and 
the Spanish holdings in South America. To the emigre observers 
the key to all of southern South America was the Plata.1 French 
commercial agents such as Frangois de Pons, agent in the Captaincy 
General of Venezuela in 1806, maintained that only the French 
could save Spanish America from the English. 
In spite of what seemed to French commercial agents and emigre 
observers a golden opportunity to seize a rich colonial empire, 
Napoleon's actions were somewhat dilatory and, no doubt, in view 
, 1. C. L. Lokke, ed., "French Designs on Paraguay in 1803," Hispanic American His-
torical Review, VII(l928), 396-401. 
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of the defeat of Le Clerc and the transfer of Louisiana to the 
United States, shocking. However, Napoleon had been busy on 
the Continent and not until 1807 did he develop his Iberian policy, 
thereby becoming the instigator of the movements in the Spanish 
and Portuguese colonies that eventually led to their independence. 
The extension of the Napoleonic political system to the Iberian 
peninsula was a direct result of the struggle for supremacy between 
England and France. Napoleon's Iberian policies were aimed at 
destroying England and English power and were predicated upon 
English actions. Napoleon's combined French and Spanish fleet 
had been defeated October 21, 1805, by Lord Nelson at Trafalgar, 
putting to rest British fears of invasion. However, scarcely a 
month later came Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. Thus, by the 
end of 1805, England controlled the seas and Napoleon held the 
Continent. As they could not get at each other, they were driven 
to indirect devices. Both powers turned to the use of the blockade. 
England established a naval blockade against French controlled 
ports, using a system of fees and licenses to curb neutral trade. 
Napoleon, in turn, ordered a ''paper" blockade against England, 
and closed European ports under his control to English goods, 
thus instigating his Continental System. 2 His concept was that 
by stopping British trade he would close British factories, causing 
bread lines to appear, riots to develop, and revolution to spring up, 
which in tum would force England to accept French terms. 
For this plan to be successful the nations of the Iberian peninsula 
mu.st also close their ports to British trade. An agreement had been 
made with Portugal in 1800, and supplemented in 1801, to the 
effect that Portugal would not give aid to the enemies of France 
and that her harbors would be closed to English trade. This re-
quirement was not fulfilled, and no real attempt to enforce it was 
made until February, 1805. At that time Talleyrand sent General 
J unot to remind the Prince Regent of the agreement and to inform 
him that France now expected him to honor and enforce it. 
Junot's mission failed, but Napoleon did little about it until July 
of 1807, when he requested the Portuguese ambassador to inform 
his government that France wanted the ports closed, all Englishmen 
arrested and their property taken. The result was the opposite of 
that desired by Napoleon. The requests frightened the Prince 
Regent John and tied Portugal more closely to England. As the 
2. For a complete list of restrictions, orders and decrees on neutral trade see A. C. 
Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and 
Napol.eon, 1793-1812 (Philadelphia, 1932), 9-14. 
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Prince Regent made no effort to carry out Napoleon's requests he 
was informed to do so immediately or France would declare war. 
Napoleon's objective, when he determined to occupy Portugal 
toward the end of 1807, was to seal off from the British the last ports 
of Western Europe and thus complete his Continental blockade. 
In this, his immediate objective, he was completely successful; how-
ever, in depriving England of one market he was instrumental in 
giving her another which was perhaps of greater value.3 When 
Canning was made aware of the Napoleonic threat to Portugal, he 
entered into negotiations with Souza Coutinho, at that time the 
Portuguese Ambassador to London, regarding the creation of new 
relations between England and Portugal. The result of these ne-
gotiations was the Convention of October 22, 1807, by which the 
two States agreed to friendship and alliance. England assured the 
Prince Regent that if it were necessary for him to leave Portugal 
for Brazil the British navy would escort him. It was understood 
that if such a move occurred the Prince Regent would take with 
him the Portuguese navy and merchant marine, thus keeping them 
out of Napoleon's hands. It was also understood that if Prince John 
anived in Brazil there would be further negotiation in regard to 
British commerce. The Prince Regent, however, did not ratify the 
agreement until after the English instituted a blockade of the 
Portuguese ports and word was received that Napoleon had crossed 
the border.4 
In the meantime, Napoleon had negotiated with Spain the Treaty 
of Fontainebleau, October 27, 1807. By this treaty Napoleon agreed 
to recognize Charles IV as the Emperor of the two Americas, and 
both parties agreed to the dismemberment of Portugal. For this 
purpose, a supplement to the treaty granted permission for Na-
poleon to move French troops through Spanish territory into Por-
tugal. 
Using as an excuse the malign influence of Britain and the sub-
servience of the Portuguese ruler to England the forces of Napoleon, 
under the command of General Junot, entered Lisbon November 
29, 1807. He was, however, too late to make a prisoner of the 
Prince Regent John, as he had embarked on the 27th, and left Lisbon 
harbor early on the 29th, for Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, under the pro-
tection of the British navy. Upon his arrival in Rio de Janeiro the 
Prince Regent immediately opened the Brazilian ports to the com-
3. Alan K. Manchester, Brit-ish Preeminence in Brazil, Its Rise and Decline ( Chapel 
Hill, 1933). 
4. Temperly, Life of Canning, 80-81. 
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merce of friendly nations. This was followed by negotiations with 
Lord Percy Strangford, the British envoy to Portugal, who arrived 
in Rio de Janeiro July 22, 1808, which resulted in a treaty of com-
merce being signed February 10, 1810. This treaty was "to make 
the Brazils an emporium for British manufactures destined for the 
consumption of the whole of South America." 5 The treaty was a 
reward for British aid and granted to them a special preference of 
fifteen per cent on their goods entering Brazil. British manufac-
tured goods, long bottled up by Napoleon, poured into Brazil, and 
by 1812, four-fifths of England's exports to South America were 
passing through that colony's ports. 6 In the long run Napoleon's 
policy here backfired and proved quite beneficial to the British. 
Jefferson's embargo prevented the merchants of the United States 
taking advantage of the opening of the Brazilian ports. In spite of 
the bitter denunciations by the New England Federalists, Jefferson 
insisted that the embargo was necessary to maintain peace--a state 
of affairs Jefferson believed should be maintained at any cost. Na-
poleon was delighted with Jefferson and felt that the United States 
was playing his game. He rejoiced over the widening gap between 
the United States and England and was quite happy, since he could 
not successfully blockade England, to receive American aid along 
this line. Napoleon even went so far as to pretend to help the 
United States enforce the embargo. The same day that Canning 
wrote to Strangford regarding Brazil becoming an emporium for 
British manufactures, Napoleon issued his Bayonne decree, April 
17, 1808, which ordered the seizure of all American ships in French 
harbors. Thus, between the embargo and the Orders in Council of 
England and Decrees of France, American shipping all but ceased 
and American policy, temporarily at least, played directly into Na-
poleon's hands.7 
The incidents just discussed aided the English government in 
finding a solution to the difficult problem of English policy toward 
the Spanish-Americans and Spain. England's ability and her ardent 
desire to supply the South Americans, both Portuguese and Spanish, 
with goods was looked upon by these people as an outright ex-
pression of British good-will. Neither the encouragement nor the 
5. Canning to Strangford, April 17, 1808, in Manchester, British Preeminence in 
Brazil, 18. 
6. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil, 90-97. 
7. There are two excellent studies of the embargo: L. M. Sears, Jefferson and the 
Embargo (Durham, 1927) and W. W. Jennings, The American Embargo: 1807-1809 
(Iowa City, 1921). A very d etailed treatment of the problems here involved may be found 
in Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administrations of 
Jefferson and Madison (9 vols., New York, 1889-1891). 
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example of the North Americans, nor the French propaganda which 
Napoleon poured upon them, competed with the stream of badly 
needed English goods. If the British, to carry on their war effort 
against France, needed trade, the colonists needed English goods 
to survive. The revolutionary juntas had no effective means of 
taxation and were, therefore, dependent upon the customs duties 
to maintain their revolts. Commerce alone assured the British an 
initial deference in the minds of most Latin Americans. 8 
The adroit and elastic English mind was well able to see ways 
of increasing any favors granted them without great risk of offend-
ing or raising the outright enmity of Spain. English ministers could 
state, off the record and quite confidentially, that England would 
protect the colonists from France should Spain collapse. Revolu-
tionary leaders could quietly receive private funds. The Foreign 
Office could receive, as had been done in the past, revolutionary 
agents at the back door and permit them to purchase arms and 
supplies, and the Royal navy could very discreetly protect such 
commerce. These attentions were extended to the Latin Americans 
as evidence of British intentions and were of great significance in 
Anglo-Spanish-American relations, as well as in the aid given to the 
development of English policy. 
Napoleon, after the escape of Prince John, turned his attention 
toward Spain, and in January sent his troops into that unfortunate 
country. Manuel Godoy suggested that the royal family move 
from Madrid to Seville, thinking of this step as being the first 
in a long journey to Buenos Aires. The French Emperor, however, 
had no intention of letting the Spanish monarch slip through his 
fingers as had the Portuguese ruler. Ferdinand, the Well Beloved, 
played directly into his hands by forcing the abdication of Charles 
IV and placing himself upon the throne. Napoleon lured both 
Charles IV and Ferdinand to Bayonne, France, where they were 
forced to cede to Napoleon sovereignty over Spanish dominions. 
This phase of Napoleon's policy was completed by May 10, 1808. 
lt was followed immediately by French merchants being encour-
aged to trade with the Spanish colonies. Napoleon was ready for 
the next step, to take over the control of the Spanish colonies. 
On June 15, 1808, an Assembly of Notables, composed of some 
one hundred and fifty Spaniards, influenced by Murat. met at 
Bayonne. The following June 20th, this Assembly recognized 
Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain and the Indies. It is interesting 
to note that also present, and for the first time in their history, 
8. Goebel, "British Trade" in HAHR, XLIII(l938), 311. 
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were selected persons to represent the Spanish-American colonies 
of Mexico, La Plata, Venezuela, and New Granada.9 
Napoleon's plans now materialized in great clarity. He did not 
intend to take the Spanish colonies by conquest and tie them by 
chains of war to France; apparently, Toussaint L'Overture had 
taught him something. Instead, he would give them a legal 
monarch, and control through his influence over the throne. In 
this manner British trade could be blocked and the French would 
have wide open markets. To assure these markets to France, 
Napoleon and Joseph signed a treaty stating that Napoleon ceded 
the right of the crown of Spain and the Indies to Joseph. Included 
in the treaty was a French guarantee of the territorial integrity of 
the colonies which Spain possessed and an agreement allowing the 
introduction of French goods with no heavier duties or charges 
than Spanish vessels paid.10 
From June of 1808, until December, 1809, Napoleon expended 
a great amount of time, energy, and money in an effort to win to 
his side the American colonies of Spain. Through Joseph, Napoleon 
gave to every province in the Spanish dominions the right to send 
deputies to the Cortes. For the first time, the colonies were to 
enjoy the same rights as the Mother country. Reforms in other 
lines were caried out, e. g., one legal code was adopted applicable 
to Spanish America as well as Spain; one commercial code was 
put in force which included such attractive items as reciprocity 
between the colonies and Spain, no special privileges to any party 
in regard to exports or imports, and agriculture and industry with-
out molestation in the colonies. In an effort to convince the 
Spanish-American colonists that Spain as a nation maintained the 
integrity of her dominions and her independence, Napoleon decided 
to leave the governing personnel in the colonies as it had been 
under Charles IV and Ferdinand VII; however, under the cloak 
of being the protector and restorer of Spain, he placed in the posi-
tions of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Indies and 
Minister of the Treasury, individuals who were partial to French 
interests. 
Napoleon,s policy toward Spanish America was now a two-fold 
affair. He wanted to convince the colonists that the dynasty in 
Spain had changed, but that the monarchy remained, and he 
9. For a d etailed discussion of the actions of Napoleon and Murat and an account 
of the gratitude and appreciation of the deputies from Spanish America, see: W. S. 
Robertson, Ff'ance and Latin-American Independence (Baltimore, 1939), 25-38. For the 
pages on French policy that follow, the writer is largely indebted to this excellent study 
by W. S. Robertson. 
IO. Ibid., 38-39. 
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wanted to check English gains and intrigue. A tremendous propa-
ganda campaign was instituted to enlighten the colonists to the 
advantages which would come to them by the regeneration of 
Spain. He sent muskets, sabres, powder and lead, and ordered 
the creation of a navy for the protection of Spanish America. To 
make certain that the Spanish-Americans gained knowledge of all 
that was being done for them, and who was responsible for it, as 
well as to see that they were informed of the greatness and power 
of Napoleon, French missions were sent to the viceroyalties. 
Among these missions was that of the Marquis de Sassenay 11 
to Buenos Aires. Sassenay, a French royalist, had been an emigre 
to the United States, during which time he had engaged in com-
mercial activities which had twice taken him to Buenos Aires. 
On his first voyage, Sassenay remained in Buenos Aires six months; 
the second, two years, September, 1801, to May, 1803, during 
which time he became quite intimate with his compatriot, Santiago 
Liniers, who, by 1808, had become viceroy of the Viceroyalty of 
the Rfo de la Plata. De Sassenay's career as an emigre was well 
known to the French authorities from the close scrutiny of his 
affairs entailed in granting him amnesty in 1804. Thus, Sassenay 
was chosen because he had lived in Buenos Aires, knew the lan-
guage, and was well acquainted with Liniers. He was summoned to 
Bayonne immediately after Charles IV and Ferdinand VII ceded 
to Napoleon Spain and the Indies, arrived there May 29th, was 
given his instructions dated the same day, and put to sea for 
Buenos Aires the next day aboard the Consolateur. Napoleon 
was wasting no time. 
Sassenay's instructions, signed by Champagny, Duke of Cadore, 
May 29, 1808, informed him that he was to deliver his despatches 
to Liniers and to explain, as if he had been an eye-witness, what 
had been done at Bayonne, and how happy the Spanish people were 
with the prospect of regeneration under Joseph Bonaparte. He 
was to observe carefully the effects produced on the authorities 
by the news of the changes which had occurred in Spain, to gather 
all the information possible about Spanish America, particularly 
the Viceroyalty of La Plata and, if possible, information of the 
same kind regarding Chile and Peru. He was to gather this in-
formation and return as rapidly as possible.12 
Landing at Maldonado on August 9, Sassenay proceeded to 
11. For the Sessenay mission the writer is indebted to C. H. E. Marquis de Sassenay, 
Napoleon I•r et la fondation de la Republique Argentine (Paris, 1892). Hereinafter cited 
as Sassenay, Republique Argentine. 
12. Ibid., 132-134. 
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Montevideo where he found Elio, the governor, on the point of 
administering to the people the oath of fidelity to Ferdinand VII. 
To the envoy's suggestion that the governor await the news from 
Bayonne at Buenos Aires, Elio gave an emphatic refusal. Sassenay 
went on to Buenos Aires, arriving at the capital August 13, where 
he expected to be received by his old comrade with open arms; 
instead, he was treated with a cold formality and left to cool his 
heels in ante-chambers before being granted an audience by the 
viceroy. Liniers, in order to avoid any appearance of working with 
the French, chose to receive him in company with members of the 
cabildo of Buenos Aires. For this assembly the despatch box was 
opened and Sassenay read the acts by which Charles IV, Ferdi-
nand VII, and the infantas renounced the Spanish throne and the 
despatches of Champagny in which Joseph's recognition as king 
was recommended. To these were attached the formal command 
of the Spanish Ministers and the Council of Castile that the oath 
of allegiance to Ferdinand VII should not be administered.13 Of 
the immediate results of this reading Sassenay says: 
When the members of the junta became aware of the contents of the 
despatches, I was informed that they had no desire whatever for any other 
king than Ferdinand VII. Several members were of the opinion that they 
should take violent measures against me and that I should be detained; but 
finally the view prevailed that I should be required to embark immediately 
for Montevideo . . . I am convinced that, if the viceroy had had the 
means or perhaps if he had more audacity, and if I had been able to return 
to Europe, events might have taken a different course.14 
Sassenay was forced to leave Buenos Aires immediately, but 
Elio was not as generous as the people of Buenos Aires, informing 
the French envoy that news from Cadiz reported that war had 
broken out between France and Spain, and, therefore, Sassenay 
was a prisoner of war. It was clear that the people of the Plata 
considered the actions of Na pol eon as interference with their own 
independent action, and that they preferred to conduct their own 
affairs without foreign meddling. After twenty-one months Sas-
senay escaped and made good his return to France. 
Napoleon's missions to other parts of Spanish America met with 
similar fates, but probably the most emphatic protest against N apo-
leon' s policy came from the Plata. The viceroy Liniers was ousted 
almost immediately and Dean Gregorio Funes, acting Bishop of 
Cordoba, took up his pen and blasted Napoleon's hopes as far as 
the Rio de la Plata was concerned, stating that while they had been 
13. Ibid., 245-249. 
14. Ibid., 251-252. 
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in doubt Napoleon had made their decision for them and they 
belonged to Ferdinand, not Napoleon.15 
In the meantime, the Central Junta at Seville formally declared 
war upon France, and addressed despatches to officials in Spanish 
America to maintain inviolable the bonds with Spain. The junta 
also sent delegates to England asking Canning for English aid 
against France.16 Thus it was Napoleon's Iberian policy which 
again came to the aid of the somewhat stumbling attempts of Eng-
land to form a Spanish-American policy. 
This appeal for English aid seemed to Canning such a great op-
portunity that he did not hesitate to send it in spite of the complex 
situation. It is a recognized fact that Canning was not in favor of 
nationality, but in this case we have at least one instance where he 
stepped out of character. Not only did Canning himself step out 
of character, but it appears that England adopted methods she 
despised and denounced, for England ignored the official organ of 
state and entered into relations with sectional rebels or organiza-
tions within that state. Canning helped the struggling juntas of 
each province with money, arms and equipment, but he would not 
recognize the provincial juntas as political entities, for he wanted 
to foster the formation of a Spanish national assembly. This policy 
meant allying with a nation, not with a government; it meant break-
ing with a government which most Spanish did not trust, and nego-
tiating with individuals who were patriots. War, indeed, makes 
strange bedfellows. 
The efforts of Joseph and Napoleon Bonaparte to control Spanish 
America through alliance with Spain, rather than rivalry with her, 
were abandoned after the stands taken by the Seville junta and 
Canning. Napoleon, forced to modify his policy, decided to use 
secret agents to foment revolution in Spanish America. His ap-
proach now was to be that of a liberator who wanted in return 
nothing but friendly relations and commerce. For this he would 
ship the Spanish-Americans arms, ammunition, and other supplies 
needed for their revolution. The Emperors' propaganda reminded 
the Spanish-Americans that it had been France that aided in the 
independence of the United States, and his agents emphasized the 
difference between a progressive United States and an enslaved 
15. For a discussion of this proclamation see Robertson, France and Latin-American 
lndep~ndence, 60. For the proclamation see Gregorio Funes, Proclama al clero del obispado 
~e Cord?ba de Tucuman por su provisor gobemador ( Buenos Aires, 1808). The above 
information will be found in pages 2 to 7 of Funes' proclamation. 
6. See pages 32 and 33 this paper. 
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Spanish America.17 Use was ,also made of the United States as a 
base of operations for the secret agents of N apoleon.18 
In the meantime, Joel Barlow had been appointed Minister to 
France, and had been instructed by Secretary of State James 
Monroe that the Ministers of the United States were to promote 
the recognition of Venezuela by other nations.19 Barlow's instruc-
tions, as far as France was concerned, were hardly necessary, for 
even as they were being drawn up conversations were taking place 
between Jonathan Russell, American Charge d'AHairs at Paris, and 
the Duke of Bassano, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, re-
garding French policy toward Spanish possessions in America. On 
August 20, 1811, Serurier stated that the Emperor had decided •'to 
acknowledge and confirm the independence of every portion of these 
possessions which should have the spirit and the physical means to 
assert it." 20 
The conversations between Russell and Bassano apparently cov-
ered ways and means of aiding the Spanish colonies, for in his re-
port to Monroe, Russell stated that France was disposed to send 
arms, ammunition, and "military skill (officers)." Russell added 
that it had been intimated by Bassano that the "only mode in which 
this aid could be officaciously furnished was through the concur-
rence and agency of the United States." Assurances were given 
Russell that Count Serurier "would be instructed to submit to the 
American Government precise propositions on this subject." 21 At 
the suggestion of Russell, Bassano agreed that East and West Florida 
could not maintain independence and that "their annexation to the 
United States would entirely accord with the policy of His Majesty." 
The willingness of France for close cooperation with the United 
States regarding Spanish America was made quite clear to Joel 
Barlow who, shortly after his arrived in Paris, sent the following to 
Secretary of State Monroe: 
The Emporer has determined to declare the Spanish Americans free and 
17. This reformulation of policy was formally presented to the Corps Legislatif on 
December 12, 1809. L e Moniteur Universel, December 14, 1809, quoted in Robertson, 
France and Latin-American Independence, 73. 
18. For a discussion of the establishment of these centers for revolution in the United 
States see ibid., 67-104. The unrecognized Spanish Minister to the United States, Luis 
d e Onis, was well aware of Napoleon's agents and their schemes. He wrote to the Spanish 
officials to watch for these French agents slipping into Spanish territory and considered 
Americans blind for not seeing what was going on. See Onis to Captain General of 
Caracas, Feb. 2, 1810, Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 1273-1274. 
19. James Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, including a Collection of his Public 
and Private Papers and Correspondence now for the First Time Printed, ed. by S. M. 
Hamilton (7 vols., New York, 1898-1903), V, 364. H ereinafter cited as Monroe, 
Writings. 
20. Russell to Monroe, Sept. 2, 1811, Manning, D ip. Cor., II, 1371. 
21. Ibid. 
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independent and to give them arms and ammunition to defend themselves; 
this however on condition that they shall not connect themselves with England 
by exclusive privileges of trade. He probably means, tho' the Duke did not 
say it, that they shall adopt the Continental system of Europe and exclude the 
Engli h trade altogether. He wants American aid in transporting the arms 
and ammunition. 
Secondly, the Emporer wishes the United States to establish regular packets 
between them and France, to run monthly, and he will pay half the expence.22 
On January 8, 1812, Minister Barlow wrote Bassano that the 
Provinces of Venezuela had declared their independence and had 
proposed that the United States recognize them. He informed Bas-
sano that although recognition had not yet been extended, a friendly 
and conciliatory answer had been returned. Barlow also told Bas-
sano the Venezuelans had been notified that the Ministers of the 
United States would be instructed to promote the recognition of 
their Independence by other powers. He stated how "happy" 
President Madison was that the Emperor "is animated with the same 
good will towards the Spanish colonies in America, and that he 
harmonizes with the President in the desire to see them independ-
ent." Barlow also expressed the belief Buenos Aires would soon 
follow the example set by Venezuela. 23 
These conversations and the notes exchanged between the United 
States and France prepared the way for a rapprochment between 
these two powers in regard to Spanish America and Spanish-Amer-
ican policy. When viewed in conjunction with the public declara-
tion of the United States of December 10, 1811,24 it would appear 
that the United States favored American and French support of 
independence for Spanish America. The United States was moving 
toward opposition to Ferdinand VII and England. 
American ambitions along this line met two disasters. One was 
the terrible earthquake of March, 1812, in Venezuela, which was 
the beginning of a series of misfortunes ending in the defeat of 
Miranda; the second was the treaty acknowledged by the Emperor 
in December, 1813, which restored to Ferdinand VII the throne of 
Spain and the lndies.25 These two events forced the United States 
back into a more conventional neutrality. The war of 1812 effec-
tively checked any serious consideration of Spanish America, other 
than contiguous territory such as Florida. 
British policy was altered by the actions of the Spanish junta, 
L .22. Bru:Iow to Monroe, Sept. 29, 1811, in ibid., II, 1372. Robertson, Ff'ance and 
atm-Am81'tean Independence, 93, gives the date Sept. 20, for this document, which is 
probably a typographical error. Barlow had not yet arrived in Paris at that date. 
23. Barlow to Bassano, Jan. 8, 1812, Manning, Dip. Cor., II, 1373. 
24. See page 30 of this paper. 
25. See Robertson, France and Latin-AmBf'ican Independence, 103. 
45 
France, and the United States. Canning, as we have seen, com-
mitted England to aid the Spanish patriots, and the British govern-
ment stuck grimly to this promise in spite of early disasters upon 
the peninsula. Not only did England sign a treaty of peace, friend-
ship and alliance with the central junta of Seville, 26 but it dropped 
the single-minded policy it had followed in the early period of the 
Spanish-American uprising and even arranged for the expulsion 
of one plotter against Spanish possessions, Aaron Burr, from Eng-
land.27 Canning continued to insist that England would counten-
ance no effort to interfere in the government of Spanish America, 
a warning quite disturbing to American policy makers. 
The British hoped that the Seville junta would generously reward 
them by granting them direct trade through open ports or by sanc-
tioning their existing contraband trade. To British chagrin, the 
Seville junta was not so inclined and actually tried to prevent the 
colonists from learning that England was giving assistance to 
Spain. 28 In spite of all Canning did, the Spanish junta stood on its 
argument that the colonies had been elevated to a status of legal 
equality with Spain and nothing further need be done. Spanish 
officials were fully aware that England was now wholly committed 
to the Continental struggle, and were impervious to all appeals. 
The British government now faced a real dilemma; they could 
not withdraw from the Peninsular War, and they could not drop 
their interest in Spanish America. In regard to the latter, British 
policy makers found themselves faced with revolutionists who, for 
the sake of trade and commerce, must be pleased. On the other 
hand, Spain was her ally and England could not afford to create 
further disturbances in the form of revolution in the colonies. To 
do so would detract from Spanish efforts against Napoleon. Addi-
tional problems came from three other sources: English merchants 
who were clamoring for Spanish-American trade, the growing inter-
est in Latin America, and the drawing together of the United States 
and France. British policy, indeed, needed to be readjusted. The 
question was, how could it be done? It was clear even to the unini-
tiated that no single solution existed for these diverse probems. 
The United States was warned by Canning that the British gov-
ernment could not see with indifference an attack upon Spanish 
26. January 14, 1809. 
27. This was done at the instigation of the Spanish envoy. Isaac J, Cox, " Hispanic-
American Phases of the 'Burr Conspiracy,'" Hispanic American Historical Review, XII 
( 1932 ), 171-172. 
28. J. Holland Rose, "Canning and the Spanish Patriots in 1808," American Historical 
Review, XII( 1906), 47. 
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holdings. 29 For the rest, the British government was content for a 
time to follow a program of threats and contraband well mixed 
with special pleading based upon all that England was doing for 
Spain. 
In October, 1809, Canning and Castlereagh broke with one an-
other, fought a duel and resigned their posts; the Duke of Portland 
resigned also. Spencer Perceval emerged to establish a new ad-
ministration, placing in the Foreign Office Lord Wellesley, whom 
he recalled from Spain to fill the position. The chief characteristics 
of Wellesley were indolence and irresponsibility, shrouded with an 
absence of method, and yet he possessed a powerful intellect. 
Wellesley, faced with a Peninsular War and the economic prob-
lems involved, attempted to avoid the Spanish-American question. 
The very factors, however, that prompted Wellesley's desire to 
avoid the question of Spanish America, forced him to make some 
gesture, at least, toward solving the problem. The British were 
now convinced that only uninterrupted access to the Latin American 
market could support their credit and pay for the Peninsular War. 
Wellesley, therefore, again brought forth the old appeal of Can-
ning's that England be allowed to trade directly with South America. 
This appeal was repeated time after time, and always received a flat 
rejection from the Spanish Cortes, which, under the domination of 
the Cadiz merchants, wanted to keep their virtual monopoly of the 
colonial markets. 
The Spanish Cortes, however, feeling perfectly safe, and certain 
that England would not withdraw from the Peninsular War, failed 
to weigh properly the discontent and dissatisfaction within the 
Spanish Empire. It also overlooked the fact that the favor which 
England was asking could come from another source. England 
would take no overt step which would anger Spain, but there were 
other steps that could be taken. 
To the British, attempting to find a way out of their dilemma, the 
revolutions were a godsend. Wherever rebellion appeared in Span-
ish America two factors accompanied it: one, the newly formed 
juntas opened their ports to trade with friendly nations, and, two, 
they swore allegiance to Ferdinand VII. As far as the British were 
concerned the major part of their problem was solved. The English 
argued that difference of opinion had arisen between the colonies 
and Spain, not revolution. They could carry on unrestrained com-
U }~ fanning to Jackson, July l, 1809, in "Instructions to the British Ministers to the 
SDI e tates, 1791-1812," American Historical Report, Bernard Mayo, ed., III, 292. 
ee also Morier to Smith, D ec. 15, 1810, Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 1261-1262. 
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merce with the colonies and yet avoid breaking in any way their 
treaty obligation to maintain intact the Spanish Empire. 
This policy of pretended ignorance of the state of Spanish-
American affairs was pointed up by conversations, in July of 1810, 
between Lord Wellesley and the Venezuelan agents, Simon Bolivar 
and Luis Lopez Mendez. The meeting was a ticklish one, for if 
Wellesley gave an unrestrained welcome and encouragement to the 
two agents, relations with Spain would be endangered. On the 
other hand, English relations with South America would be en-
dangered if the agents were turned away. Wellesley refused to 
permit the topic of independence to come before the group, but 
instead discussed the question of local self-government within the 
framework of the Spanish Empire. To England this was a perfect 
way out, as it would serve a multiple purpose. Wellington and the 
English forces in Spain had to be considered, for if Spain turned 
against England these forces would be caught in hostile country. 
The discussions as directed by Wellesley would provide a com-
promise between Spain's determination to retain full sovereignty 
and the colonists' desire to assert their independence. Both, there-
fore, could look upon England as a friend. At the same time Eng-
land, by a careful use of such a plan, could keep out French and 
American influence and gain for England the benefits of the trade 
and commerce of Spanish America. 30 This was not a simple and 
uncomplicated policy to follow. It was, indeed, a tightrope, with 
deference having to be paid to the prejudices of Spain and sym-
pathy afforded to the colonies. 
The problem, however, was not yet settled, for Spain refused to 
accept the new conditions and planned, at the first opportunity, to 
reassert her full control over the colonies. Although the Spanish 
government could find nothing de.finite to protest in British actions, 
it had no intention of permitting the British to entrench themselves 
commercially within the Spanish Empire. The upsetting fact to 
the British government was that Spain refused to accept as final 
the dissolution of her colonial monopoly, thereby destroying Welles-
ley's dream of England inheriting by default the Spanish-American 
market. The Regency and the Cortes in Spain refused to under-
stand the financial problems facing England and, being so-called 
Liberals, thought they had solved all the colonial troubles by 
30. William S. Robertson, "The Beginnings of Spanish-American Diplomacy," in 
Essays in American History Dedicated to Frederick Jackson Turner, ed. by Guy S. Ford 
(New York, 1910), 247. 
granting them equal rights with Spain. They, therefore, disre-
garded the material grievances of the colonial juntas and, in spite of 
the Peninsular War, determined to enforce their control in Spanish 
America.81 
The re-establishment of Spanish control over the colonies would 
mean a return to the definitely restricted trade of the earlier period 
and the dependence for the most part upon contraband. It was 
clear to England that the most Spain would give would be tem-
porary concessions. If England were to have her markets then 
English policy must once again be readjusted. Wellesley, tired of 
having his warnings ignored and his advice rejected, now decided to 
insist upon settlement, comprehensive in scope, of the Spanish 
quarrels. He changed his stand to one which stated that the 
colonists had an argument, and insisted that Spain recognize their 
claims. He now took the position of insisting upon a certain meas-
ure of self-determination for the Spanish colonists and of mediation 
between them and Spain. England, of course, would be the media-
tor. Thus was established the British policy that would carry them 
through the Napoleonic war. 
Lord Wellesley did not push through this new policy for in 
March of 1812 he resigned, and Lord Castlereagh became his suc-
cessor. This was a happy choice, for Castlereagh was already ac-
quainted with the problems of Spanish America and was possessed 
of an infinite supply of patience. The latter was an attribute 
greatly needed in dealing with Spain. 
The idea of mediation proved a happy one. The Spanish, finally 
beginning to realize that England was more necessary to them than 
they were to England, felt as long as the conversations continued 
English policy would remain limited and, in time, Spain might 
regain the allegiance of her colonies- through force. Castlereagli 
was also content to spin the negotiations out interminably. He 
discovered that they tended to prevent Spain from taking more than 
a few thousand troops from the Peninsular War and sending them 
to the colonies. They had also made somewhat .easier the flow 
of trade and had to a degree restrained the colonists themselves 
from going to the extreme of independence, which at this time 
would have played into the hands of the United States and France. 
Thus, Castlereagh used mediation as a device which, while it settled 
nothing, prevented the tensions within the Spanish Empire from 
manifesting themselves too violently for the duration of the war. 
If England came out of the war as the victor, then the time gained 
would have eliminated France. With the United States involving 
31. Ibid., 238. 
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itself in a painful and fruitless conflict with England the Americans 
would have few, if any, resources left over to devote to Latin 
America. Talk was cheap, and, to all intents and purposes, would 
in the end pay off better than action. 
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Chapter IV 
Early United States Missions 
THE decade following the overthrow of the Spanish vice-
roy in the Rio de la Plata found the government of the United States 
torn between conflicting desires and policies toward Spanish Amer-
ica. The negotiations of the struggling Buenos Aires government to 
obtain recognition from the United States were complicated by un-
willingness of the United States to extend succor and recognition 
for fear of offending the great European powers and blocking 
negotiations with Spain that would give Florida to the United States. 
In spite of all this caution and "watchful waiting," the United 
States government did intend to recognize the government of 
Buenos Aires when it could be done in accordance with what were 
considered the best interests of the United States. From 1810 to 
1823, the story of the relations between the United States and 
Buenos Aires is concerned with the attempts of the latter to get 
aid and recognition through various quasi-diplomatic agents. At 
the same time the commercial and political interests of the United 
States motivated the sending of special agents and commissions 
from the United States to the Rio de la Plata to look after the com-
mercial interests of North Americans, as well as to report on the 
progress of the revolution, the political stability of the country, 
and the ability of the Buenos Aires government to maintain its 
independence from Spain. 
In 1808, when the news reached Buenos Aires that Napoleon's 
brother had become King of Spain, several criollo leaders of that 
region immediately became interested in winning independence 
from Spain. Consequently, on May 20, 1810, under the leadership 
of Manuel Belgrano and other criollo leaders, a demand was made 
that the viceroy, Cisneros, resign. The Spaniards attempted to 
compromise, but on May 25, 1810, the criollo leaders overthrew the 
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viceregal government and set up a funta to govern in the name of 
the deposed King of Spain, Ferdinand VII. At the same time, they 
sent men to England to ask for aid. 
Although the newly created funta at Buenos Aires was presum-
ably working toward unity of action with the Cadiz Regency, it 
soon became evident that some of the leaders were moving steadily 
in the direction of complete independence from Spain. The leaders 
of the Buenos Aires funta, Cornelio de Saavedra, Belgrano, Moreno, 
and Bernardino Rivadavia, became involved in the question of 
whether the monarchial or republican form of government would 
best meet their needs and whether or not complete independence 
from Spain should be proclaimed. As was inevitable, however, dis-
sensions arose within the funta, and different ambitions came into 
play. The democratic Moreno, finding himself opposed by the con-
servative Saavedra, finally resigned from the funta. Meanwhile, 
military expeditions from Buenos Aires failed to bring Upper Peru, 
Paraguay, and the Banda Oriental under the control of the Rio de la 
Plata capital. 
It soon became apparent that the provinces of the former Vice-
royalty lacked internal unity. The people of the province of Buenos 
Aires, who took the lead in the unification movement, were not 
trusted by those of the other provinces. Within a short time after 
the formation of the funta, the inhabitants of Buenos Aires were 
seeking to establish a centralized state in which their province and 
their capital city should hold first place; whereas, the provinces in 
other parts of La Plata, as well as certain elements in the rural popu-
lation of Buenos Aires province, tended to favor a federal govern-
ment along the model of the United States in which all members of 
the federation might have equal rights. The refusal of either side 
to compromise led to a long period of conflict which seriously 
checked all efforts to form a federal government. 
During the four years following 1810, the funta at Buenos Aires 
was, by popular demand, replaced by a Triumvirate, which in turn 
was replaced by a Council and a Supreme Director. 
While the people of the Plata were trying to establish a stable 
government, there arrived from Europe a brilliant native son, Jose 
de San Martin. San Martin had served in the Spanish army and navy 
since 1789 and had won fame and honor for his military ability. 
Avoiding politics as much as possible, San Martin saw that he might 
best serve the cause by attempting to drive the Spaniards from Peru, 
their greatest stronghold in South America. Accordingly, he was 
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appointed governor of the province of Cuyo at the eastern border 
of the Andes, where he prepared a well-drilled army which he could 
lead into Chile and, using that country as a base, strike at Peru by 
sea. From 1814 to the end of 1816, San Martin molded a cosmo-
politan body of men into a military machine. 
While San Martin was thus occupied, the leaders in the various 
provinces were gradually coming to the point where they desired 
complete independence from Spain. This desire reached a culmina-
tion with the restoration of the conservative Ferdinand VII to the 
throne of Spain. His intent to rule with despotic power was quickly 
evidenced by his proclamation setting aside the liberal constitution 
of 1812, which recognized the colonies as an integral part of the 
nation. Ferdinand's policy caused the liberals in Buenos Aires to 
turn against him and to unite with the revolutionaries in seeking 
complete independence. 
Finally, on July 9, 1816, a congress of delegates meeting at 
Tucuman made a formal declaration of complete independence 
from Spain and organized the country into the "United Provinces 
of South America." An able statesman from Buenos Aires, Juan 
Martin de Pueyrred6n, was given power as Supreme Director to 
govern the country until some form of constitutional government 
could be devised. At this time there was still much divergence 
of opinion as to whether a monarchy or a republic would prove 
more satisfactory. Various French, Portuguese, and Spanish per-
sons of royal blood received consideration. Some desired the 
United Provinces to become a British protectorate, while others 
wanted to place a descendant of the Incas upon a throne. Finally, 
it was agreed to discard all these schemes and to establish some 
form of republican government. This resulted in a bitter struggle 
between the centralists of Buenos Aires and the federalists of 
the provinces. 
By 1819, the United Provinces were in such a chaotic political 
condition that Pueyrred6n became discouraged and resigned his 
office as Supreme Director. General Jose Rondeau was quickly 
chosen to replace him. Also, in 1819, a congress met at Buenos 
Aires and attempted to draw up a new constitution, but this con-
stitution was considered centralistic by many of the interior prov-
inces, which rose in opposition to it. The people of Buenos Aires 
then called in General Belgrano to check the separatist movements 
of the provinces with military force, but Belgrano's men deserted 
him when he attempted to take the field against several of the 
interior provinces. In 1820 the cause of the unitarists suffered a 
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severe setback at Cepeda, where they were defeated by the federal-
ists. Thereafter little progress toward unity was made for several 
years because the various provincial leaders did not sincerely wish 
to see the establishment of any form of strong national government. 
Between 1820 and 1824, the dozen "United Provinces" went their 
separate ways, while Buenos Aires existed as a distinct state under 
its own governor, Martin Rodriguez. When Bernardino Rivadavia 
became Rodriguez's minister, the province of Buenos Aires pros-
pered in many ways and a degree of stability was achieved. 
In the meantime, efforts to solve the problems of ridding southern 
South America of Spanish domination were meeting with success. 
Under the leadership of San Martin, the "Army of the Andes" was 
quietly trained for the projected campaign into Chile and Peru. 
San Martin was convinced that the Rio de la Plata would never be 
free as long as the Spanish held Chile and Peru. By 1814 Spain 
had been freed from French rule and Ferdinand VII had been 
restored to his throne. His efforts to re-establish the Spanish 
Empire by advocating better relations seemed to bear fruit in some 
areas of South America, and in these areas the royalists gained 
some strength. The people of the Plata had little hope of establish-
ing good relations with Ferdinand VII. He believed the only way 
to handle the Plata was with a military force, a threat he con-
stantly held over their head and futilely tried to make a reality. 
He was able to send some aid to northern South America and to 
check for a short time the separatist movement there. But in the 
South, San Martin crossed the Andes and defeated the Spanish 
in two decisive battles, Chacabuco, February 12, 1817, and Maipu, 
April 5, 1818. 
The history of the Rfo de la Plata from 1810 to 1823 is, therefore, 
one of almost complete chaos, anarchy, and foreign war. In view 
of this the United States, domestically involved with a twofold 
problem of territorial expansion and development of stability, and 
in the foreign field struggling to make known its concepts of neu-
trality and arbitration, moved with great circumspection. The 
policy of the United States was neutrality, but its desire was for 
the independence of the Plata and the ousting of European political 
influence. 
The year 1810 saw the first planned effort of the United States to 
extend its agencies in Spanish America. Such agencies were badly 
needed as Thomas Sumpter, Jr., United States Minister at the Por-
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tuguese Court in Brazil,1 was the only formal diplomatic representa-
tive in Latin America. The news of the May revolt in Buenos Aires 
spurred Secretary of State Robert Smith to appoint Joel Roberts 
Poinsett special agent of the United States to South America, that 
is, to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru. Poinsett's instructions of June 
28, 1810, indicate that he was being sent for reasons other than 
merely to look after the commercial interests of the United States. 
He was informed in his instructions that a crisis was approaching 
which "must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish 
America" and might "dissolve altogether its colonial relations to 
Europe." It was felt by the government of the United States that 
the geographic position and "other obvious considerations" made 
it the "duty" of the United States to "take such steps, not incom-
pat~ble with the neutral character and honest policy of the United 
States, as the occasion renders proper." 2 The instructions given to 
Poinsett set the pattern for all agents and consuls sent to Spanish 
America during the period 1810 to 1822. For this reason, if no other, 
they are worthy of at least partial quotation: 
. . . You will make it your object, whenever it may be proper, to diffuse 
the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will toward 
the people of Spanish-America as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion 
of the globe and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly inter-
course; that this disposition will exist, whatever may be their internal system 
or European relation, with respect to which no interference of any sort is 
pretended; and that, in the event of a political separation from the parent 
country, and of the establishment of an independent system of national 
government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United 
States to promote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal intercourse, 
between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all a common interest, and 
as lying under a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice 
and good will, which is the only source of happiness for nations.3 
In addition, Poinsett was instructed to learn the conditions exist-
ing in the colonies, to explain mutual advantages of commerce 
with the United States, "to promote liberal and stable regulations, 
and to transmit reasonable information on the subject." 4 To make 
possible his carrying out these instructions with the greatest de-
gree of protection and respectability, Poinsett was furnished with 
a credential letter as used by similar United States agents in the 
West Indies. 
The concepts expressed by the United States Government in the 
instructions to Poinsett were not its monopoly. It is interesting to 
1. Thomas Sumpter, Jr., of South Carolina, was appointed United States Minister 
to the Portuguese Court in Brazil March 7 , 1809, and continued as such until July 24, 1819. 
2. Smith to Poinsett, June 28, 1810, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 6-7. 
3 . Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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was reluctant to receive him, objecting to the form of his commis-
sion because it was not directed to it and did not bear the signature 
of the President of the United States. Poinsett overcame the mis-
givings entertained by the junta, explaining to them that he bore 
the credentials used by American agents in the West Indies and, 
probably his best card, that he carried the same papers and author-
ity held by the agent recently sent to La Guaira, Venezuela. When 
this explanation had been made and accepted, the junta in part to 
strengthen its own independent position, sent President Madison a 
formal acknowledgement of the arrival and acceptance of "Don 
Josef R. Poinsett" as a commercial agent of the United States. It 
stated further that he would be permitted to carry on "the full exer-
cise of his agency, which it considers as a preliminary to the Treaties 
between Nation and Nation, which will be Rules of a permanent 
Commerce . . between the two States." 10 
Shortly after his arrival in Buenos Aires, Poinsett wrote that the 
Plata was greatly disturbed over Napoleon's aggression in Spain and 
the ambition of the Princess regent of Portugal to become regent 
of all of South America.11 He also wrote that, with the exception 
of Paraguay, all the provinces of the Viceroyalty of La Plata had 
joined the junta.12 A few days later he wrote regarding the forma-
tion of a Congress in Buenos Aires that the towns of Santa F ' , 
Corrientes, Cordoba, Tucuman, Catamarca, Salta, Jujuy, Mendoza, 
San Luis, and San Juan had already sent deputies to Buenos Aires 
and that deputies were on the way from the towns of Rioja, Potosi, 
Santa Cruz, and Oran, as well as from the province of Cochabamba, 
the Presidency of Chuquisaca, the Intendency of La Paz, and 
Chile.13 
While the junta of Buenos Aires assured Poinsett that when this 
Congress of Buenos Aires should meet a declaration of independ-
ence would be forthcoming, Poinsett was of the opinion that it 
would be postponed until a later date.14 At the same time he was 
also assured that Buenos Aires wished to establish close ties with 
10. Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rfo de la Plata to Madison, F eb. 13, 1811, 
DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. See also Mannings, Dip. Cor., I, 320-321. An Argentine historian 
comments that the statem ent in this document regarding a treaty between " ations" 
indicates the boldest political statement by the funta of its desire for ultimate independence 
that appeared to that date. See Juan F . Lazaro, Las vinculaciones de nuestro pa£s con los 
Estadas Unidos en la primera decada de la revoluci6n re-fl,igadas a traoes de la prensa 
periodico ( Buenos Aires, 1937 ) , 5. 
11. Poinsett to Silas Atkins, Feb. 13, 1811, MS., Poinsett Papers, Historical Society, 
Pennsylvania, I, 31. H ereinafter cited as Poinsett Pap. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Poinsett to D epartment of State, Feb. 16, 1811, ibid., I, 93. 
14. Memoranda of Poinsett, ibid., I, 98. 
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the United States and was informed that the commerce of the 
United States would be that of the most-favored-nation. 
From the beginning of his mission Poinsett experienced anxiety 
in regard to the conduct and intentions of the English at Buenos 
Aires. He was constantly watching and attempting to thwart Brit-
ish plans. This attitude probably accounts for the British labeling 
Poinsett as the "arch enemy of England." 15 He wrote that England 
was steadily gaining commercial power, and he viewed with a great 
deal of scorn what he considered the "double dealing" of the British, 
for they were supporting Spain openly against Napoleon, and yet 
were striving to gain commercial advantages from Spain's discon-
tented colonies. He believed that the revolutionary groups feared 
and, at the same time, courted Britain. Therefore, in Poinsett' s 
opinion, if the revolutionary states could be brought to declare their 
independence before the existing relations between Spain and Eng-
land ended, there would be an excellent opportunity to substitute 
American for English influence in Buenos Aires and, through Buenos 
Aires, all of southern South America. With this in mind he advo-
cated sending aid to Buenos Aires in the form of guns and muni-
tions. He also asked for instructions to cover any declaration of 
independence by the junta, and suggested a letter of credence from 
the President of the United States.16 
Secretary of State Monroe refused Poinsett's request for a letter 
of credence, believing the presentation of such a letter would con-
stitute a recognition of those governments. Monroe also made it 
clear that the United States would not actively aid in their struggle 
for independence. One of Poinsett's frequent requests to his gov-
ernment did bear fruit, however, for President Madison appointed 
a resident consul for Buenos Aires and promoted Poinsett to the 
position of Consul-General for Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru.17 
Monroe's reply to Poinsett's recommendations, while perhaps not 
entirely satisfactory to such a strong advocate of the revolution, 
may have been interpreted as something of a concession to his 
great ardor for the cause of the revolutionists. It contained no 
definite promise of immediate recognition but did give a strong 
hint that a successful revolution would meet with the approval of 
the United States. There could be no mistaking this implication 
in Monroe's letter: 
The disposition shown by most of the Spanish provinces to separate from 
Europe and to erect themselves into independent States excites great interest 
15. Joseph Johnson, "A Sketch of Mr. Poinsett's Life," ibid., XXI, 71. 
16. Poinsett to Department of State, Feb. 16, 1811, ibid., I, 93. 
17. Monroe to Poinsett, Apr. 30, 1811, ibid., I, 101. 
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here. As inhabitants of the same Hemisphere, as Neighbors, the United States 
cannot be unfeeling Spectators of so important a moment. The destiny of 
these provinces must depend on themselves. Should such a revolution how-
ever take place, it cannot be doubted that our relation with them will be 
more intimate, and our friendship stronger than it can be while they are 
colonies of any European power.18 
It seems almost certain that Poinsett did everything in his power 
to encourage a complete break between the junta at Buenos Aires 
and the provisional government of Spain. But the complete story of 
the extent of his activities in this connection is not, and probably 
never will be, fully known. To a man of his nature, correspondence 
such as that cited above would give every encouragement to agitate 
for independence, but other than the friendship of the United 
States he had little to offer them in a material way. England was 
mistress of the seas, and it appeared that the United States was 
moving toward war with that nation; if so, no aid could be expected 
from North America. Another factor that probably effectively 
checked his efforts to encourage pronouncements of independence 
was the adroit maneuvering of the British through Lord Strangford, 
and the British care to do nothing to offend seriously the Spanish 
Regency or to disrupt their trade with Buenos Aires. 
For many weeks Poinsett busied himself with attempts to gain 
commercial advantages for the United States and to block the 
British. From time to time he reported to the Department of 
State on revolutionary events in the Plata. He also suggested that 
William Gilchrist Miller be appointed as the resident consul at 
Buenos Aires. This would make it possible for him to move on to 
Chile. He wrote to his friend, Albert Gallatin, then Secretary of 
the Treasury, calling his attention to the qualifications of Miller, 
which he stated were his honorable character, knowledge of Span-
ish, and business ability, and asked Gallatin to use his influence 
in securing the appointment.19 Poinsett's desire to move to Chile 
and the opposition of some forty British merchants to his attempts 
at inducing the junta to adopt liberal and stable commercial regu-
lations, led him to ask the State Department to place a resident 
agent in Buenos Aires. When he was appointed Consul-General 
on April 30, 1811, he had already named one Luis Goddefroy to 
work under him.20 
Goddefroy was appointed at the suggestion of several Baltimore 
merchants who sent a petition to the President on April 1, 1811. 
The petition remarked that the commerce of the United States 
18. Ibid. See also Manning, Dip. Car., I, 11. 
19. Poinsett to Albert Gallatin, March 9, 1811, Poinsett Pap., I, 47. 
20. Memoranda of Poinsett, ibid., I, 67. 
60 
with the Plata had become very lucrative and important. It re-
quested the appointment of a consul or commercial agent at Monte-
video or Buenos Aires and recommended Goddefroy.21 
Although Goddefroy and his family came to the Rio de la Plata, 
he never served as consul. There were two reasons for this. First, 
between the time of his appointment and his arrival at Montevideo 
in August, 1811, Elio in Montevideo had been appointed Viceroy 
of the Rio de la Plata and was recognized as such by Britain.22 
Elio, angered that the 7unta of Buenos Aires would not accept him, 
blockaded the river and planned to attack Buenos Aires.23 When 
Goddefroy and his family arrived en route to Buenos Aires, Elio 
refused to permit them to land, and Goddefroy, not wishing to 
endanger his family's lives in Buenos Aires, decided to go to 
southern Brazil until conditions improved. 24 Second, his reces-s 
appointment was rejected by the Senate, November 18, 1811. 
When Poinsett was appointed Consul-General for Buenos Aires, 
Chile, and Peru in April, 1811, he was given authority to appoint 
vice-consuls wherever he thought they were needed. With the 
rejection by the Senate of Goddefroy's recess appointment, Poin-
sett, still feeling that a consul was needed at Buenos Aires, 
appointed William G. Miller of Philadelphia as vice-consul. His 
commission asked the government of Buenos Aires to permit him 
to exercise the duties of his office, adding that the United States 
would grant the same rights to its agents. The commission was 
signed by President Madison and Secretary of State Monroe.25 
Apparently this was an "on the spot" appointment. From the 
letters in the "Appointment Papers" it appears that Miller lived 
with Poinsett in Buenos Aires and, while his presidential appoint-
ment was not made until June 24, 1812, he signed consular dis-
patches from Buenos Aires as early as December 2, 1811, as "Your 
Obdt. Servant" and by December 31, 1811, as vice-consul.26 
While Poinsett was greatly disposed toward the independence 
of South America, he was careful at times not to permit his own 
enthusiasm to get the better of his judgment. He recognized the 
difficulties facing the peoples of the Plata region and seemed 
impressed with their instability of purpose and procedure. He had 
hopes for their future and stated that eventually independence 
21. Baltimore Merchants to Madison, April 1, 1811, MS., Department of State, Ap-
pointment Papers. Hereinafter cited as DS., AP. 
22. Poinsett to Secretary of State, May 10, 1811, Poinsett Pap., I, 71. 
23. Poinsett to Department of State, June 16, 1811, ibid., I, 83. 
24. Goddefroy to Poinsett, Aug. 26, 1811, ibid., I, 125. 
25. President of the United States to William G. Miller, June 24, 1812, DS., AP. 
26. Miller to Monroe, Dec. 2, 9, 10, 20, 31, 1811, DS., DUSC., I , Pt. I. 
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would be achieved. The aggressiveness of the Portuguese did not 
disturb him, for he felt the overall effect of that would serve to 
bring cohesion and tend to destroy the existing chaos and anarchy, 
that the people of the Plata would band together against an out-
side force. Even in 1811 he foresaw the ultimate success of their 
movement for independence. 27 
Toward the end of October news began to seep into Buenos Aires 
that there was to be a revolt in Chile and that Paraguay was 
apparently coming around to the point of view held by the people 
of Buenos Aires. Poinsett felt that the differences which had 
existed between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, if not already 
adjusted, were about to be settled.28 With possible revolution in 
Chile and a vice-consul in Buenos Aires, Poinsett believed the time 
for his trip to Chile had arrived.29 Apparently he left Buenos 
Aires around the middle of November, 1811.30 The first of a series 
of North American consuls to Buenos Aires was officially recog-
nized by the government of Buenos Aires on November 23, 1811, 
just a few days after Poinsett left for Chile. 
When Poinsett reached Chile, he quickly became a partisan of 
the insurgent leader, Jose Miguel Carrera. Poinsett assisted 
Carrera' s government in drafting a constitution and, accepting a 
commission as General in the Chilean army, successfully carried 
out at least two campaigns. These activities caused the British, 
whose ships both merchant and naval were making free use of the 
ports in South America, to put pressure on the government of 
Chile for his deportation. In the spring of 1814 Poinsett returned 
to Buenos Aires, thus escaping the defeat of the patriots at Ranca-
gua that sent Bernardo O'Higgins and his handful of survivors 
across the Andes to join San Martfo at Mendoza. From Buenos 
Aires he complained to his government of the British pressure for 
his expulsion from Chile.31 
Upon reaching Buenos Aires, Poinsett discovered a British fleet 
in the Plata and was therefore forced to make arrangements for a 
Portuguese vessel to take him from Punto Indico to the Madeira 
Islands.32 From there he sailed for the United States and arrived 
at his home in Charleston, May 28, 1815. On July 16th, his work 
27. Poinsett to Monroe, Oct. 24, 1811, Poinsett Pap., I , 119. 
28. Poinsett to Sumpter, Oct. 25, 1811, ibid., I, 115. 
29. Poinsett to Monroe, Nov. 2, 1811, ibid., I, 111. 
30. Miller to Monroe, Dec. 10, 1811, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
31. Poinsett to Monroe, June 14, 1814, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 395. 
32. Joseph Johnson, "A Sketch of Mr. Poinsett's Life,'' Poinsett Pap., XXI, 71. See 
also Halsey to Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1815, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
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was acknowledged by Secretary Monroe with the following ex-
pressions: 
In acknowledging this communication which terminates your agency in a 
trust of much delicacy and importance, I have the honor to state that the 
ability and zeal with which you have discharged its duties, the success with 
which you have conciliated the good disposition of the local authorities and 
people where you have resided, in conformity with the amicable relations 
existing between the United States and Spain, and the information which you 
have communicated, have obtained the approbation of the President.33 
This is, indeed, a strange letter, all facts of Poinsett's mission con-
sidered, coming from a "strictly neutral" nation. However, in spite 
of Poinsett' s meddling in the revolutionary movements in South 
America, and despite his very apparent lack of diplomatic decorum, 34 
he did lay the foundation for the United States-Buenos Aires 
relations. It might even be suggested that he had a better under-
standing of English policy in Spanish America, from his time spent 
there, than did our ministers sent to England. His mission also 
served official notice that the United States was interested in the 
movement of the people of the Rio de la Plata toward independence. 
Transportation in the period being examined was dependent 
chiefly upon horses on land and sailing vessels by sea. Communi-
cations, therefore, were carried on either by word of mouth or by 
letters and despatches carried by messengers. It is interesting to 
note that in the case of letters sent by ships the agents of both the 
United States and the Plata had little faith in the successful voyages 
of the vessels leaving their respective countries, and few are the 
letters or despatches sent that were not made in triplicate and sent 
by different vessels to assure the arrival of at least one copy at its 
final destination. Examination of the original documents reveals 
the number, usually in the upper left margin of the first sheet, of 
the copy. It was not only fear of loss by storm at sea that created 
this situation, but there was a more active danger at this time; the 
cruisers of the British navy, which were making quite free with the 
sea lanes, not only around Buenos Aires but between the Plata and 
the United States. Thus, owing to the means of communication, 
international affairs, especially among the young countries of the 
Americas, were much more a matter of personal relations among 
individuals than they are today. Therefore, the type of men sent 
to Buenos Aires, and their activities while there, to a great extent 
33. Monroe to Poinsett, July 16, 1815, Poinsett Pap., I, 172. 
34. Poinsett, in writing to a m ember of his family, pointed out that he had been 
without instructions from Washington for eighteen months, and that he had learned to 
accustom himself to his own approbation. See letter to Joseph Johnson, Sept, 2, 1813, 
ibid., I, 140. 
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determined the basis for South-American op1mon of the United 
States, its people and its policies. Although the United States did 
not recognize the government at Buenos Aires for over a decade 
after the overthrow of the viceregal government, these American 
consuls were generally well received. The officials of Buenos Aires 
were eager to deal with the representatives of the United States in 
any manner which would imply even a strained unofficial recogni-
tion of their independence. 
The letters of vice-consul William G. Miller were mainly con-
cerned with details of political unrest at Buenos Aires and the 
progress of the revolutionary armies in that area. In spite of the 
war between the United States and Great Britain, Miller managed 
to keep up a precarious correspondence with the United States gov-
ernment by means of the ships which still, though less frequently 
than formerly, sailed between the Rfo de la Plata and the United 
States. In the Plata ports, however, American shipping had practi-
cally disappeared for lack of naval protection. The significance of 
this fact must not have been missed by the people of Buenos Aires. 
Miller reported from Buenos Aires in July, 1812, that "the commerce 
of the United States to this port for the last six months has been 
trifling," and added that "the presence of a national ship would give 
security to the American trade . . . which would immediately 
encrease [sic]." 35 
Miller, like Poinsett, was also constantly disturbed by the grow-
ing influence of England. He believed the United States was 
throwing way its opportunity and endangering the lives of its 
citizens by not following the British example and stationing a "na-
tional ship" in the Rio de la Plata. He reported that such a step 
would bring greater respect and security to American citizens and 
would also be "highly flattering to the government & people as it 
would have the appearance of protection and attention to their 
interests tho [sic] in fact be protecting our own . . . . 36 
Feeling as he did toward the English, he reported, with a great 
deal of evident pleasure, the refusal of the government of Buenos 
Aires to accept the intended agent of the British government, Gen-
eral Robert P. Staples. He was informed by the junta that the 
British had not addressed it an "introductory letter or taken any 
35. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. See also Manning, Dip. 
Cor., I, 329. 
36. Ibid. 
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notice of the many letters written to them, a long time since." 37 
While this evident rebuff to an English effort to extend friendship 
to Buenos Aires gave Miller a great deal of satisfaction, and seemed 
to indicate that he was watching very closely British as well as 
American affairs in Buenos Aires, it is extremely difficult to agree 
with him that he was wide awake. There is little in his corres-
pondence to indicate that he was aware of the amount of British 
goods coming into the Rio de la Plata via Brazil and Montevideo; 
nor is there any indication of his awareness of the significance of 
this trade. It is quite possible that he knew of it, but, if so, why 
did he not inform his government of this surreptitious trade and 
the effect it was having upon the inhabitants of the Rio de la Plata? 
Miller's reports paint a picture of the events in Buenos Aires 
and indicate that the year 1812 was a turbulent one for the Plata 
region. The conflict between the Executive and the Assembly was 
in full blossom,38 and the peace which Poinsett predicted was 
disrupted by Jose Artigas who, "disgusted at the depredations 
of the Portuguese and the manifest intention of the Old Spaniards 
in conjunction with them to annoy the creoles as much as possible," 
decided to fight.39 Miller informed his government that the de-
mands for independence were growing stronger, but as yet had 
not become the desire of any large united majority. In view of 
this he did not believe that the Assembly, which would meet in 
August, would declare independence. He felt that such a declara-
tion at this time would be brought about only if some of the rest-
less patriots forced the government to make such a statement. 
He added that it seemed to be the opinion of the government that 
it would wait until after the fall of Montevideo "unless an unex-
pected supply of arms should arrive in which case the congress 
will immediately throw off the mask." 40 
Shortly after Miller wrote the above letter, a group of hasty 
patriots did attempt to force the government into independence. 
This group of "coffee house politicians" called for an immediate 
declaration of independence and banishment of all Europeans. 
After their return to their homes in the evening, they were arrested 
37. Miller to Monroe, April 30, 1812, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. It is interesting to note 
that, while the junta of Buenos Aires refused to issue a formal declaration of independence, 
it is insisting upon being treated as an independent nation. See also Miller to Monroe, 
July 16, 1811, ibid., which hints that intrigue between the British minister and Carlotta 
was generally believed in Buenos Aires. 
38. Miller to Monroe, April 30, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
39. Miller to Monroe, Jan. 10, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
40. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. An interesting question might 
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and sent off to the army. Miller reported facetiously that" . 
tranquility has since reigned. The executions have not yet stopt 
[sic] : 29 have been shot; 4 others are under sentence of death as 
accomplices in the consp[iracy] of 4 July." 41 
Miller also reported that on May 19, 1812, two Buenos Aires citi-
zens, Diego de Saavedra and Juan Pedro de Aguirre, agents of the 
revolutionary junta, had returned home after a mission to procure 
arms in the United States. They brought with them a small supply 
of arms and reports of general interest and enthusiasm for their cause 
in the United States. This, said Miller, "has produced the effect 
expected: the U.S. are looked up to as the only sincere friends of 
their cause not only by the Government but by the people." 42 
Meanwhile, the officials of the government at Buenos Aires were 
striving to get still more definite aid from the United States. One 
plea addressed to President Madison admitted that in the "transition" 
from one form of government to another there had been anarchy in 
the Rio de la Plata, but now order had been restored and the "Love 
of Liberty" had triumphed. Therefore, the plea continued, the 
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata and the United States had 
much in common and should have friendly relations with each 
other.43 Again asking for definite succor in the form of arms and 
ammunition, the Supreme Director assured President Madison that 
the United Provinces would not be ungrateful for such relief and 
would be willing to grant commercial treaties advantageous to the 
United States.44 
On August 30, 1814, Thomas L. Halsey, an enterprising young 
man of Providence, Rhode Island, relieved Miller of his duties at 
Buenos Aires.45 Halsey was the son of Thomas Lloyd Halsey, a 
wealthy and prominent citizen and one-time French consular agent 
in Rhode Island. Shortly after graduating from the College of 
Rhode Island, now Brown University, he entered upon a commercial 
career and, sometime before 1807, arrived at Buenos Aires.46 H~ 
was engaged in business at Buenos Aires for several years, buying a 
41. Miller to Monroe, Aug. 10, 18, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. The conspiracy here re-
ferred to was a plot by one Don Juan Martm Alsega and 48 others who, for one million 
dollars, conspired to upset the government and massacre all the chiefs of the revolution 
and all patriots as well. The Princess Carlotta was eventually exposed as the prime mover 
of the conspiracy. See Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
42. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
43. The Constituted Assembly of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata to 
Madison, July 21, 1813, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 332-333. 
44. Gervasio Antonio de Posadas to President of the United States, March 9, 1814, 
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large estate outside the city, which he used to carry on a large and 
profitable business in sheep. He imported a number of blooded 
sheep from the United States and was responsible for the introduc-
tion, in 1810, of the Merino breed into the Plata.47 In 1812, he left 
his import-export business for a brief trip to the United States, and 
it was at this time that President Madison appointed him consul for 
Buenos Aires. 
Halsey was an ambitious man and was vitally interested in in-
creasing American trade and prestige at Buenos Aires. He indicated 
the direction of his thinking along these lines a year before he left 
to take over his duties, suggesting among other things that great 
use could be made of the India shipping by having it stop at Buenos 
Aires. To increase prestige, he suggested the stationing of a frigate 
in the waters of the Rfo de la Plata, a point which he continually 
stressed until his recall in January, 1818.48 
Halsey was delayed in notifying the State Department of his ar-
rival because of the secret departure of Poinsett and the fact that 
Poinsett would not carry any despatches with him that might, if 
detected, impede his return to the United States. Thus, it was not 
until six months after his arrival that Halsey was able to send a 
letter to his government. He then informed Washington that he 
had been received with respect and found the government of Buenos 
Aires quite "favorably disposed to facilitate the trade and cultivate 
a friendly intercourse with the United States." 49 He had been in-
structed to press for the reduction of duties on many of the products 
and manufactured goods of the United States, as well as to arrange 
for the deposition in the American consulate of American ship 
papers. He informed the Secretary of State, in his first despatch 
from Buenos Aires, that he had deferred bringing either of these 
problems before the Supreme Director because there had been no 
American trade, as "no American vessel has entered this port since 
my arrival here." 50 
Halsey, in his first despatch, indicated some concern over the 
course of the revolution and its future possibilities. He called at-
tention to the election by the assembly of a "young Gentleman of 
talents and promise," General Carlos Alvear, to the position of 
47. Ibid. 
48. Halsey to Monroe, May 3, 1813, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
49. Halsey to Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1815, ibid., I, Pt. I. Gervasio Antonio de 
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Supreme Director. He did not feel that this election would settle 
the chaotic conditions in Buenos Aires but did think that General 
Alvear would command respect. He pointed out that the Govern-
ment of Buenos Aires was looking forward with "much anxiety" to 
peace between England and the United States. There seemed, in 
his opinion, two reasons for this: one, the increase in commerce 
that would follow such a peace and, two, an expectation that the 
United States would then send aid. He added that: 
Should this country succeed ( which it can with difficulty effect without 
some assistance) in establishing a government independent of Spain, the 
trade of the United States here will be lucrative and important, but should 
it for want of assistance Succumb, the ports will be shut against foreign trade, 
more particularly against the flag of the United States.ta 
Halsey, like our other agents and consuls in Buenos Aires, was 
disturbed by the British influence and control over the Plata but, 
unlike the other agents, went further then suggesting sending a 
frigate to those waters. He not only asked for a frigate, but "strongly 
recommended" to the President of the United States a plan of attack 
which would destroy the British frigate stationed there, thus giving 
the United States control of the Rio de la Plata. The success of the 
plan, he said, "would be sure." Apparently he had talked it over 
with the government in Buenos Aires for he states that "it would be 
agreeable to this government." He informed Richard Rush, Acting 
Secretary of State, that the English had only one frigate "anchored 
about ten miles from this town, which the Commanders declare to 
be out of the territory & jurisdiction of this Government." He added: 
The British Commander and one of the Lieutenants always live on shore; 
a frigate of the United States bringing a good pilot or taking one at Montevideo 
and proceeding up the river immediately between Banco Ortis and Banco Chico 
would be able to attack the British frigate before any information could be 
given to the commander or proper preparations be made for defence . . ,52 
Halsey never heard anything from Washington regarding this ad-
venture on his part into naval affairs. In time he forgot the scheme, 
but he never gave up asking for ships of war for the Plata. In July 
of this same year he asked for a frigate and an 18-gun brig. 53 His 
appeals for ships were never answered, either in writing or in the 
form of the ships requested. 
During Alvear's administration, Halsey struggled with such prob-
lems as lowering duties and transferring ship papers to the con-
sulate. One unfortunate incident occurred, the murder of an Amer-
ican citizen, one Captain Richard Hughes of Boston, for which 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. See also Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 337. 
53. Halsey to Monroe, July 17, 1815, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. See also Manning, 
Dip. Cor., I, 340-341. 
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Halsey was unable to gain satisfaction, although he located a man 
who had Hughes' watch.54 Another incident, one which for a time 
excited the government of Buenos Aires, arose with the seizure of 
Buenos Aires goods by a United States privateer. It seems that one 
Don Manuel Pinto of Buenos Aires, who held a commission from 
the Directorate, was returning from England on a British ship with 
arms and ammunition for his government. On December 19, 1813, 
within sight of the Island of Madeira, the English vessel was taken 
by an American privateer. Don Manuel was made a prisoner and 
taken to New York, while the property of his government, which 
was under his care, was taken before the prize courts. Nicolas de 
Herrera wrote Halsey one year later requesting the return of the 
arms on the grounds that they were illegally seized. 55 
The next day Halsey proceeded to give Herrera a lesson in inter-
national law and, to a degree, diplomacy. He informed Herrera 
of the "General Law of Nations," as set forth in the treaties of Ma-
drid of 1667, Utrecht of 1713, Paris of 1763, and others, that "ene-
mies property on board a Neutral ship is free from Capture ( contra-
band of war excepted) & that the property of a friendly state 
found on board of an enemies ship is liable to Capture & Condem-
nation [sic] particularly so, articles Contraband of War." He 
also informed Herrera that the prize courts in the United States 
were "independent of the influence" of the President. However, he 
added, he would "with pleasure lend his aid to any measure" pro-
posed by Herrera for the recovery of the property.56 Apparently, 
Herrera had no suggestions to make, for here the matter ended. 
Halsey, being a businessman, constantly attempted to get his 
government to see and take advantage of the great market in the 
Plata. When he wrote of the struggle between the officials of 
Buenos Aires and Artigas over the possession of Montevideo, he 
often stressed what that could mean to the United States. Finally, 
he wrote that the lack of commerce between these two Plata ports 
was causing prices to soar, that American goods would bring triple 
their price, and he advised United States merchants to take advan-
tage of this profitable trade. 57 
In the period 1812 through 1816, the Government of Buenos 
Aires developed a new and original doctrine regarding seamen 
which proved particularly vexatious to Halsey and, eventually, to 
54. Halsey to Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1815, _DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
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the Buenos Aires government. This doctrine maintained that all 
men in the Plata were free. If sailors from another state chose to 
remain in the Plata they were absolved from allegiance to any other 
nation and from contracts previously made. 58 This led to many 
desertions from American ships and, in some cases, prevented ships 
from sailing from the port. Halsey called the attention of his 
government to these desertions and stated that they received en-
couragement and indirect protection from the government. 59 He 
also pointed out that the Director did not pretend to defend this 
doctrine, but connived at the practice under it.60 The practice 
soon became so bad that when the Buenos Aires government con-
tinued to insist upon its doctrine, Halsey finally suggested that 
American ship captains be forced to place a bond of $400 for each 
sailor. Each sailor then was to be accounted for upon return, or 
the bond forfeited, plus some other penalty.61 
Halsey was somewhat discouraged with the lack of leadership 
and the general chaotic conditions in the Plata. He felt that the 
conflicting parties were in part responsible for the above stated 
violations, and wrote that the parties or factions in this country 
were injuring the cause of independence.62 He further lamented 
that no man had arisen among them of sufficient merit to direct 
with wisdom either the affairs of government or its armies, or who 
had the public esteem.63 The problem of desertion of American 
sailors was quite suddenly settled July 4, 1816, when the Buenos 
Aires government took an about face, denied its original stand with 
high sounding phrases and, in co-operation with the American con-
sul, blocked further desertions by removing its protection, and 
placed would-be deserters in safe custody until returned to their 
vessels.64 
Throughout his stay as consul in Buenos Aires, Halsey was con-
cerned with the success of the revolutionary movement in the Rio 
de la Plata region and often recommended that his government give 
it aid. This insistence on his part did not stem from a lack of knowl-
edge of American policy; in fact, he gave every indication of a clear 
understanding of the objectives that his government had in view 
when he wrote: 
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lt would appear to be the Policy of the United States that the whole Con-
tinent of America should be united, at least in friendly intercourse & com-
mercial relations, and these encouraged & strongly cemented, that at some future 
period, United they may be able in a measure to resist the proponderating 
influence of Europe. Spain must from the proximity of her most important 
Colonies to the United States sooner or later be at war with us, this will take 
place the first moment she feels herself sufficiently strong for the contest; why 
then it might be asked, suffer this favorable opportunity to pass, by seizing 
on the Floridas indemnify the Citizens of the United States for their heavy 
losses; & by assisting the inhabitants of these provinces in a righteous cause, 
which must have the wishes of all good men, would gain to the Government 
of the United States, the Glory of giving Freedom. . . ,65 
Thus, while he understood American policy, he suggested that 
an opportunity was being thrown away. Aid to Buenos Aires could 
bring nothing but advantages to the United States. He suggested 
a loan to Buenos Aires of $500,000 or, if this could not be done, one 
of 10,000 muskets, 2000 cavalry sabres, 2000 pikes, 100 tons of gun 
powder.66 The next year he had fears for the success of the move-
ment and wrote that the situation of the country was extremely 
critical. He felt that the Buenos Aires government would listen to 
almost any proposition of the United States, even to the point of 
giving advantages in trade, or perhaps place itself more immediately 
under the direction of North America, if the United States would 
afford assistance necessary to accomplish its independence.67 His 
pleading fell upon deaf ears. 
Sixteen days after Halsey expressed his fears, the representative 
Congress meeting at Tucuman declared the independence of the 
United Provinces. Immediate notice was sent to Halsey, who was 
reminded that this was the "moment to advance the commercial re-
lations that have already begun." 68 
In 1816, another North American arrived on the scene. He was 
Colonel Joseph Devereux, who had planned to go to South America 
for business purposes. However, before sailing, he was appointed 
as Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires. with instruc-
tions to gather information on the political conditions of the United 
Provinces of the Rio de Ia Plata. It was expected that Devereux 
would correspond with the State Department somewhat regularly, 
and that he would serve as Special Agent for some time. 
Colonel Devereux took a lively interest in the cause of independ-
ence and became very much aware, whether through his own ob-
servations or by Halsey's suggestion is difficult to determine, of 
65. Halsey to Monroe, July 3, 1816, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
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the need of funds to continue the Revolution. As a result, Devereux, 
termed by Halsey "this Generous friend to mankind" and "Worthy 
Citizen," offered his service in the procurement of a loan to be 
raised in and guaranteed by the United States.69 The loan, as finally 
agreed to by Juan Martin de Pueyrred6n, Supreme Director of the 
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, was for two million dollars, and 
the House of John Devereux was to get a six per cent commission 
for underwriting it. In a letter of appreciation to President Madi-
son, Pueyrred6n reminded him that "there only remains for your 
Government to extend the protection needed to carry it into 
effect." 70 
As soon as word of Devereux' s action reached Washington, he 
was recalled and replaced by William G. D. Worthington, who was 
appointed on January 23, 1817, Special Agent for Buenos Aires, 
Chile and Puru. Halsey had to defend his actions as consul. He 
denied that he had any part in the project, stating that it was 
Colonel Devereux's project and that he had placed his signature 
to it merely as the agent in Devereux's absence. He pointed out 
that as he received no salary as consul it was necessary to earn a 
living by commercial or other pursuits and it sometimes happened 
that his signature as an individual was unintentionally blended with 
the official capacity.71 
Halsey's troubles, however, were just starting. As a businessman 
in Buenos Aires he had made enemies who were desirous of seeing 
him lose the position of Consul. In addition, in line of duty, he 
had made an enemy of the Supreme Director, Pueyrred6n. The 
first indication of impending disaster for Halsey is found in his letter 
to Rush, acknowledging the information regarding Worthington's 
appointment. There he tells of having received repeated invitations 
from Jose Artigas, Chief of the Banda Oriental, to visit him. In 
the meantime, Halsey discovered that Artigas was entering into a 
commercial treaty with the English government. Halsey, therefore, 
decided a visit was necessary, if not to prevent the treaty, at least 
to see that England should not gain any advantages that the United 
States did not have. While there, he was received with marked 
respect, and given assurances that any advantages or protection 
given to English goods or nationals would also be extended to the 
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United States. He also picked up a copy of the commercial treaty 
between England and the government of Artigas, which he sent 
under the same cover with his letter. However, he told the Acting 
Secretary of State Rush that Pueyrred6n was "very jealous of the 
visit" even though Halsey had informed him in advance of his 
going and had offered him his services. 72 He feared there might 
be some reaction. 
Halsey's fears were correct and he did not have long to wait for 
the reaction. On January 7, 1818, he received a note from Gregorio 
Tagle, Pueyrred6n's Secretary of State, stating that his part in favor-
ing the "insiduous endeavours of the factions and disturbers of the 
public" being known, he was, therefore, to get out of the territories 
of the Rfo de la Plata within twenty-four hours, failing which would 
result in "serious consequences to his person." 73 On the following 
day, however, the Supreme Director dropped all charges against 
Halsey. Halsey asked Tagle for an explanation, but received noth-
ing further than the observation that "it was altogether a measure 
of the Supreme Director." 74 
Halsey was not so fortunate as far as his own government was 
concerned, for we find him writing in August of receiving a despatch 
from the State Department, dated January 22, 1818, informing him 
that the President had revoked his consular commission. The 
charges against him were that he was "interested in Privateers 
equipped and commissioned to cruise against a Nation at peace 
with the United States" and that he had "presumed to send to the 
United States Commissions to equip an armed vessel. " 75 
Halsey placed the blame for his discharge upon that '1ow fellow 
DeForest" about whom he had warned the Secretary of State.76 
Since the government had given him no instructions regarding its 
policy and had recalled his commission without advance notice, he 
believed he had good reason to complain. 77 
Halsey was told by Adams to turn the Consulate over to Worth-
ington, but Worthington had gone to Chile. Consequently, Halsey 
remained as consul at Buenos Aires until September of 1819, when 
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he received word that Worthington was returning. He then left in 
his place a Mr. Dunn of Delaware and returned to the United 
States.78 In 1820 he arrived in the United States, armed with papers 
from the naval department at Buenos Aires, signed by Juan Jose de 
Echevarria, certifying that he had no part in privateering and that 
he had not been an "Equipper or Agent." This evidence also called 
attention to the fact that the ships he was accused of being con-
nected with actually belonged to David Curtis DeForest and acer-
tain Higenbothom. 79 Halsey immediately went to Washington to 
persuade Secretary of State John Q. Adams to reappoint him to the 
consulship. Adams recorded in his diary that Halsey "told me that 
he came to justify his conduct, which he attempted to do without 
success." 80 Adams told Halsey that he was charged with extorting 
unlawful fees in his consular capacity, with sending blank privateer-
ing commissions to this country for which he was to receive a five 
per cent commission on the prizes captured, and with selling priva-
teering commissions· for Artigas of the Banda Oriental, the bitter 
enemy of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Commenting 
to Adams on the conduct of Halsey, Henry Hills, United States 
consul at Rio de Janeiro, advised that the government at Washing-
ton could not expect to get the best type of men to fill these consu-
lar offices as long as they received no salary and, therefore, had to 
make a living in commerce.81 
In the meantime, William G. D. Worthington had arrived in 
Buenos Aires, September 5, 1817. On September 13th he met with 
the Supreme Director and explained the noncompliance of the 
United States regarding Colonel Devereux's loan.82 While he satis-
fied the Buenos Aires government regarding the loan, he had a 
harder time convincing it that he was only a Special Agent for 
Commerce. When he finally made it clear that his commission as 
such did not constitute recognition of independence, public opinion 
in Buenos Aires toward him became "luke-warm" if not actually 
"repulsive." 
Worthington then proceeded as rapidly as he could to get himself 
in almost the same hot water that Halsey shortly found so scalding. 
All of the American agents and consuls to Buenos Aires recognized 
the British threat; only Washington seemed ignorant of it. All the 
78. Worthington to Adams, March 7, 1819, DS., DUSM., I, Pt. II. 
79. Affidavit of Juan Jose de Echevarria, Sept. 9, 1818, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. II. 
80. Adams, Memoirs, V, 77, 92-93. 
81. Ibid. See also Hill to Adams, Dec. 21, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., II, 704. 
82. Worthington to Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1817, DS., DUSM., I, Pt. I. The two 
men conversed in French, as Worthington did not speak Spanish! Ibid. 
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agents and consuls, like Worthington, "thought it necessary to do 
something for our safety and to watch our interests." 83 Worthing-
ton's "project" was an agreement regarding commerce and seamen. 
He made an outline of some forty-five articles, which he submitted 
to the United States State Department October 30, 1817, and to 
Tagle, the Secretary of State for the United Provinces.84 He was 
very careful to point out that this was "unofficial," and only "my own 
personal opinion," and that the respective governments might think 
differently on the matter.85 He also called attention of the United 
Provinces government to the fact that he did not have and did not 
"pretend to be clothed with any treaty-making powers or specific 
instructions. . ." 86 On January 1, 1818, he wrote Adams that 
after a great amount of discussion the Buenos Aires government 
accepted his "project" for further consideration. His discussion 
had been with one Julian Alvarez, who came "well instructed on 
the subjects of the project." This fact seemed to disturb him some-
what, for he added, "there is only one thing I feel anxious about, 
which is, that I may not in any manner have involved my own 
country by these proceedings." He further stated to Adams that 
he intended "this project to be as a manual of what ought to be 
observed toward us." 87 Alvarez and Worthington cut the forty-five 
articles to twenty-five, affixed their signatures to them January 1, 
1818, and in time they were approved by the government of Buenos 
Aires as of that date. 
While Worthington did not intend to involve his country, Article 
eighteen created considerable difficulty. It stated that: 
Consuls, Vice Consuls, Commercial Agents & Vice Commercial Agents may 
reside in either country and enjoy all the rights & privileges belonging to 
them by reason of their functions.88 
The project itself was virtually a treaty of amity and commerce. 
Under this article eighteen, the Supreme Director of the United 
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata wasted no time in appointing and 
sending as Consul to the United States David C. DeForest. 
Having successfully completed his project in Buenos Aires, Worth-
ington left for Chile, happily unaware of the explosion his "project" 
could cause in Washington. Upon learning of Worthington's ac-
83. Worthington to Adams, Jan. 1, 1818, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
84. Worthington to Tagle, Oct. 30, 1817, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
85. Worthington to Tagle, Dec. 17, 1817, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
86. Worthington to Tagle, Dec. 17, 1817, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
87. Worthington to Adams, Jan. 1, 1818, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
88. Project signed by Alvarez and Worthington, Jan. 1, 1818, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
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tions, Adams is reported to have spoken of the agent as having 
"broken out into a self appointed Plenipotentiary," and President 
Monroe shouted: "Dismiss him instantly. Recall him! Now to 
think what recommendations that man had." 89 Worthington's dis-
missal was dated February 25, 1819. 
When Worthington returned to Buenos Aires, he discovered that 
the government there not only had refused to accept Dunn, whom 
Halsey had left in charge of the Consulate, but had placed the 
consular documents under its own care for safe keeping. 90 Worth-
ington, unaware that he was no longer a Special Agent of the United 
States, but anxious to return, appointed Nathaniel W. Strong of New 
York as consul,91 and left for the United States. 
Nathnniel Strong accepted the position as consul only for six 
months, on the belief that in that time the State Department would 
have an opportunity to appoint another consul. The time, how-
ever, elapsed without any action on the part of the United States, 
and Strong's business made it necessary for him to leave Buenos 
Aires. He, therefore, appointed one John Zimmerman, Esq., of 
New York, as vice-consul.92 Fortunately, Judge Prevost, Special 
Agent of the United States to Peru, happened to be in Buenos Aires 
and approved Zimmerman.93 
89. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 70. 
90. Worthington to Adams, March 7, 1819, DS., DUSM., I, Pt. II. 
91. 'Worthington to Tagle, March 4, 1819, ibid., I, Pt. II. See also Strong's acceptance, 
Strong to Adams, Apr. 28, 1819, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. II. 




Early Buenos Aires Missions 
WITH the overthrow of the viceroy in May 1810, the 
governing junta of Buenos Aires, in need of an ally and munitions, 
turned to England for aid. This was a natural step, for American 
interest and commerce, while growing, was still slight; England 
was the great commercial nation and the significance of the attack 
by Popham had not been missed by the people of the Rio de la 
Plata. Their appeal to England, however, went unanswered, for 
by this- time England, led by Canning, had become the ally of 
Spain and was not willing to make any ov.ert act that would en-
danger the Peninsular War effort. Following the very evident re-
jection of British aid, the junta turned to the United States, sending 
a letter informing the United States government of the steps taken 
in Buenos Aires and the reasons for such action. The junta pointed 
out that there would be some who would give an "odious interpre-
tation" and who "will blacken with the mark of perfidy actions that 
have Truth for their bases." It added that "for the purity of our 
Intentions we appeal to the Tribunal of Reason," ending its some-
what hidden appeal by stating that this "Junta has too exalted an 
Idea of the high Character which distinguished the United States 
of America to doubt for a moment the equity of its decisions. 
. . ." It expressed belief of United States friendship to its cause 
and extended "with Pleasure the grateful Impressions of its friend-
hi ,, 1 s p. 
Undoubtedly, the arrival of Poinsett and his acceptance by the 
junta on February 13, 1811,2 stimulated the belief in Buenos Aires 
that the United States would supply it with arms and munitions. 
As we have seen, Poinsett had in numerous despatches adv.ised his 
1. Governing Junta of Buenos Aires to the President, Feb. 11, 1811, DS., ARN., 
I, Pt. I. 
2. Junta of Buenos Aires to the President, Feb. 13, 1811, ibid. 
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government to send these badly needed supplies. It is reasonable 
to suppose that he had discussed this problem with members of the 
Buenos Aires government and it may have been Poinsett who sug-
gested that they seek aid in the United States, much as the United 
States, in the early days of the American Revolution, sought aid 
from France. Certainly it was the presence of this impetuous and 
extremely partial American agent that gave impetus to the sending 
of the first mission from Buenos Aires to the United States. 
Less than four months after the arrival of Poinsett, Cornelio de 
Saavedra, President of the Governing Junta of the Provinces of the 
Rio de la Plata, informed the President of the United States that 
his son, Diego de Saavedra, and a merchant, Juan Pedro Aguirre, 
had been commissioned by their government to procure arms from 
the United States. He added that it was important that they "con-
ceal from the Public their real names" because his son was a Cap-
tain of Dragoons and Aguirre was "the actual Secretary of the Most 
Excellent Cabildo." 8 Three days later, June 5, 1811, the junta 
addressed a letter to the President "in the name of Ferdinand VII, 
King of Spain and the Indies," and issued full powers and detailed 
instructions to its two agents. They were commissioned to purchase 
on public credit the following articles: 2000 pairs of pistols of one-
ounce caliber; 4000 carbines, or short cavalry arms with bayonets; 
8000 swords; 10,000 other guns with cartridges, and 1,000,000 flints 
for the carbines and pistols. They were further authorized to 
order on credit up to 30,000 additional guns, carbines and pistols, 
to be delivered at the risk of the sellers to Buenos Aires. The 
former articles would be paid for in Buenos Aires upon certifica-
tion of purchase and shipment from the United States.4 
It was not the intent of the governing junta to compromise in 
any way the government of the United States or any other nation. 
The agents were made fully aware of this and the United States 
was so informed.5 This necessitated, therefore, the greatest secrecy 
as to their names and operations. The agents, accordingly, were 
equipped with two passports and represented themselves to be 
traveling as businessmen. They also carried a formal letter from 
the junta to the President of the United States informing him of 
their real names and the purpose of the mis-sion. 6 
3. Saavedra to the President, June 2, 1811, ibid. 
4. Commission of Diego de Saavedra and Juan Pedro Aguirre, June 5, 1811, ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Governing Junta of Buenos Aires to the President of the United States, June 6, 
1811, ibid. The names assumed by Saavedra and Aguirre were Jose Cabrera and Pedro 
L6pez. 
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Unlike the United States agents and consuls sent to Buenos Aires 
who were expected to pay their own expenses, Saavedra and Aguiue 
were provided 20,000 pesos for the expenses of their mission. They 
were carefully instructed to ship their purchases on a packet to 
Buenos Aires, to Ensenada de Barragan, or to Montevideo. They 
were also informed that, if a war between the United States and 
England should delay the shipment of their purchases, they should 
make use of the letters-patent they carried and fit out a ship to 
send their purchases to Buenos Aires. If at all possible they were 
also to employ the services of cannon-makers and gunsmiths who 
had tools and models. If they could recruit such men for service in 
Buenos Aires, they could assure them a salary of 3000 pesos per year. 
Saavedra and Aguirre made the long sea journey from Buenos 
Aires to the United States aboard the cutter Tigre,1 leaving Buenos 
Aires in the latter part of July and arriving at Philadelphia, October 
25, 1811. They immediately sought an interview with Secretary of 
State Monroe.8 
The experiences of their first few days in the United States must 
have been bewildering and confusing indeed. The press in the 
United States was pouring out praise of the revolutionists in South 
America and their "glorious cause of freedom" and disparaging 
remarks about Spain and the "dissolute" Ferdinand VII. Before 
Congress, at the time, was the subject which, by December 10, 1811, 
took the form of the Mitchill resolution, stating for all the world 
the friendly interest of the United States in the establishment of 
independent sovereignties in Spanish America and the desire of the 
United States to establish amicable relations and commercial inter-
course with the Spanish-Americans. All of this would seem to indi-
cate that the two envoys from Buenos Aires would have little diffi-
culty in achieving the purpose of their mission. Soon, however, 
they were to learn that in the United States, as elsewhere, there 
is a great difference betwen the wordy harangue of the politician 
and the publicist and definite action by the government. Un-
fortunately for Saavedra and Aguirre, they had arrived at an in-
opportune time. The United States was once again experimenting 
with non-intercourse measures; hard money was scarce and credit 
tight; and few were interested in speculation with unknown for-
eigners from a little known and remote region called the Rio de la 
Plata. 
A few days after their arrival at Philadelphia, the two envoys 
7. The Tigre belonged to an American businessman in Buenos Aires, William G. Miller. 
8. Saavedra and Aguirre to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1811, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
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were given an interview with Secretary of State Monroe, who ques-
tioned them regarding the political and economic conditions of the 
Rio de la Plata. Monroe then assured them that: 
. . . the United States of the North would be glad to see the emancipa-
tion of their brother peoples of the South under a liberal constitution, and 
that he believed they would continue their glorious career of liberty despite 
the presence of some risks which perseverance would overcome; that we could 
go about the land, and export freely such materials [ auxilios] as we pleased, 
and that desirous of assisting us this branch of the Government would for its 
part dissemble knowledge of any contracts we had made with munitions 
makers; that assistance could not go any further than this, since we could not 
be considered other than one of Spain's old provinces; but if there were 
anything else in which the Government could serve us, it would do so with 
pleasure. Mr. Monroe, at the same time gave us important warnings and 
begged us to let him know ahead of time of our departure. 9 
Saavedra and Aguirre returned to Philadelphia after their inter-
view with Monroe and placed an order with Messrs. Miller and Van 
Buren of Philadelphia for as much munitions as their money would 
purchase. All efforts to secure more on credit failed.10 Madison 
and Monroe discussed the possibility of using some American mer-
chant in imitation of the French Rodrigue Hortalez and Company 
of the American Revolution. They invited Saavedra and Aguirre 
with Telesforo de Orea, the agent of the Venezuelan government 
to a conference on this subject on January 7, 1812. At this time, 
Monroe informed them that "the Government was disposed to sell 
them the arms, at regular prices, and to satisfy itself with the re-
sponsibility for these by the credit of a respectable merchant of 
the country, that it was moved to do this by its desire for our 
independence. ." 11 The envoys were greatly pleased with 
the government's stand and immediately suggested Stephen Girard 
as the merchant. 
Stephen Girard was quite willing to serve in this position, but 
he wanted definite instructions and approval of the United States 
Government. He also wanted the cooperation of his government, 
as he did not have the amount of material the agents wanted. He 
wrote to Monroe that Saavedra and Aguirre: 
. . . have applied to me to purchase and to ship on account of their 
respective governments Twenty Thousand muskets with their Bayonettes. 
Although I am disposed to be serviceable to these gentlemen, yet I do not 
wish to contract with them unless I am assured that the shipment alluded to 
will not be considered as unlawful or disagreeable to the President, . . . 
9. Saavedra and Aguirre to the Junta Gubemativa, Nov. 11, 1811, AGN, Sl-A2-A4, 
No. 9. 
10. Saavedra and Aguirre to Miller and Van Buren, Nov. 11, 1811, ibid., Sl-A2-A4, 
No. 9. 
11, Saavedra and Aguirre to the Junta Gubemativa, Feb. 16, 1812, ibid., S1-A2-A4, 
No.9. 
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and that the Government will facilitate me the means of obtaining said 
muskets, etc., either by selling or lending them to me under such terms and 
conditions as will be judged reasonable.12 
The government consented to sell him some eighteen to twenty 
thousand rifles, thus proving the sincerity of Monroe's promise, 
while putting a strain on the country's neutrality, but did not give 
Girard explicit instructions or approval, without which he would 
not act. 
On the 20th January, 1812, Saavedra and Aguirre reminded 
Monroe of "the obligation which we have and our desire to ac-
complish the orders . . . received from our government" and 
recalled for him Girard's request for approval of the United States 
Government. They stated that their "proposition" with Girard and 
his request made it impossible for them to make other arrangements 
"to obtain the assistance which Buenos Ayres needs so urgently." 
They then appealed to Monroe to give Girard the answer he was 
waiting for.18 This, their last attempt, received no reply, and thus 
ended their mission to the United States. They purchased what 
supplies their money would buy, and on February 5 notified Monroe 
that they were leaving for Buenos Aires within eight days and 
offered to carry any dispatches from the United States Government 
to their own. They added that "the liberality with which we have 
been considered by the United States Government and people, and 
their favorable disposition to the cause that ours sustain, remain 
engraved in our gratitude and respect." 14 They arrived at the port 
of Ensenada de Barragan on May 14, 1812, on the frigate Liberty, 
having been conducted through the Spanish blockade of the Rio 
de la Plata by Captain David Seecht, of the American frigate St. 
Micliael. They brought with them 1000 muskets with bayonets 
and 362,050 Hints, which they had purchased in the United States.15 
They exaggerated somewhat their reception in the United States 
and so impressed their own people and government with the North 
American attitude and helpfulness that the American consul at 
Buenos Aires, W. G. Miller, reported that the effect of their mission 
was to cause the United States to be looked up to as "the only 
sincere friend of their cause not only by the Government but by 
the people." 16 
Although the United States officials did not formally recognize 
12. Girard to Monroe, Dec. 2, 1811, as quoted in J. B. McMaster, Life and Times of 
Stephen Girard (Philadelphia, 1913), Il, 168-171. 
13. Saavedra and Aguirre to Monroe, Jan. 20, 1812, DS., ARN., I. Pt. I. 
14. Saavedra and Aguirre to Monroe, Feb. 5, 1812, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
15. Saavedra and Aguirre to Supremo Gobierno, May 14, 1812, AGN, Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
16. Miller to Monroe, July 16, 1812, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
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Saavedra and Aguirre as agents from an independent country, it 
seems that their mission did help crystallize a policy in Washing-
ton that was in favor of the independence of Buenos Aires. After his 
first conference with the Buenos Aires representatives, Secretary of 
State Monroe wrote John Q. Adams, then United States Minister 
to Russia: 
Various considerations, which will readily suggest themselves to you, have 
induced this Government to look with a favorable eye to a Revolution which 
is taking place in South America. Several of the Provinces have sent deputies 
to this country, . . . but as yet a formal recognition of neither has been 
made.17 
The Secretary of State's statement that no formal recognition of 
a minister from Buenos Aires or other rebelling Spanish colonies 
had been extended implies that the deputies- from South America 
had been received informally. Nevertheless, the policy pursued 
by Madison and Monroe in these first relations with the rebellious 
South American colonies was an unquestionable recognition of 
belligerency and a very benevolent neutrality. However, the South 
American envoys actually enjoyed no more privileges in the United 
States than did the unrecognized Spanish Minister, Luis de Onis-. 
Late in 1812, the United States went to war with England. The 
government of Buenos Aires realized that there would be little 
chance of getting military supplies from the United States for the 
duration of the war and, as they had not as yet declared its inde-
pendence, that it would be useless to press for recognition. There 
were, therefore, no missions from Buenos Aires to the United States 
from 1812 to 1816. 
The absence of envoys from Buenos Aires does not mean the 
iunta permitted the United States to forget it. It made use of the 
American consuls and agents in Buenos Aires and wrote constantly 
to the United States government. On February 10, Juan Manuel 
de Luca, Secretary of the ad interim government, wrote to W. G. 
Miller that "his Excellency desires nothing so greatly as to initiate 
with those free countries of North America those commercial rela-
tions of mutual inter.est and frankness which open the channels 
to industry and prosperity of States. " 18 
On July 21, 1813, the triumvirate, Nicolas Rodriguez Pena, Jose 
Julian Perez and Antonio A. Gomez, developed the ideas of de Luca 
into a suggestion for a "fraternal alliance" between their govern-
ment and the United States. They pointed out they had been cer-
tain that the United States would never be indifferent to their 
17. Monroe to Adams, Nov. 23, 1811, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 12. 
18. Juan Manuel de Luca to Miller, Feb. 10, 1813, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
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emancipation and that the time had now arrived when "the love 
of freedom has overcome all opposition" and an order had been 
produced which "will assure the results of our glorious Revolution" 
and will result in the declaration of independence. They went on 
to state that "The dispositions which arise from the analogy of po-
litical principles and the indubitable characteristics of a national 
sympathy, should prepare a fraternal alliance which would truly 
unite the Americans of the North and South forever." 19 Accom-
panying this letter was one from one Manuel Moreno, the private 
secreta1y, informing the President of the United States that under 
different cover was being transmitted the public papers of the 
government of Buenos Aires ''by which your Excellency will be 
able to judge of the Political State in which the Provinces of Rio 
de la Plata are at present." 20 
Among the vast amount of correspondence sent to the United 
States by its agents and consuls and by the junta and the various 
Supreme Directors of the government of the Plata during the years 
of the War of 1812, there appears an extraordinary letter from 
Gervasio Antonio de Posadas to the President of the United States. 
The occasion of this letter was his appointment as Supreme Direc-
tor of the United Provinces. Posadas, following the pattern now 
established, was sending official notification of his appointment to 
that position and informing the United States, through public pa-
pers, of the condition of the region of the Plata. After the usual 
felicitations and the reminder that the United States, since the be-
ginning of its struggle, had "manifested a desire to favor their 
glorious enterprise," he politely excused the failure to give aid on 
the basis that "it may be that distance has prevented them [United 
States-] from giving us such succor as would ere now have ended 
our fatigues." He informed the President that, in spite of the lack 
of aid, they had maintained their freedom for four years. Posadas' 
perception of the entire international situation was then very clearly 
shown as he added: 
At the period when our independence was about to be confirmed the 
extraordinary victories of the Allied Powers of Europe again deranged our 
affairs. The victories of the North, which obliged France to cease oppressing 
Spain, may enable our enemies, with the assistance of Great Britain, to injure 
our cause, if some powerful arm does not volunteer her aid. Though humanity 
and justice are interested in the sacred cause defended by South America, 
four years of experience have taught this people that it is not for the interest 
of the Potentates of Europe to favor the independence of the colonies. Hith-
erto the greatneess of the powers of Europe has been founded on our degrada-
19. Nicolas Rodriguez Pena and others to the President, Jan. 21, 1813, ARN., I, Pt. I. 
20. Manuel Moreno to the President, Jan. 21, 1813, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
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tion. Perhaps the preponderance we should give to your influence in the 
commercial world has not a little influence. It is on you we place our present 
hopes, who have the happiness to govern the only free people in the world, 
whose philosophic and patriotic sentiments we are ambitious to imitate. I am 
sensible the war, in which you are at present engaged, will prevent your giving 
us that immediate aid that would end our troubles. The people of this country 
can as yet support their cause with dignity, could they procure a supply of 
arms and ammunitions. Your Excellency cannot fail of being able to afford 
us these supplies; and our prompt and ready payment cannot be doubted. Your 
Execllency may be assured that the Provinces of Rio de la Plata will not be 
ungrateful for such relief, and will be ready to engage in any treaties of com-
merce that will be advantageous to the United States. The interest that the 
inhabitants of said States have generally felt for the success of our Cause con-
vinces me of the happy result of this request. .21 
Following news of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on Decem-
ber 24, 1814, ending the war between the United States and Eng-
land, the junta and Supreme Director Alvarez made preparations to 
send again a formal mission to the United States. Before this new 
mission was readied there came to Buenos Aires, en route to the 
United States, Brigadier Jose Miguel Carrera, of Chile. Carrera, 
probably at the suggestion of Poinsett, was going to the United 
States in an effort to secure ships and arms. Alvarez decided to make 
use of Carrera's visit to the United States and asked Carrera to "ex-
pose the necessities of these people" and to explain verbally the situ-
ation in the Plata, as well as point out the glory it would bring the 
United States to "aid them in their heroic enterprise." Alvarez wrote 
the President that since the Treaty of Ghent had been signed the ob-
stacles to United States aid '1aid by the rupture with England" no 
longer existed and the United Provinces now looked forward to great 
:generosity from the United States.22 
About the thirteenth of November, 1815, the first official mission 
from Buenos Aires, after the War with England, left for the United 
States. This was a very business-like mission and was carried out 
·by Thomas Taylor, who was a citizen of the United States employed 
·by the government of Buenos Aires as a privateer. Although Taylor 
.spent little time with the government of the United States, and 
21. Posadas to Madison, March 9, 1814, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
22. Alvarez to Madison, May 26, 1815, ARN., I, .Pt. I. The Mission of Carrera had an 
·unfortunate ending. He returned to Buenos Aires at the time when everyone was anxious 
about the San Martfn expedition to Chile and made himself pef'sona non grata by referring 
to San Martin's plans as madness and folly. When news of the success of the expedition 
reached Buenos Aires, Carrera was greatly disappointed, and be called San Martin a 
scoundrel and talked of his ambitious designs on the liberties of Chile. The government of 
Buenos Aires ordered him out of the country. He then added insult to injury by joining 
Artigas. Carrera had been successful in getting two ships and their armament. These 
were sold to him on the understanding that they would not be delivered into his bands 
until paid for. Carrera lacked the necessary funds and would not permit the government 
,of Buenos Aires to purchase them and as a result did not receive delivery of the ships. 
Carrera also brought French and American officers and artisans. See Halsey to Secretary 
of State, March 3, 1817, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I. 
apparently offered no plea for aid, there is no doubt that his mission 
had the official support of the government of Buenos Aires. He was 
provided with a letter of introduction to the President of the United 
States from the Supreme Director Alvarez, and he reported his suc-
cess by letter, February 8, 1816, to Alvarez.23 The purpose of his 
mission was to get ships which could be used as privateers. Ap-
parently he had no difficulty carrying out his task, for he arrived in 
Annapolis January 16, 1816, and in his letter of February 8, 1816, he 
informed Alvarez that "your intentions will be completely fulfilled.» 
He added that "within a month a vessel ought to be perfectly armed 
for sea, and I believe I have to do no more than await the arrival 
of the frigate Avispa in these parts in order to go with all the rest." 24 
Taylor's mission was clearly meant for the sole purpose of obtaining 
ships and arms for privateering. 
The changes which had come about in the European situation 
with the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of legitimate gov-
ernments, including that of Ferdinand VII, called for another mis-
sion to make clear to the United States the situation in Buenos Aires. 
Another factor behind this mission rested in the strong feeling that 
the Congress, which was now assembling at Tucuman, would result 
in a formal declaration of independence. If this should occur, there 
should be an agent in the United States to take full advantages of 
any opportunities such a step might effect. Therefore, early in 1816, 
Alvarez appointed Colonel Martin Thompson as agent to the United 
States. Thompson was chosen for the uncomplimentary reason that 
his personal qualities would not excite suspicion of his mission's im-
portance. 25 Thompson was sent as an agent not yet invested with 
public character, nor was he to exceed the specific object of his 
mission without an understanding beforehand with the United 
States Government. He was sent to implore "the protection and aid 
necessary for the defense of a just and sacred cause." 26 
Thompson's instructions imposed upon him absolute secrecy as to 
his voyage and mission.27 Theoretically, no one was to know of it, 
except the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, the President 
23. Taylor to Supreme Director, Feb. 8, 1816, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. This is the 
only letter of Taylor's in regard to this mission. 
24. Ibid. Two vessels were fitted out, leaving port as merchant ships and later armed 
as privateers. 
25. Alvarez to the President, Jan. 16, 1816, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. Also AGN., Sl-
A2-A4, No. 9. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Juan Martin Pueyrred6n, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de 
la Plata, to Monroe, Jan. 1, 1817, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. Herein Pueyrred6n explained the 
secrecy of this mission as being necessary because of "the suspicion that might otherwise 
have arisen concerning its object." Apparently, great fear of England and English action 
still existed in Buenos Aires. 
85 
of the United States, whom Alvarez would inform by letter, and 
Thompson himself. He was to inform the President of the state of 
affairs in Buenos Aires and the desire of the Plata region to tighten 
its relations with the United States by a "pact of reciprocal interests.'' 
Thompson was to order, in the name of the government of Buenos 
Aires, every kind of material assistance, pledging his government to 
compensate the United States with every commercial advantage. 
If he could not get munitions on credit, or could not arrange a loan, 
he was to guarantee cash payment. He was particularly instructed 
to request at least one, and to strongly recommend two, United 
States frigates to protect the trade of the United States and to permit 
a preponderance of North Americans over English nationals. His 
instructions also invested him with the task of procuring from the 
United States government officers of all classes. He was to urge 
that the United States induce those European powers without colo-
nies to take a part in the destiny of the Plata; and he was to attempt 
to establish secret relations with the government in Mexico. 28 In 
short, Thompson was to do everything possible to obtain support 
for the Buenos Aires government and its cause. It is interesting to 
note, however, that all such aid was to be obtained through the 
United States Government. 
In his credential, presenting Thompson to the President, Alvarez 
asked that the agent be given the same consideration granted United 
States agents in Buenos Aires. Alvarez called attention to the failure 
of the Plata to declare its independence and to the interruption of 
communication by the War of 1812 between the United States and 
England, stating that "well known circumstances" had prevented 
the United Provinces from establishing with the United States the 
relations of "amity and strict correspondence which reciprocal in-
terest and a common glory ought to have inspired." He excused this 
failure to declare independence by stating that "a series of ex-
traordinary events and unexpected changes, which have taken place 
in our ancient mother-country, have constrained us not to make a 
formal declaration of national independence." However, he speci-
fied, "our conduct and public papers have sufficiently expressed our 
resolution." Alvarez added that by the time the President had this 
letter, the General Congress would have met, and he concluded with 
assurances that one of its first acts would be a declaration of inde-
pendence. 29 
28. Instructions for the Deputy to the United States, Jan. 16, 1816, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, 
No. 9. 
29. Alvarez to the President, Jan. 16, 1816, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. Also AGN., Sl-
A2-A4, No. 9. 
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Thompson was also the bearer of a separate note of a more 
personal character and a gift for President Madison; a sample of the 
first arms manufactured in the provinces of "Buenos Aires and 
Tucuman under the auspices of a free Government." Alvarez also 
enclosed a manuscript essay on the new mineral discoveries of the 
province. His communication ended with the old but apparently 
sincere refrain: "the expressions of the sentiments of a people, who 
amidst the struggle in which they are engaged to secure their rights, 
reflect on the natural relations which are one day to unite them 
with that people over whom you so worthily preside." so 
By 1816, the United Provinces were willing to establish closer 
relations on any terms the United States might want. The advan-
tage, however, of such a consummation was not, in the eyes of the 
United States, great enough to compensate for the risks involved. 
The United States wanted Florida; she did not want war with Eng-
land, Spain or a European coalition. Closer relations with Buenos 
Aires might bring about war with any one of them, or possibly all 
three. Moreover, recognition of the Thompson mission was made 
impossible by the actions of Thompson himself. 
Thompson arrived in New York May 3, 1816, but delayed going 
immediately to Washington as the summer heat had driven the 
President and most of the cabinet from that city.31 While in New 
York, he and Carrera contracted with several French and Polish 
officers to serve in Buenos Aires thereby exceeding his instructions. 
He also speculated on the use of a steamboat in the Plata waters. 
When not engaged in this fascination, he wrote long despatches to 
Buenos Aires requesting more salary and more secretarial aid.32 He 
also requested public rank, as his present standing as private deputy 
prevented his being officially received.33 
The actions of the government of the United Provinces are at this 
point somewhat vague and contradictory. While Thompson was 
exceeding his instructions in the United States, the Congress of 
Tucuman appointed Juan Martin Pueyrred6n as Supreme Director 
of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Pueyrred6n wrote 
the President of this, and announced his changing of Thompson's 
status from secret to public agent.34 At this time Pueyrred6n was 
fully aware that in contracting with French and Polish officers di-
30. Alvarez to Madison, Feb. 9, 1816, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
31. Martin Thompson to the Supreme Director, Aug. 23, 1816, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Thompson to Supreme Director, Nov. 14, 1816, ibid, Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
34. Juan Martin Pueyrred6n, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio 
de la Plata to the President, Jan. 1, 1817, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
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rectly, and not through the United States government, Thompson 
had violated his orders.35 In spite of this, Pueyrred6n's government 
honored the contracts he had made with such officers and did not 
recall him for another nine days.36 The charges that he had granted 
licenses for privateering indicates that Pueyrred6n had become 
aware of Spain's protests to the United States regarding these vio-
lations of neutrality and feared that United States embarrassment 
over the situation might cause unfavorable reaction toward the 
United Provinces. Pueyrred6n must have been thoroughly dis-
gruntled when he dismissed Thompson, for he told him quite 
bluntly that it would be unnecessary for him to return to Buenos 
Aires.37 Thus, we have an interesting episode of an agent who was 
appointed, then reappointed and dismissed before he ever reached 
the official seat of the Government to which he was sent. 
If Thompson had not furnished Pueyrred6n sufficient grounds 
for dismissal in making direct contracts with foreign officers, grant-
ing privateering commissions, and entering into negotiations with 
shipping firms before reaching an understanding with the Wash-
ington government, his meddling in regard to East and West Florida 
and Amelia Island would have served the purpose. The order for 
his dismissal had been written, but not received when he joined with 
the agents from Venezuela, New Granada and Mexico in commis-
sioning one Gregor MacGregor to take possession of East and West 
Florida. Although the act was disavowed at once by the three 
countries involved, MacGregor went ahead and the United States 
then became involved in a lengthy and distasteful problem. All in 
all, Thompson did a thorough job of mishandling the duties given 
him by his government. His successor, Manuel Hermenejildo de 
Aguirre, felt he had the answer when he reported to Pueyrred6n 
that "Thompson is in a hospital, hopelessly crazy." 38 
Three factors combined to bring to the United States the best 
known of the early agents from Buenos Aires, Aguirre, Commissar 
General of War and Navy for the United Provinces. The first, of 
course, was the dismissal of Thompson; the second was the fact that 
having made, on July 9, 1816, an express declaration of independ-
35. Ibid. Pueyrred6n stated: "I have learned by communications concerning the 
above mentioned agent, [Thompson] that he has arbitrarily departed from the line of the 
Duties which was marked out for him, in not squaring his conduct by the advice of your 
Excellency, by whose judgment he was to be guided as to the appropriate man.ifesting or 
not manifesting, his official character, but on the contrary, that he has acted in a manner 
directly repugnant to those principles." 
36. Pueyrred6n to Madison, Jan. 10, 1817, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
37. Instructions to Martin Thompson, Feb. 9, 1816, ibid., Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
38. Manuel Hermenejildo de Aguirre to Pueyrred6n, Aug. 17, 1817, ibid., Sl-A2-A4, 
No.9. 
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ence from Spain, the United Provinces now desired recognition of 
their new status; the third centered around General San Martin and 
his plans for the emancipation of Peru by sea. Aguirre, in March 
of 1817, was recommended to Monroe for his "qualities of probity, 
capacity and patriotism." 39 As agent of the United Provinces to 
the United States, he was granted "privileges, pre-eminencies and 
prerogatives" as to suggest his having diplomatic character, but 
neither his commission nor any of his instructions delegated him 
any power as a public minister nor any power to negotiate as such. 
Instead, the decision as to his actual position seems to have been 
left entirely with the United States government. Accompanying 
Aguirre on this mission was one Gregorio Gomez, who served as his 
assistant. 40 
The primary purpose of Aguirre's mission was the purchase of 
ships for a naval squadron. Although his original instructions stated 
only that his duties were to promote "whatever conduces to the 
progress of the cause in which these Provinces are engaged, to their 
honor and the consolidation of the great work of our Liberty," 41 
subsequent instructions and his credentials make clear that the 
navy was the primary concern of both Pueyrred6n and San Martin. 
San Martin, having defeated the Spanish Royalists at Chacabuco, 
February 12, 1817, was planning to attack the Spanish forces in 
Peru. This step made necessary a navy which could control the 
Pacific, and transport and convoy the army to Peru. For this pur-
pose he returned to Buenos Aires and agreed with Pueyrred6n on 
the choice of Aguirre to carry out the task he wanted accomplished. 
Thus it was that San Martin using powers granted him by Bernardo 
O'Higgins, Supreme Director of Chile, drew up a contract which, 
if carried out, would give him at least the beginnings of a naval 
squadron and would at the same time place pesos in the pocket of 
Aguirre. Apparently San Martin worked on the principle, if not 
for himself, for his associates, that a degree of self interest would 
aid in achieving the desired ends. He gave Aguirre 100,000 pesos 
in cash and a promise of 100,000 more in three months time. With 
these sums Aguirre was to purchase or have constructed in the 
United States two 34-gun frigates. These frigates were to meet 
detailed specifications given by San Martin and to be fully equipped 
and armed. San Martin also required that they be sent to Val-
paraiso, by way of Buenos Aires, under the Hag of the United States. 




Perhaps to speed the transaction, San Martin agreed to grant Aguirre 
a bonus of 100,000 pesos if Lima should be taken with the aid of 
these ships.42 
It is interesting to note that Aguirre was provided with fifty 
privateering commissions, twenty-five from each government, and 
in addition was instructed to engage naval officers, offering them the 
salary which they would be paid in the American navy in time of 
war plus fifty per cent of the proceeds from the sale of any prizes 
which they might take.43 One wonders if Thompson went to the 
hospital, of which Aguirre wrote, after talking to Aguirre with re-
gard to his instructions. 
In addition to his formal credentials signed by Pueyrred6n, 
Aguirre carried with him letters to the President from San Martin 
and Bernardo O'Higgins, Supreme Director of Chile. San Martin's 
was a simple, dignified letter alluding to the similarity of the move-
ment for freedom in both Americas and explaining that the Supreme 
Director of Chile believed that a principle instrument to secure 
the liberty of America was the armament in the United States of a 
squadron destined to the Pacific Ocean which: 
. . . united to the forces that are preparing in the River La Plata, may 
cooperate in sustaining the ulterior military operations of the army under my 
command in South America; and convinced of the advantages which our 
political situation promises, I have crossed the Andes in order to concert in 
that capital, among other things, the guaranty of my Government, and in 
compliance with the stipulations between the Supreme Director of Chile and 
its intimate ally, to carry into effect the plan which has been confided to 
Don Manuel Aguirre. Your Excellency . will, I hope, deign to 
extend to the above named person such protection as is compatible with the 
actual relations of your Government; and I have the high satisfaction of 
assuring your Excellency that the arms of the country under my orders will 
not fail to give consistency and respect to the promises of both Governments.44 
It would seem certain that the mission of Aguirre was one of the 
strangest ever to come to the United States. On the surface he was 
replacing an agent who was dismissed for granting privateering 
commissions and for recruiting officers to serve in Buenos Aires; 
yet, Aguirre had definite instructions to recruit such officers and 
was officially given twenty-five privateering commissions from each 
government sending him. In the letter presenting Aguirre to Mon-
roe, Pueyrred6n stated that Aguirre was sent in the character of 
agent, but at the same time requested for him "all the protection 
42. Alberto Polomeque, Or!gines de la diplomacia Argentina, misi6n Aguirre a Norte 
America (2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1905) , II, 123-128. 
43. Francisco Jose Urrutia, Paginas de historia diplomatica; los Estados Unidos de 
America y las republicas hispanoamericanas de 1810 a 1830 (Bogota, 1917), 58-59. 
44. Jose Francisco de San Martin, General of the Army of the Andes, to James Monroe, 
April 1, 1817, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. S e also Manning, Dip. Cor., I , 352. 
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and consideration required by his diplomatic rank and the actual 
state of our relations." It was well known that an unrecognized 
agent had no diplomatic rank, but Pueyrred6n seemed to want to 
ignore such a fact, or perhaps he was leaving the entire question to 
the United States government. Pueyrred6n, however, seemed to 
know what he meant, for he added that this would be a "new tie, by 
which the United States of the North will more effectively secure 
the gratitude and affection of the free provinces of the South." 45 In 
spite of what Pueyrred6n may have had in mind, or what Aguirre 
later came to believe, he had no diplomatic character, for he had no 
commission as a public minister of any rank, nor any power to 
negotiate as such.46 
Aguirre and Gomez sailed from Buenos Aires late in May, 1817, 
and arrived in Baltimore in July. As President Monroe was not in 
Washington and the new Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, 
had not yet arrived from London, Aguirre met with Richard Rush, 
Acting-Secretary of State. The meeting was an informal affair 
with great friendliness shown on both sides. Rush assured Aguirre 
of the good will of the President and the people of the United States, 
but he also made clear to him that the government of the United 
States, because of its treaty of amity and commerce with Spain and 
its policy of strict neutrality, could take no part in the struggle. 
Rush informed Aguirre that the policy of neutrality followed by the 
United States was the policy best suited and most likely to be of 
benefit to the South Americans. In regard to the purchase of ships, 
the United States government would not sell them to him, but the 
laws of the country would not prevent a person from purchasing 
arms and munitions from private individuals. The entire transac-
tion, said Rush, must be placed under a situation as a mercantile 
speculation, and under a neutral flag; in this manner a trade in 
vessels, guns, arms and warlike stores would not only be permitted 
but protected by the government. According to Rush, Aguirre was 
satisfied, stating that he would leave for Baltimore the next day to 
begin his career as a "merchant." Before leaving, however, Aguirre 
dropped a bomb with a slow fuse into Rush's lap by rather guard-
edly stating that the people of Buenos Aires were not fitted to be 
republicans and implying that they would not be able to establish 
45. Pueyrred6n to Monroe, Apr. 28, 1817, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
46. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to House of Representatives, March 25, 
1818, in American State Papers, Class I, Foreign Relations ( 6 vols., Washington, 1852-
1859 ), IV, 173. Hereinafter cited as ASP., FR. Adams further stated that: "The charac-
ter in which Mr. Aguirre presented himself was that of a public agent from the Govern-
ment of La Plata, and of a private agent from Chile. His commissions from both simply 
qualified him as agent.'' 
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a democratic form of government. He added that he thought they 
would extend an offer to Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand VII, to 
come to Buenos Aires as an independent King.47 Aguirre's parting 
statement was true, a fact which added to the worries of Monroe 
and his administration which, following policy set by Jefferson, was 
opposed to the extension of monarchy to the Western Hemisphere. 
When Aguirre and G6mez returned to Baltimore, where they 
hoped to purchase or build their ships, they soon discovered that 
neither Buenos Aires nor Chile had any credit and that without the 
sanction of the United States government there was no possibility 
of gaining it. They were forced to contract for the building of two 
34-gun frigates in New York, with the understanding that 100,000 
pesos would be paid at the beginning of construction and the bal-
ance, also 100,000 pesos, before the -ships left the port. Aguirre, 
expecting daily to receive from Chile 100,000 pesos, was quite opti-
mistic and wrote that the ships could be expected in Valparaiso by 
March, 1818. In addition to contracting for the two ships, Aguirre 
gave out several privateering commissions and sent three ships, the 
Ellen Tooker, the Colomb and the Araucan, to Chile loaded with 
munitions, their owners taking the risk of receiving their money 
from either the government of Buenos Aires or of Chile.48 
According to Aguirre it was impossible to build these ships with 
any secrecy because of the enthusiasm of the American people for 
the South American cause.49 Aguirre would probably have been 
more correct if he had said it was impossible because of the alertness 
of Luis de Onis. Certainly the Spanish Minister was behind the 
move to prevent the building of these ships and also the subsequent 
four days Aguirre spent in jail. Aguirre informed Adams that 
while the formal contracts for the construction of his two ships 
was being drawn up he was presented with a copy of "an Act of 
Congress, prohibiting under heavy penalties all persons from 
fitting out vessels of the description of those he had ordered.~' 
Apparently fearing that this would prevent his ships from reaching 
their destination, he appealed to Adams for some further informa-
tion.150 Adams suggested that he get legal advice, which Aguirre 
did, only to learn that the neutrality law permitted vessels of any 
size to be built in the country and sent out of it, provided they 
47. Richard Rush, Statement in relation to conversation with Aguirre, Nov. 22, 1817. 
This apparently was written out on the order of John Q. Adams to make clear the Letter 
of Aguirre to Adams, Nov. 14, 1817, DS., ARN., I , Pt. I. 
48. G6mez to Pueyrred6n, Nov. 13, 1817, AGN., S1-A2-A4, No. 9. 
49. Aquirre to Adams, Nov. 14, 1817, DS., ARN., I. Pt. I. 
50. Ibid. 
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were not armed, or if armed, that the intent was not to use them 
against a power with which the Unitd State was at peace. He was 
further informed that the Director of Customs was empowered to 
detain and confiscate such ships, the owner to be imprisoned for ten 
years and fined $10,000. Aguirre decided to take the risk and the 
work went forward. In the meantime, he appealed to his govern-
ment to send the 100,000 pesos, as promised, so that the ships could 
put to sea as soon as possible. 51 His initial mistake, according to 
Monroe, lay in communicating to the Department of State his 
intention to contravene the law.52 
The ships were finished and anchored in the harbor at New 
York, for the contractors would not turn them over to Aguirre 
until they received the balance of their fees. Aguirre sent Gomez 
to Buenos Aires to explain the situation and to get the money which 
was due according to the terms of San Martin's contract. In the 
meantime, he was arrested and then released when it was found 
impossible to prove he had armed the ships.53 Believing it imprac-
ticable to get the ships out of American waters, and faced with the 
great expense of caring for them, Aguirre offered to sell them to 
the United States.54 Monroe refused to purchase the ships, as he 
did not think he had the power to do so, and believed that even 
if he had the power such an action would be highly improper.55 
Then in an effort to clear the ships from the United States, Aguirre 
had them registered, to give them a mercantile appearance, in the 
name of his captains, Joseph Skinner, to whom he gave command 
of the Horatio, and Paul Delano, to whom he gave the Curiacio. 
Fortunately, he was able at length, through the assistance of an 
American citizen, to borrow enough money to satisfy his creditors 
and get the ships away from New York. The cannon and other 
armament were removed from them and placed on board merchant 
vessels, which took them to Buenos Aires where the vessels were 
put in fighting trim. 
They left New York early in September, and reached the Rio 
de la Plata early in November. Again Aguirre ran into difficulty, 
as the funds necessary to complete the purchase of the vessels 
were still not available. After some delay the Curiacio was pur-
chased, renamed the Independencia, armed and sent to Chile, 
where it arrived on June 23, 1819. Captain Skinner refused to turn 
51. Aguirre to Supreme Director, Nov. 25, 1817, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 9. 
52. Monroe to Adams, Aug. 17, 1818. Monroe, Writings, VI, 64-66. 
53. Adams to Aguirre, Aug. 27, 1818, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
54. Aguirre to Adams, Aug. 10, 1818, ibid., I, Pt. I. 
55. Adams to Aguirre, Aug. 27, 1818, Manning, D ip. Cor., I, 76. 
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over his ship until payment was received and, as that did not seem 
to be forthcoming, took the Horatio to Rio de Janeiro and sold it 
to the Portuguese government. 
Had Aguirre been satisfied to stay within his instructions it is 
quite possible that he would have played the part of gaining the 
recognition so much desired by his government. It can be said 
that he accomplished the real object of his mission, but as a diplo-
mat he was not a success. Apparently, while struggling with the 
problem of getting his ships and munitions from the United States, 
his judgment was warped by the attempts of Henry Clay to embar-
rass and harass the administration. Under Clay's influence he 
demanded recognition for the government of Buenos Aires, asked 
for a new neutrality law, and protested the seizure of Amelia 
Island by the United States as being unfair to the revolutionists.56 
In addition, he voiced the opinion that the chances of the United 
States becoming involved in war presented no valid reason why 
he should not solicit the recognition of his nation. As the United 
States was disturbed over the possibility of war with Spain, still 
fearing that Spain might find European support, and as the ques-
tion of Florida was the very heart of American foreign policy, 
Aguirre did more than just exceed his instructions, he was indis-
creet and importunate. His actions turned an administration, 
which had been favorably inclined toward recognition, against 
such a step, and the combined work of Clay and Aguirre forced 
the issue before Congress, where it was defeated on March 28, 
1818, by a vote of 115 to 45.57 The following day, March 29, 
Aguirre received a despatch from Pueyrred6n, for Monroe, in 
which he formally requested recognition.58 Aguirre's mission did 
serve to bring before the American people the questions of neu-
trality and recognition. 
56. The question of neutrality is discussed in chapter VI, and recognition in chapter 
VII, this paper. 
57. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1646. 
58. Peuyrred6n to Monroe, Jan. 14, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 370. 
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Chapter VI 
The Neutrality Question 
THE controversy over the rights and duties of the United 
States as a neutral in the Spanish-American revolution played only 
a minor part until 1816. Until this date, the United States relied 
upon the Neutrality Act of 1794, which prohibited Americans from 
engaging in, or preparing for, hostilities against any power with 
which the United States was at peace, from within the territory of 
the Union. The law, with the sanctions and penalties provided, 
had been effective. 
The Spanish-American revolution, however, presented a new 
problem, and one which consequently led to controversy upon a 
number of points. This conflict was not between two organized 
and independent states, but between a nation and various provinces 
within its territory. The Madison administration, by executive 
orders, put into effect the Neutrality Act of 1794 and directed that 
American ports be open to all ships, regardless of their flag or na-
tionality. In so doing, Madison virtually recognized the belliger-
ency of the rebelling colonies. While this action was disappointing 
to a few of the Spanish-Americans, it was the greatest help that the 
United States could render at the time. With few exceptions, neu-
trality placed the insurgents upon the same level as Spain, and in 
practice benefited them more than it did the Spanish. 
Following the War of 1812 the maritime aspect of the question 
became the center of controversy. The United States maintained, 
and insisted upon the acceptance of its view, that it had the right 
to carry on commerce with both belligerents. This trade, it as-
serted, should be free from seizure, except for contraband of war 
and forced entry of a legally constituted and effective blockade. 
The United States also asserted that a "paper blockade" was no 
blockade at all. Spain opposed the American stand and maintained 
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that foreign ships had no right to trade with her colonies, whether 
in revolt or not, except where such a right had been granted by 
Spanish decrees. Spain also claimed that ships sailing under the 
flags of the rebellious colonies were pirates, and should be treated 
as such. 
In Spanish eyes American neutrality was made even more fa-
vorable to the South Americans by an order of the Treasury De-
partment dated July 3, 1815. This order specifically stated that 
ships flying the flags of any of the insurgent governments were to 
be admitted to the ports of the United States.1 The indefatigable 
Onfs vigorously protested this ruling. 2 Onfs was quite correct in 
pointing out that the law made it much easier for the Spanish-
Americans to obtain war supplies, but the American feeling was 
that it was only strict and impartial neutrality which, in effect, 
granted both parties access to American ports on equal terms. 
Before 1815 Spain's naval power in the Caribbean and the South 
Pacific was greater than that of the Spanish-Americans, and Spain 
was able to harass the "illegal" trade with her colonies. With the 
ending of the War of 1812, and the resultant unemployment of both 
men and ships in the United States, the Spanish-Americans were 
given an opportunity, through the use of privateers, to destroy 
Spain's naval supremacy. Thus, the action of the Treasury De-
partment, which made United States ports a haven for the privateers 
of all Spanish America, was a bitter blow to Spain. 
Privateers licensed by Buenos• Aires began their activities with a 
single vessel that brought two prizes into the home port in 1815.3 
The next year Thomas Taylor appeared in Baltimore, where he pur-
chased two ships and experienced little trouble disposing of a num-
ber of privateering commissions. New Orleans and Baltimore be-
came centers for privateering activity, the former for ships operating 
under the colors-of Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, and the latter 
serving those from Buenos Aires. 
Among the first privateers equipped in Baltimore were two swift 
schooners of about one hundred and seventy tons, the Romp and 
the Orb. At that time, it was customary for merchant ships bound 
for distant points to carry some armament, and by falsifying the 
des-tination and number of the crew, they easily avoided trouble, 
especially in ports such as Baltimore, where public opinion was 
1. John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (3 vols., Washington, 1906), 
I, 170. 
2. Onis to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1815, ASP., FR., IV, 423. 
3. Theodore S. Currier, Los corsarios del Rfo de la Plata (Buenos Aires, 1929 ), 23. 
Hereinafter cited as Currier, Corsarios. 
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greatly in favor of the Spanish-American movement. The Romp and 
the Orb, following this pattern to avoid difficulties with the au-
thorities, cleared as merchantmen with crews of normal size, taking 
on the rest of their complement after leaving port. These vessels, 
and others, had very succes,sful cruises, and instances of great 
profits were reported. It was claimed that by March of 1817, the 
Romp had taken prizes amounting to $290,000.4 Reports and ru-
mors of such privateering profits led to large scale desertions from 
the American Merchant Marine, especially at Buenos Aires, wher.e 
many vessels were stranded.5 It has• been estimated that as many 
as 3500 American seamen became privateers in the period 1816 
to 1821.6 
The privateers usually cruised in the West Indies where they de-
clared and effectively maintained a blockade of Cuba and Haiti, 7 
but their operations extended to both sides of the Atlantic. In 
1816, it was reported that: 
The Buenos Ayrean privateers still vex the coasts of Spain-with great 
efforts, Ferdinand lately sent . . . two frigates and a sloop of war, to 
capture them or scare them away; but after being at sea 15 or 20 days and 
seeing nothing, they returned into port to refit! in the meantime one of these 
privateers actually chased a ship into the bay of Cadiz. They make many 
captures.s 
Occasionally prizes were sent to the United States, but more often 
to St. Thomas or St. Bartholomew, where marks were changed and 
papers falsified in such a way as to make it possible to send them 
to any port.9 
As the Spanish-Americans did not have the men, ships, or capital 
necessary to carry on privateering, the backing for such enterprises 
came from interested merchants and shipowners in the United 
States. The State Department received note after note from Onis, 
giving the names of merchants involved. Onis went so far as to 
accuse officials of the federal government-the postmaster at Balti-
more, and the collectors of the ports of Baltimore and Savannah-
of playing a part in the business.10 A number of the first prizes 
sent to Buenos Aires were consigned to W. G. Miller, formerly the 
American agent at that port.11 The United States Consul, T. L. 
4. Onis to Adams, Mar. 26, 1817, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 1923. 
5. Halsey to Tagle, July 31, 1815, DS., DUSC., I, Pt. I, Halsey to Monroe, March 14, 
1816, ibid. See also chapter IV this paper. 
6. Currier, Corsarios, 32. 
7. Niles W eekly Register, Apr. 5, 1817; June 7, 1817. 
8. Ibid., Nov. 9, 1816. 
9. Adams, Memoirs, V, 15. 
10. Ibid., IV, 186, V, 151. 
11. Currier, Corsarios, 20. 
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Halsey, made a large fortune in privateering.12 Onis bitterly com-
plained of these violations of neutrality, and the courts, whose rec-
ords give sufficient and conclusive proof of American participation, 
show that his complaints were well founded. 
While privateering was the major feature for Onfs' protests 
against United States violations of neutrality, others attracted his 
attention also. He objected, time after time, to American-based 
filibustering expeditions against Spanish territory. There were a 
number of these expeditions, the most important being those of 
Francisco de Miranda against Venezuela, Bernardo Gutierrez de 
Lara and Augustus Magee against Texas, and Francisco Javier 
Mina against Mexico. These activities disturbed Onfs so greatly 
that he made them the principal subject of his first note to Secretary 
Monroe after his formal reception as the minister of Spain.13 Presi-
dent Madison responded with a proclamation of neutrality pro-
hibiting such military expeditions against the dominions of Spain.14 
Additional difficulty for the United States came through the 
seizure of the port of Galveston and Amelia Island by bands of 
privateers. At the time these two areas were focal points of dis-
pute between the United States and Spain, and their occupation 
by forces other than those of the United States occasioned con-
siderable apprehension that they and Florida would pass from 
Spanish to English control, should the latter aid Spain to regain 
her colonies. There is evidence to prove that, while this was not 
the case, the adventurers who occupied these two locations in-
tended to establish a government independent of the United 
States.15 
The establishment at Galveston was made early in 1817, by 
Commodore Louis Aury, who founded his own government and 
set up an admiralty court to condemn captured vessels.16 This 
action was purportedly taken in the name of Mexico, but testimony 
of men who served in Galveston indicated that the main purpose 
of their enterprise was the capture of Spanish vessels and property, 
and that no thought was given to the idea of aiding the revolution 
in Mexico or in any of the other Spanish colonies.17 It is interest-
12. See chapter IV this paper. 
13. Onis to Monroe, D ec. 30, 1815, ASP., FR. , IV, 422-423. 
14. Proclamation of Sept. 1, 1815, ASP., FR., IV, 1. The important documents 
relative to the question of neutrality may be found in ASP., FR., IV, 1-4; blockade, 144-
159; illegal armaments and Amelia Island, 184-202; Florida question, 422-625; Spanish 
colonies, 217-348. 
15. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1787. 
16. Ibid., 1790. 
17. Ibid. , 1798. 
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ing to note that by this time Spanish shipping had been almost 
entirely swept from the seas, that the privateers had turned against 
the shipping of other nations, and that, by 1819, complaints of 
depredations on British and American commerce were common. 
Commodore Aury abandoned Galveston for Matagorda, April 
5, 1817,18 but Galveston was re-occupied within ten days by a 
group from New Orleans. This group, originally bound for Mata-
gorda, had taken two ships of supplies to Galveston and, upon 
finding it abandoned, decided to remain there instead.19 
About the same time that Aury was operating at Galveston an 
adventurous Scot, Gregor McGregor, who had served with the 
patriots in Venezuela, and for a time had been in the good graces 
of Bolivar, became interested in taking control of East Florida. 
Having failed to obtain English support, he approached Acting-
Secretary of State Richard Rush. The plan presented by McGregor 
to Rush was for the United States to purchase Florida after the 
filibusters had taken it from Spain. Officially, Rush refused to 
have anything to do with this scheme, but his strong sympathies 
for the patriots allowed him to leave McGregor with the impression 
that personally he would not be sorry to see such action take 
place.20 
Failing to get aid either from the United States or England, Mc-
Gregor turned to the Spanish-American agents resident in the 
United States. Here he was successful, and on March 31, 1817, 
received a commission from three deputies: Lino de Clemente of 
Venezuela, Pedro Gual of New Granada, and Martin Thompson of 
Rio de la Plata.21 By this commission McGregor was to procure 
both East and West Florida for the governments granting the com-
missio_n. The plan he was to follow was to conquer Amelia Island 
first and then move into the Floridas. This was to be accomplished 
in the name and under the auspices of the Spanish-Americans, who 
then planned to sell the territory to the United States for $1,500,000. 
The scheme eventually simmered down to an attack on Amelia 
Island. 
McGregor made his landing on Amelia June 30, 1817, and with 
little difficulty took control of the poorly defended island, establish-
ing a_n independent government. McGregor could not control his 
followers, and after a short time withdrew from the enterprise, his 
18. Ibid., 1786. 
19. Ibid., 1796. 
20. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 53. 
21. Sir Gregor McGregor's commission, ASP., FR., IV, 415. 
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place being taken by Louis Aury. Under Aury's control Amelia 
Island became a hotbed of intrigue, smuggling and piracy. 22 Onfs 
did not protest the actions of McGregor until July 9, 1817. By that 
time it was, of course, too late for the United States to take any legal 
action, although proceedings were started against him. John 
Quincy Adams considered the "tardiness of Mr. Onfs's remon-
strance" to be "of itself a decisive vindication of the magistrates of 
the United States against any imputation of neglect to enforce the 
laws." 23 
McGregor's and Aury's occupation of Amelia Island was im-
portant to the State Department because of its plans for Florida. 
When Spain took no action to remove the expedition, Monroe, using 
powers granted to the President by a secret session of Congress, in 
1811, 24 sent the army and navy to take over the island. This was 
accomplished on December 23, 1817.25 
Onfs entered a strong protest against American action regarding 
Amelia Island as soon as he heard of the President's plans. His 
protest was based upon the fact that both Amelia Island and Gal-
veston were in territory still belonging to Spain.26 The South-
American propagandists made extensive use of this act to show that 
the administration was against the liberty of the Spanish-Americans. 
The French also protested American action regarding Amelia 
Island, but interestingly enough, their protest was based upon the 
part that Americans were playing in pirate enterprises. In reply to 
the French Minister, Hyde de Neuville, Adams stated that the United 
States had made and was making every effort to keep its citizens 
from taking part in these expeditions, but: 
If in these endeavors they have not been entirely successful, the Govern-
ments of Europe have not been more so, and among the occupants of Amelia 
Island, for the practical purposes complained of in your notes, natives or 
Subjects of France have been included no less than citizens of these States.27 
Various groups in the United States who were ardent advocates 
of independence for the Spanish-Americans, or were just looking for 
something which could be used to embarrass the administration, 
also criticized this action of the President. They even went so far 
as to present claims in the newspapers that the United States had 
22. Monroe to Congress, Nov. 16, 1818, ibid., IV, 213-214. 
23. Adams to Congress, March 14, 1818, ibid., IV, 184. 
24. John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which 
the United States haa been a Party (6 vols., Washington, 1898), IV, 3978-3980. Here-
inafter cited as Moore, International Arbitrations. 
25. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1806. 
26. Onis to Adams, Dec. 6, 1817, ASP, FR., IV, 450-451. See also Adams to 
Congress, March 14, 1818, ibid., 184. 
27. Adams to de Neuville, Jan. 27, 1818, Manning, Dip. Car., I, 53. 
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allied with European powers favoring the return of the Spanish 
colonies to Spain. 
The Spanish-American governments, however, refused to accept 
responsibility for the acts of their agents in granting commissions 
for the establishment of independent states. 28 The Buenos Aires 
government was quick to disclaim any participation in the scheme, 
pointing out that its agent, Martin Thompson, had been dismissed 
before signing the commission, and if that had not been the case 
would certainly have been recalled because of it. 
These flagrant violations of neutrality, plus the protests and threats 
of Onis, led Monroe to propose a modification of the neutrality laws 
of the United States. At the same time, the relative importance of 
the issues involved in the dispute between Spain and the United 
States assumed greater significance in the eyes of the Spanish For-
eign Office. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1815, 
the relations of the United States to the rebelling Spanish-Americans, 
a matter which had been considered minor in 1816, had become by 
1817 of major importance, chiefly owing to the alarming reports of 
Onis. It was through the incidents just discussed, and the reports 
of Onis, that Spain came to realize that its quarrel with the United 
States was not a local issue, but an aspect of the colonial revolt. 
This realization deepened and became a conviction as the move-
ment for recognition of the Spanish-Americans gathered momentum 
in the United States. By 1817 the objectives of the Spanish Foreign 
Office were to prevent the recognition of the Spanish-Americans and 
to secure strict observance of neutrality by the United States. 
In view of the changing Spanish attitude, and the very apparent 
need for legislation regarding neutrality enforcement, Madison rec-
ommended a new law to correct the defects of the Act of 1794. 29 
John Forsyth, of Georgia, introduced in the House of Representa-
tives a new bill designed to reinforce the earlier act by prohibiting 
the sale of armed vessels to foreigners to use in a way that would 
be illegal for any citizens of the United States and which would 
require that individuals involved in any suspicious cases must give 
bond before departing from United States ports.3° Forsyth ex-
plained that neither the Act of 1794, nor the supplementary Act of 
1797, contained any provision forbidding a citizen from arming and 
28. Monroe bad expressed a number of times bis belief that the Spanish-American 
agents had exceeded any instructions from their governments. His messa_ge to Congress 
of December 2, 1817, is one example. 
29. Madison to Congress, Dec. 26, 1816, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents, 1789-1900, ed. by J, D. Richardson ( 11 vols., New York, 1909 ), 582. 
Hereinafter cited as Messages and Papers. 
30. Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 2 Sess., 71,5. 
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equipping a vessel within the United States and then selling it to 
a foreigner to be taken outsid~ the limits of the United States and 
used contrary to law. He also explained that the existing laws 
failed to authorize the interference of the Executive in preventing 
the commission of the offence, or punishing the offenders prior to 
conviction.31 The bill presented by Forsyth, and drawn up by the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs, was designed to meet the suggestions 
of Secretary of State Monroe, who believed the correction of these 
defects in the existing neutrality laws would make those laws ef-
fective.32 
Considerable and heated discussions arose in regard to the details 
and the necessity of such legislation. Representative Erastus Root, 
of New York, spoke against the bill and with great zeal denounced 
the "Tyranny of a bigotted Sovereign" ( Ferdinand VII). Root ex-
pressed the opinion of one group when he stated: 
The belligerent has the power of punshing offences committed at sea; and 
our laws provide for the punishment of offences against neutrality committed 
in our waters. What more . . . could the belligerent demand? 33 
Root also attacked the change in neutrality laws as preventing the 
South Americans from obtaining supplies in the United States and 
thus favoring imperialism over independence. He questioned the 
right of Spain to demand such' a law. 
Representative Samuel Smith, from Maryland, answered Root's 
charge that such a law favored Spain over Spanish America by 
stating that the main purpose of the legislation was to clear the 
government of any implication in the supplying of arms. He added 
that "arms might still be exported to any extent, but in the common 
way of merchants, not by force of arms, but by swift sailing." 34 One 
of Root's fellow citizens of New York, Thomas P. Grosvenor, tried 
to simplify the entire question by stating that "it was simply a ques-
tion whether the United States would or would not compel its 
citizens to adhere to their duties as the people of a neutral nation." 35 
John Randolph called the proposal a bill to make peace between the 
town of Baltimore and His Catholic Majesty.36 The debate afforded 
the members of Congress an opportunity to show their knowledge of 
history, their eloquence as speakers, and their sentiments in favor 
of the Spanish-American revolution. In spite of the strong argu-
31. Ibid., 719. 
32. Monroe to Forsyth, Jan. 6, 1817, ibid., 717. 
33. Ibid., 722. 
34. Ibid., 724. 
35. Ibid., 727. 
36. Ibid., 732. 
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ments of those opposed to the legislation, the bill was passed by the 
House on January 29, 1817, with a vote of 94 yeas to 60 nays. It 
later was returned from the Senate and, with a few minor changes, 
became law on March 3, 1817.37 
The neutrality act of 1817 was not perfect, and many, like Jeffer-
son, considered it contrary to the wishes of the people. The pressure 
of those opposed to it became so great that another law was passed, 
April 20, 1818, in an attempt to make a policy more satisfactory to 
those who were advocates of South American independence. The 
supplement of 1818 removed the provision of the act passed the pre-
vious year which permitted a foreign state to increase the strength 
of her armed ships in United States ports in order to commit hos-
tilities against any colony, district or people. The supplement also 
provided for the arming of American vessels outside the continental 
limits of the United States. This provision included those that were 
to be used in warlike action against a power at peace with the United 
States. 
While the Amelia Island question was being cleared up, Onis 
continued his protests against privateering out of American ports. 
He had expressed gratitude for the passing of the neutrality law of 
March 3, 1817, 38 but it soon became evident that the law would not 
be enforced in the manner he expected. On April 5, 1817, he offered 
the oath of two Spanish seamen that the privateer Almegda had 
robbed an English vessel on the high seas.39 The Almegda, Onis 
claimed, was fitted out in an American port. On July 9, 1817, he com-
plained quite heatedly regarding the actions of American officials 
in the port of Baltimore. In this instance Onis, at the request of the 
Spanish consul in Baltimore, sent all the necessary orders and war-
rants for the arrest of two privateers, a Captain Taylor and a Captain 
Stafford. Onis alleged that it was "notorious" that these privateers 
were manned and armed in the United States. He informed the 
Secretary of State that the Spanish consul had issued a warrant to 
the marshal of the city of Baltimore and that the collector of cus-
toms had granted a gunboat to aid in the arrest, but that the marshal 
had taken no action. After eight days of waiting, the Spanish consul 
demanded the execution of the orders. The marshal informed the 
consul that he could not make the arrest as they had not entered 
the bay. The consul then applied to the district attorney, who sym-
pathized with him, stated that the marshal's action was indeed 
37. Ibid., 767. 
38. Onfs to Rush, March 15, 1817, ASP., FR., IV, 189. 
39. Onis to Rush, Apr. 5, 1817, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 1929. 
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unusual, but took no steps to remedy it or to enforce the laws of the 
United States.40 The difficulty encountered in enforcing the new 
law is the most convincing evidence of its unpopularity, although 
this varied according to local prejudices and interests. 
By 1817, as we have seen, the privateering problem had taken on 
new importance for the United States, and public opinion began 
to turn against brigandage. Privateers from South America, espe-
cially Buenos Aires, Venezuela, and Mexico, were taking an ever 
increasing number of American ships as prizes. Many of these pri-
vateers were sailing from Buenos Aires in direct violation of her 
privateering regulations and, looked at in even the most favorable 
light, could only be classed as pirates. The laws of Buenos Aires 
required that the captain and one half the crew of all privateers 
be citizens of Buenos Aires. As Buenos Aires required a period of 
five years residence before naturalization, it was quite evident that 
many of the crews and most of the captains could only be classed 
as pirates. 
However, Buenos Aires had drawn up a special code to deal with 
privateering. The government at Washington placed the cause for 
much of the evil of the privateering system upon two articles found 
in this very liberal code, to that which ( 1 ) gave the privileges of a 
Buenos Airean and a right to that country's flag to a foreigner who 
had never been in the country, and to that which ( 2) permitted 
the privateers to send their prizes to any port they pleased.41 
The establishments that had been made at Amelia Island and 
Galveston brought such an increase in privateering that many Amer-
ican merchants petitioned the government for naval protection for 
American commerce. Despatches from J.B. Provost, United States 
agent to Peru, and Caesar Rodney, agent to Buenos Aires, indicated 
that this was the only solution and for proof pointed to England, a 
nation which had maintained a squadron in the South Atlantic for 
some time. 
Protests to the South American governments had little effect, 
so by a law of March 3, 1819, the United States followed Great 
Britain's policy of providing protection to her merchant ships. 
This new legislation was intended to deal partly with privateering 
from American ports, but its more important purpose was to give 
the United States Navy the authority to convoy American mer-
chant men on the high seas and to retake any vessel which be-
longed to the United States, or its citizens, that had been unlawfully 
40. Onis to Adams, July 9, 1817, ASP., FR., IV, 441. 
41. Adams to J. B. Provost, July 10, 1820, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 134-137. 
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captured.42 The act clearly indicated that although American 
neutrality legislation as it stood at the time favored the Spanish-
Americans, the United States intended to enforce it against the 
revolutionists just as strictly as against Spain. 
This new neutrality legislation was followed by the appointment 
of Commodore Oliver H. Perry to go to South America for the 
express purpose of putting an end to the privateering practices 
then disturbing the United States. Perry died before he reached 
Buenos Aires and was replaced by Commodore Charles Morris, 
who arrived in Buenos Aires during the uprising which placed 
Rivadavia in power. John Forbes, in the position as American 
agent, was also sent to Buenos Aires. His instructions charged 
him to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the problem of priva-
teers.43 
Forbes arrived in Buenos Aires on October 24, 1820, a time of 
great political unrest in that city. It was very fortunate that 
Forbes was sent to Buenos Aires at this time as he was the most 
able of all the agents the United States had sent to that city and 
the only one who had had previous diplomatic experience. His 
despatches clearly indicate that the people of La Plata were greatly 
under English influence and quite put out with the temporizing 
policy at Washington. It took all of his very real ability as a 
diplomat, and considerable amount of time, to win the respect 
of the Buenos Aireans. Because of feeling against him, and the 
uncertainty of the government, he, for some months, delayed 
making his demands for changes in the privateering system of 
Buenos Aires. 
On September 1, 1821, Forbes had a brief conversation with 
Rivadavia, at which time he reminded him that he was still awaiting 
an audience, and, though he understood how busy Rivadavia was, 
he would like to remind him of the seriousness of the question 
regarding privateers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that 
the evil would no longer exist, that an order recalling all privateers 
would shortly be published. He explained his government's policy 
by saying that "governments seated in perfect peace and security 
reasoned calmly on these subjects," but his country had experienced 
so many difficulties in its struggle for independence that the Gov-
ernment had been compelled to adopt the strongest measures 
against Spanish commerce; but, said he, "this is now all finished." 44 
42. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., 2523-2524. 
43. Adams to Forbes, July 5, 1820, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 130-131. 
44. Forbes to Adams, Sept. 2, 1821, DS., DUSC., II Pt. II. See also ASP, FR., 
IV, 821. 
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Rivadavia, in conference with Forbes, confirmed the statement and 
informed him a decree would be issued to that effect, a copy of 
which would be sent the American agent.45 Minister Rivadavia's 
word was made good when, on the following October 6, the prom-
ised decree was issued. 46 
By this time, the original purpose of the privateers, that of driv-
ing Spanish ships from the seas, had been accomplished. The cur-
rent opinion regarding the enforcement of strict neutrality laws 
was growing stronger as the depredations of the privateers became 
more wanton. Those who advocated Spanish-American independ-
ence had, by this time, found a new channel through which to 
direct their activities, and they began to bring forward their views 
in a movement for immediate recognition of the insurgent govern-
ments. 
45. Extract of a minute of a conference with Mr. Rivadavia, Minister of State, Sept. 
17, 1821, ibid., 823. 
46. For the text of the d ecree see Manning, Dip. Car., I , 590-591. 
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Chapter VII 
The Recognition Question 
PruoR to 1816 the question of recognition of Buenos 
Aires by the United States was carefully and studiously avoided. 
The desire for recognition, on the part of Buenos Aires, was never 
outspoken but only implied or surreptitiously suggested, a neces-
sary procedure in view of the fact that it hesitated to declare offi-
cially its independence from Spain. · 
Among the B.rst Americans to arouse national interest on the 
subject was Henry Clay, who, on January 20, 1816, brought the 
question to the fore in a debate concerning the reduction of the 
army. Clay was quick to remind Americans of the concepts of 
legitimacy as put forth at the Congress of Vienna and to suggest 
that there might be a need for an army to defend and protect Amer-
ican interests. According to Clay, the independence of South 
America was very definitely an American interest.1 Nine days later 
he pointed out that an army might be needed to aid South Ameri-
cans in their B.ght to rid the Western Hemisphere of Old World 
domination. 2 At the time, Clay was not certain of the plans being 
made by European states, but, in retrospect, we can see that there 
was some reason for fear of European interference in Spanish 
America. 
Clay's suggestion resulted in heated debates and discussion not 
only in Congress but in the press, and the American people received 
a liberal education in the conditions and fortunes of the Spanish-
Americans. The United States was, for that period, flooded with 
pamphlets, books and an ever increasing volume of newsprint deal-
ing with Spanish-American affairs. 
Outstanding among these pamphlets was one addressed to the 
1. Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 1 Sess., 724. 
2. Ibid., 790. 
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President by H. M. Brackenridge,3 an ardent advocate for the recog-
nition of Buenos Aires. Br.ackenridge believed that recognition was 
due because Buenos Aires had maintained a de facto independence 
since 1810. He was somewhat disgusted with an administration 
whose policy he characterized as "overscrupulous." He felt that 
any other nation faced with the identical ill-conduct of Spain would 
have occupied Florida and Texas, and that the now powerful United 
States certainly had nothing to fear from Spain. This appeal to 
nascent nationalism, plus his highly prejudiced disparagement of 
Spanish rule found in the first few pages of the work, made the 
pamphlet highly popular in the United States, where it was widely 
read in spite of its lack of historical truth. 
Pamphleteers were not the only propagandists who took up the 
cry for the recognition of Buenos Aires. William Duane, editor of 
the Philadelphia Aurora, used his paper unstintingly to educate the 
Americans in regard to Spanish America. Hezekiah Niles, the editor 
of Niles Weekly Register, devoted more space to reports from Span-
ish America than most of the other papers, a fact of which he was 
very proud. 4 Among his reprints of rebel proclamations and de-
crees were found articles upbraiding North Americans for their 
indifference toward Spanish America, 5 American reaction to the 
declaration of independence, and soul-stirring accounts of "Female 
patriots" who gladly and heroically gave their lives for the independ-
ence of their country.6 Niles was not as critical of the administra-
tion as most of those favoring the recognition of Buenos Aires, but 
he was insistent in his appeals for that recognition. 7 
The question of recognition was more firmly impressed upon the 
American public by the unauthorized demand by Aguirre. 8 
Both sides of the question were given a good airing before the 
American public. The Philadelphia Aurora was attacked as a dis-
seminator of false information about South America. In the North 
American Review, which opposed recognition, a reviewer of Dean 
Fune's work on the history of Buenos Aires wrote "that few sub-
jects would awaken wider sympathy than the South American 
3. Henry M. Brackenridge, South America; a Letter on the Present State of that 
Country, to James Monroe, President of the United States (Washington, 1817). Here-
inafter cited as Brackenridge, Letter to Monroe. 
4. Niles Weekly Register, Dec. 23, 1815. 
5. Ibid., Nov. 4, 1815. 
6. Ibid., Sept. 14, 1816, Sept. 28, 1816, Oct. 26, 1816, Sept. 11, 1819. 
1. Ibid., Sept. 14, 1811, Dec. 7, 1811, Feb. 1, 1812, Mar. 28, 1812, Sept. 11, 1813, 
July 20, 1816. 
8. Aguirre to Adams, Dec. 16, 1818, Dec. 26, 1817, Jan. 6, 1818, Jan. 16, 1818, DS., 
ARN., I, Pt. I. 
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Revolution, in spite of declamation and poetry, the commercial 
and political relations of the United States with these people are 
insignificant compared to those of Europe." This writer argued 
that any policy of interference on the part of the United States in 
Buenos Aires would be against the traditions of the nation. Fur-
thermore, he asked, "What sympathy or concern can Americans have 
for people of a different stock, law, institution, religion?" He felt 
that "their violence, laziness, are but the natural consequence of 
the degeneracy of a mixed race, ruined by tyranny, and afflicted 
by the evil influence of tropical climatic conditions." 9 
The journalistic tirades only tended to keep the question of recog-
nition before the public without moderating either side. However, 
the attempts of the administration to enforce strict neutrality and 
to abolish privateering were discouraging to those favoring imme-
diate recognition. The most depressing news for those clamoring 
for recognition, and the information with perhaps the greatest influ-
ence in moderating enthusiasm for welcoming Buenos Aires into the 
circle of independent states, probably came from reports of the 
Commission of 1817. 
With the victory at Chacabuco, February 12, 1817, the revolution 
in South America assumed a new aspect. It was at this point in the 
revolution that President Monroe decided to send a commission to 
Buenos Aires and Chile to study conditions there and report to the 
administration. On April 25, 1817, Monroe asked Poinsett to carry 
out this mission,10 but Poinsett declined the appointment. _Later, 
however, he did consent, at the request of the President,11 to make 
a report on South American affairs from the knowledge he possessed. 
With Poinsett declining, the administration decided to increase the 
membership of the commission to three men and one secretary. 
Those chosen were Caesar Augustus Rodney of Delaware, John 
Graham of Virginia, Theodorick Bland of Baltimore, and, as secre-
tary, Henry M. Brackenridge, also of Baltimore.12 The reasons for 
sending such a commission were at least three in number: one, the 
pressure of public opinion, two, the honest desire of the administra-
tion to gather correct information regarding conditions in that re-
gion, and finally, the desire to gain an excuse for delay in changing 
the government's Spanish-American policy. 
The commissioners sailed on the frigate Congress, on December 
9. North American Review, XII, 432 ff. 
10. Monroe to Poinsett, Apr. 25, 1817, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 39-40. 
11. Adams to Poinsett, Oct. 23, 1818, ibid., I, 79. 
12. For the discussion in Congress regarding this commission see Annals of Congress, 
15 Cong., 1 Sess., Il, 1464-1469. 
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3, 1817, and arrived in Buenos Aires February 28, 1818.13 They 
were welcomed with great formality and considerable interest on 
the part of both the government and the people of Buenos Aires. 
Because of the public nature of their mission, and the attention that 
had been attracted to it, they were able to learn little that had not 
already been reported. For the most part, they had to accept the 
information that was presented to them. In this respect, a single 
commissioner, sent without all the fanfare which accompanied this 
commission, would probably have accomplished much more. Their 
return to the United States was announced to the President on July 
30, 1818, by Adams, who informed the President that Rodney and 
Graham had returned, but that Bland had remained to go on to 
Chile before his retum.1• 
The three commissioners were unable to agree in all details 
of their findings and submitted separate statements. Although 
all were partial to the insurgents prior to their departure, their 
reports to the government indicated disillusionment.15 The es-
sence of the reports was that it appeared to be impossible for Spain 
to regain control of South America, but, on the other hand, some 
doubt existed as to the ability of Buenos Aires to maintain a stable 
government. 
While the official reports were merely informative, and made 
no recommendations, Bland, who was apparently fully aware of 
the difficulties face.cl by the governments of Buenos Aires and Chile, 
wrote that recognition of Buenos Aires was inadvisable. Rodney 
and Graham were more optimistic, and Brackenridge, in his ac-
count of the commission, was completely sympathetic to the Buenos 
Aires government, and, apparently, returned with his earlier views 
unchanged. The administration then consulted with Poinsett, who 
supported Bland's point of view. Poinsett, undoubtedly disgruntled 
because his close friends, the Carreras, had lost power in Chile, 
wrote Adams that since the people in those countries had no voice 
in the government, recognition would tend only to strengthen the 
group in power at the moment.16 
These expressions of opinion and the propaganda which was 
circulating in the United States were, in part, responsible for dis-
cussions of the question in Congress. The debates there had an 
13. Brackenridge, Voyage, I, 101. 
14. Adams to Monroe, July 30, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 74. 
15. For the texts of these reports see Rodney to Secretary of State, Nov. 5, 1818, 
ASP., FR., IV, 217-224, 227-270, Graham to . Secretary of State, ibid., 224-227, Bland 
to Secretary of State, Nov. 2, 1818, ibid., 270-323. 
16. Poinsett to Adams, Nov. 4, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 439. 
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importance far beyond the walls of their chamber, for in this 
period Congressional debates made up a large part of the news-
paper copy. In this manner, many Americans first had the question 
of Spanish-American independence and recognition brought to their 
attention. 
The question of recognition of Buenos Aires was first brought 
up in the House of Representatives on March 24, 1818, by Henry 
Clay, who had great sympathy for the struggling Spanish-Ameri-
cans. The House was considering a bill to appropriate money 
for the commissioners who were in Buenos Aires at this time. Clay 
proposed an appropriation of $18,000 for the "outfit,'' and one 
year's salary for a minister from the United States to the independent 
provinces of the Rio de la Plata.17 In defending his proposal, Clay 
called attention to the fact that the United States had been first 
established as a de facto government, and since that time it had 
been the policy to recognize such governments. If it were to con-
tinue this policy, Clay argued, it would have to recognize the 
South American nations at once.18 This motion led to a discussion 
as to whether the power of recognizing foreign governments resided 
in the Executive or in Congress. The majority of the House seemed 
to be in favor of the Executive, and the motion was defeated on 
May 28, 1818, by a vote of 115 to 45. 
The President was quick to reply to Clay's attempt to force his 
hand in foreign policy. In a message to the House the next day, 
Monroe stated that "the present acknowledgment of the Govern-
ment of La Plata, in any mode was deemed by the President inex-
pedient . . . to their interests as to those of the United 
States." 19 
Those who supported the policies of the administration immedi-
ately attacked Clay's proposal. Forsyth, of Georgia, was especially 
critical, and pointed out that England gained more from La Plata 
than the United States and, therefore, England should take the 
risks, as well as the profits, of recognition. He attempted to show 
the damage a war with Spain could bring to American commerce, 
particularly if England remained allied with Spain. Forsyth could 
see no commercial advantage in recognition. He observed that 
United States vessels entered the Plata ports freely, and that the 
ships of Buenos Aires had free access to American ports. Forsyth 
also placed stress upon the fact that no minister had as yet arrived 
17. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1468. 
18. Ibid., 1488. 
19. Monroe to House of Representatives, March 25, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 60. 
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from La Plata demanding acceptance; therefore, he added, it was 
possible they did not desire recognition at this time. He was also 
critical of Clay for attempting· to take from the President his con-
stitutional power of conducting foreign aHairs.20 
Samuel Smith, of Maryland, attacked Clay and those who sup-
ported him from a commercial aspect. Smith argued that the 
United States had nothing to gain from recognition of South Amer-
ica, but, on the contrary, would suffer because of the competition of 
any states created there. Smith pointed out that the United States 
and La Plata produced many identical products; therefore, any 
goods they would need would be purchased from a nation which, 
in turn, would buy from them. 21 
A. Smyth, of Virginia, objected to Clay's proposal from a consti-
tutional point of view, maintaining that the House of Representa-
tives had no part or responsibility in establishing foreign policy, 
and stated that "You [ the House] possess the power of impeach-
ment, and consequently, may discuss, and, by resolution, express, 
an opinion on any past act either of the Executive or of the Judi-
ciary; but you have no right to give a direction to either." 22 
John Quincy Adams maintained that recognition at this time 
was not to the best interests of the United States and staunchly 
held to his views as expressed in a report made to the President 
on August 24, 1816. In this report Adams stated: 
There is a stage in such (revolutionary) contests when the party struggling 
for independence has, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment 
by neutral parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted without 
departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when the inde-
pendence is established as a matter of fact, so as to leave the chance of the 
opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate. The neutral 
nation, must, of course, judge for itself when this period has arrived; and 
as the belligerent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very 
likely to judge differently from the neutral, and to make it a cause or pretext 
for war, as Great Britain did expressly against France in our Revolution, and 
substantially against Holland. 'If war thus results, in point of fact, from the 
measure of recognizing a contested independence, the moral right or wrong 
of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence with which 
the recognizing nation took the step. I am satisfied that the cause of the 
South Americans is just. But the justice of a cause, however it may enlist 
individual feelings in its favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in 
siding with it. The fact and the right combined can alone authorize a neutral 
to acknowledge a new and disputed sovereignty.23 
20. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1502-1518. 
21. Ibid, 1541-1542. 
22. Ibid., 1569-1570. 
23. Adams to Monroe, Aug. 24, 1816, published in Francis Wharton, ed., A Digest of 
International Law of the United States ( 3 vols., 2nd edition, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate 
Ml.wellaneous Document 162, (Washington, 1886), I, 521. Hereinafter cited as Wharton, 
Digest. 
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Clay and his followers• counterattacked vigorously with the re-
minder that Spanish-American independence meant the freedom of 
America.24 The House maintained a greater calm than Clay, and, 
as we have seen, Clay's proposal was defeated when brought to a 
vote. 25 The refusal of most Representatives to accept this resolution 
was probably based on the danger of war with Europe. Spain alone 
was not feared, but the action of the other European powers was 
an important consideration. For most Americans, recognition of 
Buenos Aires was not important enough to risk the destruction of 
American commerce at the hands of Great Britain and the threat 
of privateers that would be released by Spain. 
By the middle of 1818, events were occuring in Europe which 
would once again influence American foreign policy. Secretary 
of State Adams learned in May, 1818, that Great Britain had agreed 
to a general mediation of European powers between Spain and her 
colonies. As, shortly before this, the British minister had promised 
to keep the United States informed regarding the mov.ement for 
mediation, such news was disturbing to Adams. The State Depart-
ment was not particularly worried that Great Britain would take 
part in any mediation involving force,26 but the government was 
interested in the plans of the European allies. On May 19, 1818, 
Adams instructed Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to France, 
to ascertain the intentions of the allies. Adams explained that the 
United States desired to maintain a just policy toward all, and its 
plans must be known in order to do this-. Gallatin was warned that: 
we do not wish to join them in any plan of interference between the parties; 
and above all that we can neither accede to nor approve of any interference 
to restore any part of the Spanish supremacy, in any of the South American 
provinces.27 
Adams sent similar instructions to Richard Rush in England. In 
case of an invitation to the United States to take part in these 
negotiations, Rush was instructed to 
let it be known that we have no desire to participate in it; and above all that 
we will join in no plan of pacification founded on any other basis than that 
of the entire Independence of the South Americans.28 
Adams stated, in this same communication, that the administration 
24. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1605-1643. 
25. Ibid., 1646. President Monroe's message of March 25, 1818, giving the papers 
in the Department of State relative to South American independence down to that date, 
may be found in ASP., FR., IV, 173 ff. His message of January 29, 1818, on the same 
subject, with accompanying papers will be found in ibid., 412. 
26. Rush to Adams, March 21, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 1441. 
27. Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818, ibid., I, 66. 
28. Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818, ibid., I, 69. 
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was convinced the basic British policy was independence for South 
America and that as soon as England had satisfied her sense of 
duty to Spain she would establish a policy favoring independence. 
Thus, by May, 1818, the administration had become convinced 
that independence for South America was assured. The American 
conviction that England would not participate in any action that 
would endanger her trade was partly responsible for the develop-
ment of this belief, but the successes of the South Americans in 
defeating the Spanish forces must also be given its share in bringing 
the administration to such a decision. 
It was during this flurry of activity concerning South American 
affairs that the President's Commission of 1817 returned. While 
their reports were not the encouragement expected by those agitat-
ing for recognition, they did serve to bolster the policy pursued by 
the administration. The commissioners did agree that it would be 
impossible for Spain to retake the colonies by force, but they did 
not agree on the conditions of internal affairs. The conclusion was 
drawn that considerable unrest and instability existed. Bracken-
ridge, the secretary on the mission, developed a twofold thesis 
which he tried, with some success, to sell to the American Congress 
and people. He held that the United States would have to be the 
first nation to acknowledge th~ independence of any part of South 
America, 29 and that there was no danger Spain would consider 
recognition as a cause for war with the United States.80 
By autumn, 1818, plans were being laid by France, Russia and 
England for mediation, but the position of England in such action 
was becoming more and more vague. By October, the chances of 
the allied powers reaching an agreement seemed remote. Rush, 
writing from England, stated that "there seems to be but little pros-
pect of their coming to accord. . ." 81 By November it had 
become apparent that England would take no part in joint media-
tion.82 The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had adjourned when the 
British refused to take part in the intervention as proposed by 
France and Russia. As the plan proposed by these nations involved 
coercive action by use of threats and economic sanctions, England's 
refusal to participate seemed good indication that she opposed the 
use of force of any type to settle the question. 
Great Britain made one more overture to mediate between Spain 
and her colonies, but Spain again flatly refused the British offer. 
29. Brackenridge, Voyage, II, 247. 
30. Ibid., II, 356. 
31. Rush to Adams, Oct. 24, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 1978. 
32. Rush to Adams, Nov. 20, 1818, ibid., III, 1449. 
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By March, 1819, the English dropped their attempts to bring about 
a settlement, an act which almost forced all other powers to follow 
suit.33 
The British position, in regard to mediation, actually assured the 
eventual independence of Spanish America. The British historian, 
C. K. Webster, points out that after the failure of English mediation 
on the principle of free trade the British regarded recognition 
"rather as a matter of time than principle." 34 Castlereagh made 
excellent use of mediation to delay the recognition of Spanish 
America, for he believed, quite correctly, that the United States 
would not take such action as long as the threat of British mediation 
was held before it. While England was actually interested in a 
peaceful settlement, but one which would guarantee England free 
trade, the French and Russian governments, not seriously interested 
in a settlement of the Spanish colonial policy, used mediation as a 
means of causing Spanish distrust of England. 
By August, 1818, Monroe apparently was personally convinced 
that some of the Spanish-American governments should be recog-
nized in the near future. However, there was hesitation on taking 
any action without some prior knowledge of the possible reactions 
of other nations. Therefore, in an effort to discover what these 
reactions might be, instructions were sent to the United States min-
isters in England, France and Russia to determine how each gov-
ernment would view an acknowledgment of the independence of 
the colonies by the United States. 
The replies to this request were most encouraging. Gallatin, 
reporting on the attitude of the Continent, expressed the belief 
that protests could be expected but that no definite action would 
follow. Rush repeated his earlier opinion, "with increasing confi-
dence," that Great Britain would not consider United States recog-
nition of any of the Spanish colonies as in itself a cause for war. 
He also restated his belief that the British government was moving 
in the direction of a policy which favored independence for Span-
ish America. 85 
Toward the end of 1818, Monroe felt that a bolder policy could 
be adopted in regard to Spanish America and favored making a 
definite bid for cooperation with Great Britain. John Quincy 
Adams, his new Secretary of State, did not agree with Monroe in 
33. Rush to Adams, March 22, 1819, ibid. , Ill, 1454. 
34. Charles K. W ebster , ed., Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-
1830 (2 vols., London, 1938) , I, 14. 
35. Rush to Adams, Nov. 20, 1818, Manning, Dip. Cor., Ill, 1449-1450. 
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this regard. Adams had- just returned from his former position 
as United States Minister to the Court of St. James and could see 
no possibility for Anglo-American cooperation. This opinion came . 
from his observations in England that the classes favoring Spanish-
American independence were the classes most hostile to the United 
States, while the government, which was friendly to the United 
States, was definitely opposed to independence for the insurgents. 
In addition, Adams, in spite of his opinion, had earlier suggested 
joint action and cooperation to the British govemment,86 only to 
have his suggestion rejected by Castlereagh. Catlereagh's reply 
was quite blunt, stating simply that he could see no way in which 
the policies of the two countries were identical, or could easily be 
made so.37 
However, in accordance with the President's request, Adams 
drew up new instructions for Rush under the date of January 1, 
1819. Rush was informed to notify Castlereagh: 
. . . that the President has it in contemplation to grant . . . and 
Exequatur, or otherwise to recognize the Government of Buenos Ayers, at no 
remote period, should no event occur which will justify a further postpone-
ment of that intention. If it should suit the views of Great Britain to adopt 
similar measures at the same time and in concert with us, it will be highly 
satisfactory to the President. 38 
On January 2, 1819, the Cabinet was informed of the President's 
intention of recognition of Buenos Aires "at no remote period." 
The result was immediate and somewhat heated discussion as to 
how such a step should be taken. The Cabinet was divided on 
the question, Calhoun being of the opinion that this country should 
act in concurrence with Great Britain, Crawford, that the United 
States should send a minister to Buenos Aires, and Adams, thinking 
·that the minister should come from Buenos Aires seeking recogni-
tion. All favored recognition. 
Rush presented the President's proposal to Castlereagh at a 
conference on February 12, 1819. The reception given the proposal 
by Castlereagh was far from that expected by Monroe. Castle-
·reagh observed that the United States assumed that Great Britain 
favored the independence of Spanish America, which it did not, 
.as the policy of the British government had always been, and con-
tinued to be, the return of the colonies to Spanish control. 39 When 
·the report of this conference reached the United States, it was 
36. Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818, ibid., I, 66-70. 
37. Rush to Adams, Aug. 3, 1818, ibid., III, 1447. 
38. Adams to Rush, Jan. 1, 1819, ibid., I, 87. 
39. Rush to Adams, Feb. 15, 1819, ibid., III, 1451. 
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apparent to all concerned that Adams' appraisal of the policy and 
reactions of the British government was correct. 
It is difficult to determine exactly the effect of this rebuff of 
Monroe's offer. It is probable that it had some influence in delay-
ing American recognition of the insurgents, but other events oc-
curred at the same time which pushed the British problem into 
the background. In Buenos Aires, the stability that existed under 
Pueyrred6n came to an end with his exile and the revival of revolu-
tion and disturbing political conditions. Then, too, on February 
22, 1819, Adams and Onis signed the treaty which was to settle 
the Florida question. 
The negotiations for the Adams-Onis treaty had been long and 
tedious, starting unofficially with the recognition of Onis as Spanish 
Minister to the United States on December 19, 1815. Throughout 
the negotiations the Spanish government suggested over and over 
again that an article should be inserted in the treaty stipulating that 
the United States would not acknowledge the independence of the 
Spanish-Americans. Secretary Adams refused to give such a 
pledge,40 and Forsyth, American Minister to Spain, so informed 
the Spanish Foreign Office, refusing even to discuss the question. 
Onis attempted, also, to tie the question of American neutralicy 
to the treaty by insisting that the ships of the insurgents be kept 
from American ports. In this regard, Onis was informed that it 
was the policy of the United States to "allow any ship to enter 
as long as all duties, etc., are paid, and proper conduct is main-
tained." Monroe further informed him that "A ship is not to be 
judged by the Hag it is Hying," 41 and added that: 
All your Government had a right to claim of the United States was, that 
they should not interfere in the contest or promote, by any active service, 
the success of the revolution, admitting that they continued to overlook the 
injustices received from Spain, and remained at peace.42 
Although the treaty was signed, and received unanimous Senate 
approval within two days, the worries of the Monroe administra-
tion were not ended, for the pact met with apparently deliberate 
delay in Spain. The press in the United States carried stories that 
England was attempting to block ratification. However, the main 
reason for the delay, other than personal intrigue, was Spain's 
fear that when the United States gained Florida, it would imme-
diately recognize the Spanish-American governments. There was 
40. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 115, 116, 199, 200, 209. 
41. Monroe to Onis, Jan. 19, 1816, ASP., FR., IV, 425. 
42. Ibid., 426. 
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some hope in Madrid that Spain might yet, through military force, 
bring the colonies back into the Spanish empire. 
The treaty had scarcely been signed by Adams and Onis when 
Spain decided to hold up ratification. The United States Minister 
to Spain, John Forsyth, reported to Adams in August, 1819, that 
the Spanish desired a guarantee that the United States would not 
recognize any of Spain's colonies until such a step had been taken 
by Spain. Forsyth reported one reason for this renewed demand 
was that Spain had been informed of the conversation between 
Rush and Castlereagh, of February 12, 1819, in which the United 
States announced its intention to recognize Buenos Aires.43 
When the attitude of Spain became known, American temper 
flared and became outright bellicose. Talk and rumor of war with 
Spain became common, and even mercantile New England, which 
had long been opposed to any violent measures, joined the rest of 
the nation in developing a warlike attitude. 
Thus, by December, 1819, Monroe and his cabinet faced a deli-
cate situation. The cabinet was divided on what action to take, 
with Crawford arguing for action and Adams for delay. Finally, 
Adams suggested a compromise, which was accepted by the cabinet 
and placed in Monroe's message to Congress. Monroe then recom-
mended the passage of an act authorizing the President to take 
possession of Florida when, and if, he should find such a course 
necessary or desirable.44 This was a happy thought and astute 
diplomacy, for the act indicated to the world that the United States 
was• serious, and it increased the pressure upon Spain. At the same 
time, it left Monroe free either to use force or not as events might 
dictate. In some respects, this act could be considered an evasion 
of the issue, but there were excellent reasons for such evasion. 
Such a step could be considered an act of war, and while Adams 
did not think that Spain would fight over this issue,45 there was 
uncertainty. Since the ultimate result of the armed occupation of 
Florida could not be determined, Monroe was happy to postpone 
action until he could gather foreign opinion on the subject. 
Spain announced in August, 1819, that a minister would be sent 
to the United States to iron out questions relating to the Adams-
Onis treaty, and the arrival of General Francisco Dionisio Vives in 
April, 1820, renewed hope for ratification. However, the principal 
43. Forsyth to Adams, Oct. 22, 1819, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 1987. 
44. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 446 ff.; Monroe to Congress, Dec, 7, 1819, in Richardson, 
Messages and Papers, II, 54-58. 
45. Adams, Memoirs, V, 60. 
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aim in the negotiation now renewed was to prevent the United 
States from recognizing or giving aid to the rebel governments. 
Vives immediately protested American aid to South America and 
the unfairness of the neutrality laws of the United States. He in-
formed Adams that he was prepared to promise ratification if the 
United States would close her ports to privateers, stop future aid, 
and: 
. . . form no relations with the pretended Governments of the revolted 
provinces of Spain situate beyond the sea, and . . . conform to the course 
of proceeding adopted, in this respect, by the others Powers in amity with 
Spain.-rn 
Vives later wrote Adams that: 
. . . the belief generally prevailed throughout Europe that the ratification 
of the treaty by Spain, and the acknowledgment of the independence of her 
rebellious transatlantic colonies by the United States, would be simultaneous 
acts.47 
Adams refused to see any connection between treaty ratification 
and the recognition of the Spanish-American governments. Typical 
of his- replies is that of May 3, 1820, in which he stated that as a 
necessary consequence "of the neutrality between Spain and the 
South American provinces, the United States can contract no en-
gagement not to form any relations with those provinces." 48 On 
May 6, 1820, Adams notified Vives that further delay in ratification 
could mean more indemnities and a refusal of the boundary line 
agreed to in the treaty.49 In further effort to apply pressure, Adams 
remarked that recognition of the insurgents by the United States 
would probably follow Spain's refusal to ratify the treaty.50 
As Spain continued to delay, Adams suggested the occupation of 
Florida and the recognition of Colombia,51 in spite of Forsyth's 
information that the Spanish Cortes was meeting and, while some 
of the deputies opposed acceptance of the treaty, it would probably 
be accepted. 52 Monroe, however, remained calm, and his message 
to Congress of November, 1820, said little in regard to Spanish 
America, except to note its continued military successes. It was 
hoped that these successes would lead to peace and to a general 
recognition of Spanish America by all the powers. 53 
46. Vives to Adams, April 14, 1820, ASP., FR., IV, 680. 
47. Vives to Adams, April 24, 1820, ibid., IV, 682. 
48. Adams to Vives, May 3, 1820, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 113. 
49. Adams to Vives, May 6, 1820, ibid., I, 115. 
50. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 380. 
51. Ibid, V, 179. 
52. Forsyth to Adams, July 13, 1820, Manning, Dip. Cor., III, 2000. 
53 . Monroe to Congress, Nov. 14, 1820, in Richardson,· Messages and Papers, II, 77. 
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Undoubtedly, behind Monroe's desire not to force the question 
at this time was an unwillingness to stir up Spain while there was 
any prospect of bringing a peaceful settlement to the differences 
between Spain and the United States. Then, too, the pressure of 
public opinion for United States recognition had subsided some-
what, owing to a growing irritation with privateers, to the dis-
couraging reports of the commissioners, and to the rumors of a 
growing desire in Buenos Aires for a monarchial form of govern-
ment.54 At the same time, the very military successes of which 
Monroe spoke tended to weaken the efforts of those who were 
striving for the recognition of Spanish America. To these, it ap-
peared that the insurgents would gain their independence through 
their own efforts, and recognition, as a means of assisting them, 
would not be necessary. 
Time, however, proved Forsyth's prediction to be correct, and 
the Spanish Cortes accepted the treaty, which was signed by Ferdi-
nand VII, on October 24, 1820, and sent to the United States for 
final exchange. As the six-month time limit for ratification had long 
been exhausted, the treaty was once more sent to the Senate, where 
it was again approved on February 19, 1821. Formal ratification 
and exchange took place February 22, 1821. 
While the treaty was received with great acclaim in the United 
States, news of it created only resentment in Spanish America. 
Many Spanish-Americans felt that the United States had deserted 
them. The most generally accepted account among the Spanish-
Americans was that the treaty contained a 8ecret clause, by which 
the United States had traded recognition of their governments for 
Florida. The more conservative view was that the treaty would 
now make it possible for Spain to concentrate all of her power upon 
the problem of regaining her colonies. A small group, for obvious 
reasons, followed the lead of the British business men in Buenos 
Aires, who claimed that the United States had become the ally of 
Spain. 
While Monroe's administration continued its cautious policy and 
the Spanish-Americans were losing hope of American assistance, 
Clay continued to carry on his campaign for recognition. On Feb-
ruary 6, 1821, he introduced a bill to appropriate eighteen thousand 
dollars for: 
54. John Provost to Adams, March 20, 1820, Manning, Dip. Cor., I, 545 ff. Pro-
vost, American agent to Peru, informed Adams that negotiations were supposed to have 
taken place between Pueyrred6n and agents of the French government regarding the estab-
lishment of a monarchy for the Plata under the Prince of Lucca, a Bourbon cousin of 
Ferdinand VII. Adams became quite bitter about these monarchial schemes. 
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. . . an outfit and one years salary to such Minister as the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may send to any Government 
of South America, which has established, and is maintaining its independency 
of Spain.55 
After spirited debate, the vote on this measure was taken on Febru-
ary 9, 1821, and it was defeated 86 to 79. 56 
Clay then gave up the idea of an appropriation and on the follow-
ing day offered a declaration of sympathy with the Spanish-Ameri-
cans and of cooperation with the President by proposing a resolution 
that: 
. . . the House of Representatives participates with the people of the 
United States in the deep interest which they feel for the success of the 
Spanish provinces of South America which are struggling to establish their 
liberty and independence; and that it will give its Constitutional support to the 
President of the United States, whenever he may deem it expedient to recog-
nize the sovereignty and independence of any of the said provinces.57 
This was debated and finally voted upon in two sections, with the 
division being made at the semicolon. The first section carried by 
a vote of 134 to 12, the second by 87 to 68. A committee of two 
members was appointed to lay these resolutions before the Presi-
dent, and Clay, one of these members, in his report of February 19, 
remarked that the President assured the committee that he felt a 
great interest in the success of the provinces of South America and 
that he would take the resolution into deliberate consideration. 58 
Monroe considered this action of the House as an endorsement of 
his policies. 
By the end of 1821, stability was once again returning to South 
America. The Republic of Buenos Aires had been formed under 
the leadership of Rivadavia, and other areas were enjoying similar 
freedom and independence. On January 18, 1822, Adams informed 
Manuel Torres, agent from Colombia, that Monroe was giving 
serious thought to recognition.59 On January 20, 1822, the House 
of Representatives called upon President Monroe to send it the cor-
respondence dealing with the Spanish-American governments. The 
House also requested information on the political conditions of this 
section of the Western Hemisphere and the state of war between 
the colonies and Spain. 60 
Monroe replied to this request with a special message to Con-
55. Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1042. 
56. Ibid., 1055. 
57. Ibid., 1082. 
58. Ibid., 1091-1092. 
59. Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 2099. 
60. Ibid., 825-828. 
121 
gress on March 8, 1822. In reviewing the progress of the colonies 
toward independence, Monroe stated: 
This contest has now reached such a stage, and been attended with such 
decisive success on the part of the provinces, that it merits the most profound 
consideration whether their right to the rank of independent nations, with all 
the advantages incident to it in their intercourse with the United States, is 
not complete. Buenos Ayres assumed that rank by a formal declaration in 
1816, and has enjoyed it since 1810. . . . Thus it is manifest that all 
those provinces are not only in the full enjoyment of their independence, but, 
considering the state of war and other circumstances, that there is not the 
most remote prospect of their being deprived of it. . . . Of the views 
of the Spanish Government on this subject, no particular information has been 
recently received. . . . Nor has any authentic information been recently 
received of the disposition of other powers respecting it. A sincere desire 
has been cherished to act in concert with them in the proposed recognition. 
. In proposing this measure, it is not contemplated to change thereby, 
in the slightest manner, our friendly relations with either of the parties, but 
to observe in all respects, as heretofore, should the war be continued, the most 
perfect neutrality between them. 61 
The President concluded his message by remarking that, if the Con-
gress should concur with the views he presented, he felt certain 
they would see the need of making the necessary appropriation:s 
for carrying recognition into effect. 
Monroe's address and the documents submitted by Secretary of 
State Adams were turned over to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, who reported on March 19, 1822, that recognition of the 
Spanish-American governments would only be recognition of an 
existing fact. Thus, United States recognition would in no way 
furnish them assistance in breaking the bonds between Spain and 
her colonies, for no bonds actually existed. The committee also 
pointed out that Spain had not sent a company of soldiers to South 
America for three years. Upon hearing this report, the· House 
passed on March 28, 1822, the following resolutions: 
That the House of Representatives concur in the opinion expressed by the 
President in his message of the 8th of March, 1822, that the American prov-
inces of Spain which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoy-
ment of it, ought to be recognized by the United States as independent nations. 
That the Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to report a bill 
appropriating a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, to enable 
the President of the United States to give due effect to such recognition.62 
The second resolution was carried out with the enactment on fay 
4, 1822, of the following law: 
Be it enacted, etc., That, for such Missions to the independent nations 
on the American continent as the President of the United States may deem 
61. Monroe to Congress, March 8, 1822, ASP., FR., IV, 818-819. See also Annals 
of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., I, 284-286. For discussion of message, see ibid., 1241-1245. 
62. Ibid., 1403. 
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proper, there be, and hereby is, appropriated a sum not exceeding one hundred 
thousand dollars to be paid out of any money in the Treasury, not otherwise 
appropriated. 63 
When the Spanish minister in the United States, Joaquin de 
Anduaga, heard of Monroe's March 8 message to Congress, he 
wrote a vigorous protest to Adams, stating that the condition of 
the Spanish insurgents did not entitle them to recognition and 
questioning the right of the United States "to sanction and declare 
legitimate a rebellion without a cause, and the event of which is 
not even decided." He declared that recognition of the Spanish-
American provinces: 
. . . can in no way now, or at any time, lessen or invalidate in the least 
the right of Spain to the said provinces, or to employ whatever means may be 
in her power to reunite them to the rest af her dominions. 64 
Secretary of State Adams replied that recognition was not "intended 
to invalidate any right of Spain," but was only an acknowledgment 
of the existing fact of independence. 65 The Spanish continued to 
protest, but the threat of war diminished. Forsyth wrote from 
Spain on June 23, 1822, that Spain would probably "not do more 
than break off their diplomatic intercourse with us." 66 
Anduaga's arguments, future events proved, were without avail. 
Although the die had not yet been cast, the machinery had been 
set up whereby the President, when he "deemed it expedient," 
could recognize the independence of the Spanish-American gov-
ernments. 
63. Ibid., 2603-2604. 
64. Anduaga to Adams, March 9, 1822, ASP., FR., IV, 846. 
65. Adams to Anduaga, Apr. 6, 1822, Manning, D ip. Car., I, 157. 




Achievement of Recognition 
WHILE Aguirre was making his unauthorized demands 
for the recognition of Buenos Aires, and Congress was debating 
the issue, the insurgent government sent its last agent, David Curtis 
DeForest, to the United States. DeForest, a merchant of Hunting-
ton, Connecticut, established himself at Buenos Aires in 1802, and 
except for a short period, 1809-1812, when he was expelled by the 
viceroy, Cisneros, had a prosperous and successful career until 1818. 
In 1817 he decided to return to the United States. Hearing of his 
planned return, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tagle, offered him 
the position of Consul General in the United States, and DeForest 
accepted. 
DeForest's instructions of February 24, 1818, gave him the au-
thority to appoint vice-consuls and to undertake to secure the rec-
ognition of independence. He was also given power to distribute 
privateering commissions, a number of which he carried with him. 
In this regard, a supplementary instruction authorized him to deal 
with any country where privateers could be fitted out.1 · DeForest 
also carried with him a letter from Pueyrred6n to Monroe which 
stated that he had been appointed Consul-General, as agreed in 
Article 18 of the articles drawn up by the American agent, William 
G. D. Worthington. Thus, DeForest's credentials were based upon 
an unauthorized agreement which had already been disavowed by 
the United States. 
In addition to his instructions and the letter to Monroe, DeForest 
carried some despatches for General William H. Winder, of Balti-
more. Pueyrred6n was attempting to enlist the aid of Winder in 
securing the recognition desired by Buenos Aires. Apparently, 
1. lnsbuctions for DeForest as Consul General in the United States, Feb. 24, 1818, 
AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 8. 
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Winder's reputation had suffered in no way as a result of his career 
as a general in the War of 1812, for he was a successful lawyer and 
a prominent politician in Baltimore. More important, perhaps, was 
his close friendship with Monroe. It would seem, however, that 
the political leaders of Buenos Aires knew little of the man or his 
character. 
DeForest's first act in the United States was to deliver the des-
patches to Winder. Winder immediately wrote to Monroe, telling 
him that he had been asked to serve as a deputy or agent for the 
government of Buenos Aires. He informed Monroe that he had 
made no effort to bring about such an appointment and that it wa~ 
quite unexpected. He asked Monroe what he should do. Monroe 
dissuaded Winder from accepting such a position. 2 
Adams received DeForest on May 7, 1818, at which time the 
Secretary of State explained that it was not thought prudent to 
recognize the Government of Buenos Aires. He further explained 
that the Worthington treaty had not been approved by the Presi-
dent. He told DeForest it would, therefore, be impossible to re-
ceive him formally in the character of Consul General, adding that 
the agent was at liberty to act in his official character just as though 
he had been received in due form.3 
DeForest pointed out that Pueyrred6n felt, since a consul had 
been appointed to Buenos Aires, there would be no difficulty in the 
United States accepting a consul from Buenos Aires. While not 
emphasizing the point at this time, DeForest went on to assure 
Adams that Buenos Aires had no part in the Amelia Island affair 
and no desire to embarrass the United States regarding action taken 
there. The latter, no doubt, was an attempt to cover Aguirre's ill-
advised charges.4 
It is clear that DeForest, in his initial interview with Adams, did 
not disclose the objects of his mission. No mention was made of 
his seeking recognition, of his instructions to give out privateering 
commissions or to find a base for privateers. The following day, 
however, he touched upon the latter when he asked Adams if the 
United States would take any action if the Government of Buenos 
Aires should attempt to establish a base in Florida. He explained 
that such a base would be of great value as a means of attacking 
2. General William H. Winder to Monroe, May 3, 1818; Monroe to Winder, May 11, 
1818, "Correspondence between General Winder and President Monroe with reference to 
proposals made by the United Provinces of South America," ~d. by Mary M. Kenway, 
Hispanic American Histo-rical Review, XII ( 1932), 458-460. 
3. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 88-90. 
4. Ibid. 
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Spanish shipping. Adams informed DeForest that there was no 
intention of injuring the interests of Buenos Aires, but the same law 
used in taking possession of Amelia Island applied to Florida. 5 
Following the conversations of May 7 and 8 with Adams, De-
Forest let the matter drop until Congress met in November. At that 
time, DeForest returned to Washington and, influenced by Clay, 
decided to push the Government into formal acknowledgment of 
his diplomatic character. 6 With this in mind, he wrote Adams, in-
forming him of his return to Washington and desire to renew his 
solicitations to be accredited. 7 This solicitation resulted in a long 
conference between the two men on December 14, 1818. Adams 
again informed DeForest that the United States did not consider 
this the time for recognition and, in an effort to prevent DeForest 
from making the same error as Aguirre, cautioned him that recogni-
tion would come at the proper time. Adams also referred to the 
unrest in the Plata region, asserting that any recognition by the 
United States would in no way determine the extent of territory 
claimed by Buenos Aires, particularly such areas as the Banda 
Oriental, Paraguay and Sante Fe. 8 
DeForest greatly displeased Adams by renewing his solicitations 
for acceptance as Consul General from Buenos Aires. Adams 
clearly understood the reason behind DeForest's new insistence, and 
recorded in his Memoirs that in this affair "everything is insidious 
and factious." He noted that the action was taken for the purpose 
of "baiting the Administration," and especially aimed at placing the 
blame for failure to receive South American ministers and consul 
generals upon the Secretary of State. He added that, "DeForest's 
notes are cunning and deceptive." 9 
Adams and the administration had definite reasons for their stand, 
but Adams felt these could not be fully revealed; they would be 
offensive to Pueyrred6n and his government and, perhaps, bring 
failure to part of the administrations plans. Adams felt that, al-
though Rodney's report was a strong argument in favor of recogni-
tion, the facts disclosed in it, as well as in the reports of the other 
commissioners, gave valid reason for postponing acknowledgment 
of the government of Buenos Aires. Also tending to support the 
5. Ibid. 
6. DeForest to Tagle, Dec. 12, 1818, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 8. 
7. DeForest to Adams, Dec. 9, 1818, Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., II, 
1614-1615. 
8. DeForest to Tagle, Dec. 18, 1818, AGN., Sl-A2-A4, No. 8. Adams to DeForest, 
Dec. 31, 1818, Annals of Congress, 15 Cong. , 2 Sess., 1616. 
9. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 223. 
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policy of postponement was the attempt at mediation between 
Spain and South America, which the European powers were carry-
ing out at this time. Adams believed the attempt would fail be-
cause it was based upon the principle of restoring the colonies to 
Spain without any application of force. In Adams' thinking, if 
the United States permitted this effort to run its full course without 
attempting to disturb it, the United States would, on its failure, be 
able to recognize any of the Spanish-American governments with-
out collision with the Allies. Another reason for postponement 
rested in the internal conditions of La Plata. Adams felt that the 
pretense of the government of Buenos Aires to the sovereignty of 
the whole of the old Viceroyalty of La Plata operated against ac-
knowledgment. He pointed out to Congress and to DeForest that 
such could hardly be the case while Portugal was in possession of 
Montevideo and Artigas of the remainder of Banda Oriental, and 
with Paraguay establishing and maintaining its own government.10 
These points were, of course, exclusive of the Worthington em-
broglio. 
These facts, and the knowledge that DeForest was working with 
Clay and the opposition, led Adams to the decision to keep De-
Forest at arm's length. But DeForest was determined to press• his• 
cause and attempted to carry on lengthy correspondence with 
Adams. 
DeForest built his attack around two points. One, that without 
an exequatur, he could do nothing about the claims of the United 
States regarding irregularities and excesses committed by armed 
vessels sailing under the flag of Buenos Aires. Two, that the United 
States was unfair to the Spanish-Americans in that it recognized the 
agents and consuls of Spain in the period 1808 to 1815 but not those 
of Spanish America. Following the end of the European war, the 
United States received Luis de On:is, but continued to refuse to 
accept representatives from Buenos Aires in spite of the fact that 
Halsey, the American agent, was formally received by Buenos 
Aires.11 
Adams, however, refused to be drawn into a lengthy corre-
spondence, and settled the Deforest problem in a letter and a con-
versation. In his letter to Congress, January 28, 1819, Adams 
pointed out that the Consul of the United States at Buenos Aires 
had no other credential than his commission. This commission 
implied no recognition by the United States of any particular gov-
IO. Ibid., 166-167. 
11. DeForest to Adams, Jan. 8, 1819, Annala of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., 1619-1621. 
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ernment. Furthermore, the commission was issued before Buenos 
Aires declared its independence, and at a time when all the acts 
of the authorities at Buenos Aires were in the name of the King of 
Spain. Adams called attention to the fact that during the period 
the United States refused to accept Onfs, no consul from Spain had 
received an exequatur. Those who had been received before the 
struggle for the government of Spain had been permitted to con-
tinue the functions of their office. For this, no new recognition 
was necessary. Adams then stated: 
The equality of rights to which the two parties to a civil war are entitled, 
in their relations with neutral Powers, does not extend to the rights enjoyed 
by one of them, by virtue of treaty stipulations contracted before the war; 
neither can it extend to rights, the enjoyment of which essentially depends 
upon the issue of the war,12 
He pointed out that Spain was a sovereign and independent power, 
a fact not contested by Buenos Aires. Furthermore, Spain was 
recognized by the United States and the United States was bound 
by treaty to receive Spanish consuls. On the other hand, accept-
ance of DeForest would necessarily be based upon the unauthorized 
and disavowed articles of Worthington, and would imply a recog-
nition, not only of the Government of Buenos Aires, but of a com-
pact as binding to the United States, which was a mere nullity.13 
The question of irregularities• and excesses of armed vessels was 
brushed aside quite lightly by Adams with the statement that the 
acceptance of DeForest as Consul General would give him no 
additional means to suppress the evil. The difficulty, Adams stated, 
came from the fact that the cruisers of Buenos Aires were manned 
and officered by foreigners who had no permanent connection with 
that country or real interest in its cause.14 
Shortly before sending his papers to Congress, Adams, in a 
conversation with DeForest, cleverly put an end to his aspersions 
as a diplomat. On January 22, 1819, he reminded DeForest of his 
United States citizenship, implying that he was liable to prosecution 
for violations of the neutrality laws. DeForest then informed Adams 
that he was building a home in New Haven,15 and presumably re-
turned there at once. 
The government at Buenos Aires was informed of the reasons 
for the non-recognition of DeForest, and that government promised 
his commission would be revoked, 16 but it was not until March of 
12. Secretary of State to Congress, Jan. 28, 1819, ibid., 1608. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. , 1611. 
15. Adams, Memoirs, IV, 225-226. 
16. Minutes of a conference of Rivadavia and John M. Forbes, Sept. 17, 1821, DS., 
DUSC., I , Pt. II. 
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1823 that the promise was fulfilled. Thus, from 1818 through the 
actual recognition, Buenos Aires had no agent in the United States. 
Although no agents- from South America were present in the 
United States after 1818, American agents continued their activity 
in that region, with Worthington and Prevost still in charge. When 
Worthington left Buenos Aires, Prevost spent a short time in that 
city, only to become involved in politics. 
There was a growing irritation with the United States, undoubt-
edly due to the supposed sentimental tie between the ·people of 
Buenos Aires and the United States. This led them to expect more 
from the United States than from Europe. When the expected aid 
was not forthcoming, dissatisfaction grew. In addition to this, 
Pueyrred6n, while supporting the movement for independence 
from Spain, was, by 1818, thinking along the line of monarchial 
rather than republican form of government. In 1820 this became 
public knowledge and was partly responsible for the collapse of 
Pueyrred6n' s influence and his government. Prevost made the 
mistake of showing his approval of the overthrow of Pueyrred6n 
and his party.17 About a year later, under Rodriguez as governor, 
and Rivadavia as secretary, the Unitarios were again in power. One 
of their first acts was to expel the American agent, Prevost.18 
Before word of this episode reached the United States, Adams 
sent another agent to South America. With the recall of Worthing-
ton, the American Secretary of State considered it necessary to have 
resident agents both at Buenos Aires and on the west coast. For 
this purpose, John M. Forbes was sent to Buenos Aires, arriving 
October 24, 1820.19 The understanding was that Forbes would take 
whichever of the two areas Prevost did not want. The question of 
station, as we have just seen, was determined by the government 
of Buenos Aires, which had given Prevost but four days to get out 
of the province. He had but one day remaining when Forbes 
arrived.20 
Eventually, Forbes was able to establish normal relations with 
Rivadavia, although, shortly after he arrived, he saw little to be 
optimistic about. He wrote Adams that: 
This Country is lost both Politically and Commercially-there never was any-
thing like education among the Natives of this Country, consequently there 
are no materials for forming a public opinion and without public opinion how 
is it possible to form a Republic? the government will long continue a merely 
17. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, III, 128 ff. 




military despotism which will pass from the chief of one party to that of another, 
the people having no part or voice in it. . . . Commercially viewed, the 
resources of this Country are daily disappearing. . . . Commerce, with 
everything belonging to civilized life, may, and probably will relapse into utter 
barbarism; unless by the special grace and favour of heaven a reform in the 
personal habits and Political tendencies of the people should be effected and 
a total regeneration take place.21 
While, through his great ability, Forbes was able to bring about 
better relations between the United States and Buenos Aires, his 
despatches clearly indicate that he was working under difficult con-
ditions. The United States was not regarded as highly as it had 
been previously, and the Buenos Aires press was very critical of 
the nation. According to Forbes, there were numerous anony-
mous articles which insulted not only the character of his govern-
ment, but questioned the want of religion and honor among its 
peoples. 22 His despatches also indicate that he was constantly 
having to combat the British, whom he found commercially and 
politically well entrenched in Buenos Aires. 
Forbes' early pessimistic view of the Plata region changed with 
time, a fact which Forbes asserted was due to the great improve-
ments brought about by the very able Rivadavia. It is quite pos-
sible that Forbes had some influence on the final decision for recog-
nition, for his despatches describing the great improvements made 
by Rivadavia were submitted to Congress in March, 1822, along 
with President Monroe's special message announcing his intention 
to recognize the new states. 23 
By the end of 1821, it was evident that rapprochement had not 
been achieved between the United States and Buenos Aires. In 
spite of the conciliatory acts of Forbes, the Plata government con-
tinued to move away from the United States and toward Great 
Britain. Agitation for recognition in the United States met strong 
opposition in a Congress which was satisfied with the administra-
tion's Spanish-American policy, and the campaign for recognition 
seemed to have passed its climax. Yet, in a few months, recogni-
tion was granted. Why? 
A number of factors combined to bring about the act so long dis-
cussed and so assiduously avoided by the United States govern-
ment. In the first place, by the end of 1821, there could be no 
doubt of the final result of the wars of independence. This made 
recognition necessary if the United States was to be consistent with 
21. Forbes to Adams, Apr. l, 1821, ibid. 
22. Forbes to Adams, Dec. 4, 1820, ibid. 
23. See Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 2061-2074. 
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Adams' view that recognition was not a matter of right but of fact . 
By 1822 it was also clear that ·mediation by the European powers 
was a failure, and that the Alliance of the European powers did not 
appear as great a threat as it had in the past. English aloofness 
toward the Alliance, as evidenced at Troppau, seemed to Americans 
to indicate that England would resist any overt act on the part of 
the European powers. 
While no evidence exists of any organized effort for recognition 
on the part of the commercial interests, and while we have seen that 
the trade of the United States with the Plata was slight, the potential 
was great. The United States agents repeatedly reported the trade 
possibilities in the Plata and at the same time called attention to 
the growth of British interests. Recognition might counteract this 
trend. 
Finally, recognition could be used as a political tool in the United 
States. Since Clay had attempted to make political capital out of 
the question, others might try. Such a step would bring credit to 
Monroe and his party and block the use of the question by their 
opposition. 
All of these factors were taken into consideration by Monroe, 
Adams and Congress; and when the House of Representatives, on 
the motion of Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, called for information re-
garding South America, 24 opportunity for the first step toward 
recognition was offered. On January 31, 1822, David Trimble, of 
Kentucky, moved that the President be requested to recognize the 
Republic of Colombia and to exchange ministers with it and any 
others that were actually independent. 25 The resolution came be-
fore the committee of the whole, and the author spoke in favor of 
it.26 However, it was carried no further and no vote was taken, 
owing to expectations of administrative action on the question. The 
action expected was Monroe's message of March 8, 1822, which has 
been discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The House, as we have seen, passed the necessary legislation on 
March 28, 1822, but the Senate was more cautious. This body, fear-
ing repercussions from Europe, insisted that no money should be 
drawn until the President was completely satisfied that such a move 
would not interrupt peaceful relations with other powers. 27 The 
resolution was then passed by a vote of 39 to 3. 28 On May 4, 1822, 
24. Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Ses,., 825. 
25. Ibid., 854. 
26. Ibid., 1382 ff. 
27. Ibid., 430. 
28. Ibid., 431. 
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Monroe signed the bill which appropriated $100,000 to defray the 
expenses of missions to the independent nations on the American 
continent. In this manner was announced by the government of 
the United States its intention to acknowledge the independence of 
the Spanish-Americans. 
While Congress was debating the effects of the acknowledgment 
of Spanish-American independence, the cabinet was confronted 
with the steps that should be taken in formal recognition. Adams' 
point of view carried here, and it was decided to immediately re-
ceive the Colombian charge, the only Spanish-American agent in 
the United States at the time, and to reciprocate when the new 
government sent ministers to Washington.29 The illness of Manuel 
Torres, the Colombian charge, held up his official reception until 
June of 1822. 
Recognition of the Government of Buenos Aires came in January 
of 1823. On January 13 Monroe sent to the Senate the nomination 
of Caesar A. Rodney, of Delaware, as Minister Plenipotentiary of 
the United States at Buenos Aires, an appointment confirmed by 
the Senate on January 27. The Minister from Buenos Aires was 
General Carlos de Alvear, who, while appointed in 1823, did not 
arrive in Washington until October 2, 1824.30 
The action taken by the United States was the natural result of 
the policy which had been followed for over a decade, a policy 
expressed by Adams in his assertion that: 
In every question relating to the independence of a nation two principles 
are involved, one of right and the other of fact; the former exclusively de-
pending upon the determination of the nation itself, and the la,tter resulting 
from the successful execution of that determination. This right has been 
recently exercised as well by the Spanish nation in Europe as by several of 
those countries in the American hemisphere which had for two or three 
centuries been connected, as colonies with Spain. In the confiict;S which have 
attended these revolutions the United States have carefully abstained from 
taking any part, respecting the right of the nations concerned in them to 
maintain or reorganize their ovvn political constitutions, and observing, wher-
ever it was a contest by arms, a most impartial neutrality; but the civil war 
in which Spain was for some years involved with the inhabitants of her 
colonies in America has, in substance ceased to exist. . . . 
Under these circumstances, the Government of the United States, far from 
consulting the dictates of a policy questionable in its morality, yielded to 
an obligation of duty of the highest order by recognizing as independent states 
nations which, after deliberately asserting their right to that ch_aracter, have 
maintained and established it against all the resistance which had been or 
could be brought to oppose it. This recognition is neither intended to 
invalidate any right of Spain, nor to affect the employment of any means which 
29. Adams, Memoir,, V, 492. 
30. Carlos de Alvear to Adams, Oct. 4, 1824, DS., ARN., I, Pt. I. 
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she may yet be disposed or enabled to use with the view of reuniting those 
provinces to the rest of her dominions. It is the mere acknowledgment of 
existing facts with the view to the regular establishment with the nations newly 
formed of those relations, political and commercial, which it is the moral 
obligation of civilized and Christian nations to entertain reciprocally with 
one another.31 




I N RETRACING the period of our study one point is outstand-
ing, the United States had little or nothing to do with the inde-
pendence of Buenos Aires. It is true that the United States ex-
pressed its sympathy, gave an example of a working republic and 
recognized the belligerency of Buenos Aires. These points are 
often stressed by those who wish to develop an idealistic view of 
the part played by the early United States in the spreading of 
republicanism and democracy. Sympathy, however, won no bat-
tles; the example of a republican form of government, not yet 
firmly established in the United States, could not be emulated by 
a people whose background would not permit an understanding 
of the basic principles; and while recognition of belligerency 
opened the ports and the markets of the United States, purchases 
could not be made without money, and loans were not permitted. 
The period examined by this study was one of great transition 
for the United States. By 1810 the United States had been in 
fact a united nation for only twenty-one years. There was little 
of the strong nationalistic feeling that was manifest after the War 
of 1812. Two outstanding trends are apparent in the United 
States during the period covered by this study, the emergence from 
its preoccupation with the affairs of Europe and a growing atten-
tion to internal affairs. The central factor was national aggrandize-
ment, expressed by some in dreams of unrestrained manifest 
destiny, with others, in terms of new markets and greatly expanded 
foreign trade. While these two objectives in reality were not in 
conflict, it was some time before this fact was clearly understood. 
During the period of our study, the consequence of this misunder-
standing was the creation of opposing factions. In a nation whose 
industry, navy and merchant marine were only potential, the drive 
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for territory became predominant. Mercantile interest was, there-
fore, subordinated to this dream of a nation of continental pro-
portions which was more appealing to the nineteenth-century 
American. 
In spite of the confusion created by this needless conflict in the 
United States and the chaos created in Buenos Aires by the May 
Revolution, plus its hesitancy to make a definite declaration of 
its stand until 1816, a definite pattern is suggested by the main 
lines of development. 
It is clear that throughout the protracted struggle of the Spanish-
Americans for emancipation from Spanish rule, the policy of the 
United States was to investigate conditions in Buenos Aires and 
to maintain neutrality. This was accomplished by sending agents 
who were authorized by the government of the United States, 
though not accredited to the government of Buenos Aires. Agents 
of the same type from Buenos Aires were permitted entrance to 
the United States. From this arrangement came a series of mis-
adventures, the cause of which lay in the enthusiasm of agents of 
both countries. The Spanish-American agents desired to gain aid 
for their cause and the American agents, all businessmen, saw 
what they considered great trade possibilities. These American 
agents were actively engaged in commercial pursuits and failed 
to realize that Americans at home were little interested in the 
potential trade so discernible to them. 
The boundary controversy with Spain and the War of 1812 com-
pletely overshadowed United States interest in Buenos Aires in 
the period 1810-1815. The Madison administration continued the 
traditional policy of the United States, that of taking advantage 
of Europe's difficulties to promote American national interests. 
This meant land expansion. Land expansion meant either war 
or negotiation with Spain. In this, all interests in the United States 
agreed, for the commercial and financial interests also stood to 
gain from territorial expansion. Negotiation was favored, not only 
because war was not wanted with Europe, but also because those 
who had benefited from the peninsular trade and trade with Cuba 
did not yet see clearly their interest in expansion. In addition, 
those who held claims against Spain favored a policy which would 
bring a peaceful settlement. While certain ports had already 
started a trade with Buenos Aires, this trade was slight when 
compared with Spanish or Cuban trade and, therefore, exercised 
less political pressure. It should also be pointed out that as the 
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United States was a small nation, negotiation and arbitration con-
stituted the only sensible course. 
At the beginning of its struggle the government of Buenos Aires 
turned to the United States for aid, feeling that its cause was the 
same as that of America. Other than its desire to break with mon-
archy, it had nothing to offer which could compete with American 
manifest destiny. When the War of 1812 severed its contact with 
the United States, it turned to England, which nation established 
a dominating influence in the Plata that has not even yet been 
overcome by the United States. 
The changing status of Spanish America was brought forcibly 
before the United States through the declartion of independence 
from Spain by the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata at Tucu-
man on July 9, 1816. By this time, the Spanish policy of delay had 
created an anti-Spanish sentiment in the United States which had 
turned into a movement for the recognition of the Spanish-Ameri-
cans. 
In an effort to avoid an armed clash with Spain and to adhere to 
the American policy of absolute neutrality, the United States passed 
the Neutrality Act of 1817. To satisfy the Spanish-Americans, the 
act was amended in 1818. These neutrality acts did not speed ne-
gotiations with Spain. Spain was hoping to make use of any treaty 
to prevent American recognition of the insurgents. However, the 
period of 1815 to 1819 saw a change in character in both American 
land hunger and commercial interest in relations with Spain. Re-
garding territory, interest in Texas was growing and Florida was 
wanted for military defense and national pride. Commercially, the 
West began to think of Spanish America as a market for the produce 
of the Mississippi Valley. These, plus the effectiveness of priva-
teers, made the treaty of 1819 possible. With the ratification of the 
Adams-Onis treaty in 1821, the boundary dispute and other irri-
tating controversies with Spain were ended. The way now seemed 
clear for recognition of the Spanish-Americans. But recognition did 
not come. Why not? 
It is true, by 1821, there was little popular pressure within the 
United States for recognition. Most people seemed willing to allow 
the administration to handle the situation as it chose. It is also 
true that the influence of the United States in Buenos Aires had 
been on the wane since 1815. Buenos Aires was headed by mili-
tary men who were not greatly impressed by American political 
experience, and who were unhappy over the misadventures of their 
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agents in the United States. These men were convinced American 
neutrality legislation was unfair and believed that the United States 
had traded recognition for the Adams-Onis treaty. The answer to 
our question, however, does not lie in these points. It seems to this 
writer that it rests with John Quincy Adams and his theory of recog-
nition. 
The argument most frequently heard is that the United States 
was following the experiences of its own revolution for inde-
pendence in establishing policies in regard to the United Provinces 
of Buenos Aires. This, however, was Clay's plan. Clay would 
have sent them guns, powder, and ammunition. He would have 
compared the battles of Chacabuco and Maip6 to Saratoga and 
would possibly have advocated unlimited aid for Buenos Aires as 
France did for the United States. At least that was his implication 
and so expressed by his followers. It would be interesting to know 
if he would have carried it out. However, Adams, not Clay, be-
came Secretary of State in 1817, and it was Adams' concept which 
was put in operation. 
The doctrine supported by Adams had been stated by Vattel 
and implied by other writers on international law. Adams insisted 
that recognition of a government depended on its established au-
thority, not right but fact. It is to be remembered that the legiti-
mate state system of Europe, which was reaffirmed at Vienna in 
1815, was basically hostile to this concept. The United States was 
itself a breach, and the only one, in this European system. If the 
United States had followed Clay's plan, it could have been con-
sidered a cause for war. However, by .formulating a policy of 
neutrality, strictly enforcing that policy and refusing to recognize 
any Spanish-American state while doubt of its future still existed, 
Adams paved the way for the acceptance of his doctrine. If his 
doctrine was accepted by other states, then a great crack would 
be made in the principle of legitimacy, and recognition could be 
made without fear of war. 
When recognition came, accusations were thrown at the United 
States by the Spanish-Americans and Spain that only self interest 
motivated such action. The insurgents reminded Americans then 
and later that they alone were responsible for µieir independence. 
Such arguments · only support Adams' stand. His position was 
strictly legalistic with cognizance of international law, a point ig-
nored by Clay. 
Thl,ls, not only by action but by basic policy, th~ United States 
was opposed to contributing to the independence of Buenos Aires. 
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While we see in this period the beginnings of relations between 
the United States and the Plata, it is unfortunate that this new rela-
tionship was established with such little enthusiasm on the part of 
Buenos Aires, and even more unfortunate that to this date such 
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